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iAbstract
Federated single sign-on (FSSO) provides single sign-on across multiple domains. The lit-
erature shows that current FSSO systems do not incorporate the authentication systems of
desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based services/applications.
This is a challenge for the end-users because they need to be authenticated multiple times
(by multiple authentication systems) to access all three services.
The work presented in this MPhil thesis addresses this challenge by developing a
new simplified FSSO system that allows end-users to access desktop systems, web-based
services/applications and non-web based services/applications using one authentication
process. This new system achieves this using two major components: an “Authentication
Infrastructure Integration Program (AIIP)” and an “Integration of Desktop Authentica-
tion and Web-based Authentication (IDAWA).” The AIIP acquires Kerberos tickets (for
end-users who have been authenticated by a Kerberos single sign-on system in one net-
work domain) from Kerberos single sign-on systems in different network domains without
establishing trust between these Kerberos single sign-on systems. The IDAWA is an exten-
sion to the web-based authentication systems (i.e. the web portal), and it authenticates
end-users by verifying the end-users’ Kerberos tickets.
This research also developed new criteria to determine which FSSO system can
deliver true single sign-on to the end-users (i.e. allowing end-users to access desktop
systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based services/applications using
one authentication process). The evaluation shows that the new simplified FSSO system
(i.e. the combination of AIIP and IDAWA) can deliver true single sign-on to the end-
users. In addition, the evaluation shows the new simplified FSSO system has advantages
over existing FSSO systems as it does not require additional modifications to network
domains’ existing non-web based authentication infrastructures (i.e. Kerberos single sign-
on systems) and their firewall rules.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It is currently not possible for end-users to access desktop systems, web-based services/app-
lications and non-web based services/applications in multiple domains using one authenti-
cation session. This means end-users need to go through multiple authentication processes
(i.e. entering their credentials at the authentication prompts), and they need to either
remember an excessive number of passwords or recycle small numbers of passwords. This
may cause end-users to enter their credentials at any authentication requests without
identifying the requesting party, which leaves them vulnerable to phishing attacks.
Federated single sign-on (FSSO) is an authentication model that allows end-users
to access computer services/applications from different network domains but the end-
users are only required to enter their credentials (i.e. to be authenticated) once (Suriadi
et al., 2009). This model requires the establishment of a federation (i.e. a circle of trust)
between network domains (Wason et al., 2003); network domains allow end-users that
have been authenticated by other network domains (in the same federation) to access
their computer resources without requiring re-authentications.
Although FSSO allows the end-users to access computer resources in different
network domains using one authentication session, it does not specify which authen-
tication systems are used in the network domains. Desktop systems, web-based ser-
vices/applications and non-web based services/applications use their own authentication
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systems, and end-users need to be authenticated by these authentication systems before
accessing the computer services/applications. For example, end-users needs to enter their
credentials (e.g. username and password) at the desktop login prompt (i.e. desktop au-
thentication) in order to access the desktop system, then the same end-users need to
enter their credentials again at the web-based login prompt in order to access web-based
services/applications. A FSSO system will not deliver single sign-on unless it incorpo-
rates the authentication systems of desktop systems, web-based services/applications and
non-web based services/applications (Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Desktop, web-based services/applications and non-web based ser-
vices/applications have their own authentication systems
FSSO systems such as Project Moonshot (Howlett, 2011), Kerberos Secure Sharing
(KSS) (Gridwise Tech, 2010), SASL-SAML (Wierenga & Lear, 2012) (i.e. the combina-
tion Simple Authentication and Security Layer with SAML) and SAML-AAI/Kerberos
(Papez, 2009) (i.e. the combination of SAML’s authentication authorisation infrastruc-
ture with Kerberos single sign-on infrastructure) partially incorporate the authentication
systems. Project Moonshot only incorporates the authentication systems of non-web
based services/applications. KSS incorporates the authentication systems of desktop sys-
tems and non-web based services/applications (Figure 1.2). SASL-SAML and SAML-
AAI/Kerberos incorporates the authentication systems of both web-based and non-web
based services/applications (Figure 1.3). These FSSO systems do not incorporate the
authentication systems of desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web
based services; therefore, a single end-user currently needs to go through multiple au-
thentication processes to access desktop systems, web-based services/applications and
non-web based services/applications.
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Figure 1.2: KSS incorporates the authentication systems of desktop systems and non-web
based services/applications
Figure 1.3: SASL-SAML and SAML-AAI/Kerberos incorporates the authentication sys-
tems of both web-based and non-web based services/applications
This research attempts to address this challenge by developing a new simplified
federated single sign-on system that incorporates the authentication systems of desk-
top systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based services/applications
(Figure 1.4). The new system allows end-users to access desktop systems web-based ser-
vices/applications and non-web based services/applications (in different domains) using
one authentication process, and it includes the developments of two major components:
an “Authentication Infrastructure Integration Program (AIIP)” and an “Integration of
Desktop Authentication and Web-based Authentication (IDAWA).”
Authentication Infrastructure Integration Program (AIIP) draws from KSS be-
cause KSS is the only system that incorporates the authentication systems of desktop
systems and non-web based services/applications. Although both KSS and AIIP use Ker-
beros single sign-on systems (i.e. authentication systems) for providing FSSO, AIIP does
not directly connect the Kerberos single sign-on systems in different network domains.
The AIIPs (in different domains) seamlessly bridge the connections between end-users’
desktop systems in one domain and Kerberos single sign-on systems in the other domains.
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Figure 1.4: The new simplified FSSO system incorporates the authentication sys-
tems of desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based ser-
vices/applications
They seamlessly acquire Kerberos tickets in different domains for the end-users that have
gained access to desktop systems, so that end-users can proceed to access non-web based
services/applications (in different domains) using these Kerberos tickets (instead of re-
quiring re-authentication). Unlike KSS, the AIIP does not expose the Kerberos single
sign-on systems to the outside world (i.e. the Internet).
The IDAWA is an extension to the authentication systems of web-based ser-
vices/applications. It allows end-users to use Kerberos tickets (which were acquired during
desktop authentication) as means for web-based authentications; end-users, who gained
access to desktop systems, don’t need to be re-authenticated in order to access web-based
services/applications.
The new simplified FSSO system combines AIIP and IDAWA to provide FSSO.
It allows end-users to access desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-
web based services/applications using one authentication process. End-users who have
gained access to desktop systems can proceed to access both web-based and non-web
based services/applications (in different domains) without requiring re-authentication.
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1.1 Research Background
1.1.1 Authentication Models
An authentication model consists of two elements: an identity provider and a service
provider (Jøsang et al., 2007; Vacca et al., 2010). An identity provider manages end-users’
identities, provides authentication and identity assertions for the authenticated end-users.
A service provider, which relies on the identity providers for providing authentications,
provides computer services to authenticated end-users.
There are three authentication models: the silo model, centralised identity man-
agement (CIM) and federated single sign-on (FSSO) (Wason et al., 2003; Jøsang & Pope,
2005; Jøsang et al., 2007; Mather et al., 2009; Vacca et al., 2010). Each model manages the
identity provider and service provider differently (as described below). The authentication
processes of each model are also different.
Silo Model
The silo model keeps the identity provider and service provider in the same space (Jøsang
& Pope, 2005; Jøsang et al., 2007; Vacca et al., 2010). Each network domain has an
identity provider and a service provider (Figure 1.5). A domain’s identity provider au-
thenticates end-users for that domain’s service provider. A service provider may provide
desktop systems, web-based services/applications or non-web based services/applications.
The silo model does not provide any cross domain authentication. End-users need to be
authenticated multiple times to access computer services/applications in multiple do-
mains, and they need to remember multiple sets of credentials.
Centralised Identity Management Model
Centralised Identity Management (CIM) uses centralised identity provider approach to
address the cross domain authentication challenge. It removes the identity providers in
all of the domains, and instead it uses a single centralised identity provider to manage all
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Figure 1.5: Silo model overview
the identities for every domain (Figure 1.6) (Jøsang et al., 2007). Although this approach
allows end-users to access computer services in multiple domains by authenticating to the
single identity provider using one set of credentials, this model has not been adopted by
network domains due to privacy problems (i.e. network domains do not trust a single
identity provider to manage all the identities in the world) (Chappell, 2006). Network
domains continue to use the silo model for managing authentications, and there is a need
for an authentication model that doesn’t cause privacy issues.
Figure 1.6: Centralised identity management overview
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7
Federated Single Sign-on Model
Federated single sign-on (FSSO) decentralises identity providers into individual network
domains (i.e. each domain manages its own identity provider) similar to the silo model,
and it builds a federation (i.e. a circle of trust) between domains (Figure 1.7). These trust
relationships are created using out-of-band business and legal agreements between the
federation participants (Buecker et al., 2008). These agreements must be in place before
a federation can begin to operate (e.g. a security policy specified that network domains can
provide computer services/applications to end-users without requesting authentication if
the end-users belong to network domains in the same federation). End-users can access
computer services/applications in network domains by claiming they are from one of the
domains within the circle of trust. For example, an identity provider (in one domain within
the federation) vouches for end-users when they require accesses to service providers (in
the other domains), and the service providers will accept the accesses from the end-user
due to the established federation.
Figure 1.7: Federated single sign-on overview
FSSO has the potential to become the predominate authentication model that
is used by network domains for managing cross domain single sign-on. By separating
the identities into individual network domains, network domains adopt FSSO by building
federation on top of their existing authentication models (i.e. the silo model). In addition,
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FSSO is an improvement over CIM since it doesn’t cause privacy issues.
The next section gives a in-depth review of the current FSSO systems: Project
Moonshot (Howlett, 2011), Kerberos Secure Sharing (KSS) (Gridwise Tech, 2010), SASL-
SAML (Wierenga & Lear, 2012) (i.e. the combination Simple Authentication and Secu-
rity Layer with SAML) and SAML-AAI/Kerberos (Papez, 2009) (i.e. the combination of
SAML’s authentication authorisation infrastructure with Kerberos single sign-on infras-
tructure).
1.1.2 Federated Single Sign-on
Federated single sign-on (FSSO) was initially applied in web space. FSSO standards such
as Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) (OASIS, 2010; Madsen et al., 2005),
Liberty Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF) (Wason et al., 2003) and WS-Federated
(Microsoft, 2012b) are supported by web-based services/applications; end-users can ac-
cess web-based computer services/applications (in different domains within a federation)
after web-based authentication. These standards are not supported by non-web based ser-
vices/applications; therefore, end-users need to be authenticated separately (i.e. multiple
times) by different authentication systems when accessing desktop systems and non-web
based services/applications. For example, SAML based FSSO systems have been used by
major academic networks (e.g. HEAnet), universities/institutions (e.g. Dublin Institute
of Technology, Trinity College and University College Dublin) and online libraries (e.g.
IEEE Xplore Digital Library and ACM Digital Library). Students that were authenti-
cated by Dublin Institute of Technology’s web-based authentication system can access
online libraries such as IEEE Xplore Digital Library and ACM Digital Library (using
web browsers) without requiring re-authentication (HEAnet, 2008); however, the same
students need to be authenticated again by remote desktop authentication systems when
requesting access to remote desktop systems in Trinity college.
This research reviewed four projects that attempt to provide FSSO beyond web
space: Project Moonshot, Kerberos Secure Sharing (KSS), SASL-SAML and SAML-
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AAI/Kerberos. Project Moonshot aims to provide FSSO for accessing non-web based
services/applications, KSS aims to provides FSSO that incorporates the authentication
systems of desktop systems and non-web based services/applications, and SASL-SAML
and SAML-AAI/Kerberos aim to provide FSSO that incorporates the authentication sys-
tems of both web-based and non-web based services/applications.
Project Moonshot
Project Moonshot partially addresses the single sign-on challenge by supporting only
non-web based services/applications. Desktop authentication, web-based authentication
and non-web based authentication are separate authentication processes in this system.
End-users need to be authenticated multiple times to access desktop systems, web-based
services/applications and non-web based services/applications. For example, an end-user
needs to be authenticated three times in order to access a local desktop system in DIT,
IEEE Xplore Digital Library and a remote Linux desktop in Trinity college.
Kerberos Secure Sharing
Keberos Secure Sharing (KSS) incorporates the authentication systems of desktop systems
and non-web based services/applications, so that an end-user can access a desktop system
and non-web based services using one authentication process. It directly connects network
domains’ Kerberos single sign-on systems, so that Kerberos single sign-on systems can
support non-web based FSSO in addition to support local network single sign-on. The
end-users, who have gained access to desktop systems (i.e. who have been authenticated
by Kerberos single sign-on systems and acquired Kerberos tickets), can access non-web
based services/applications using Kerberos tickets.
KSS also partially addresses the single sign-on challenge. This system does not
incorporate web-based authentication systems; therefore, the end-users need to be au-
thenticated again (by web-based authentication systems) in order to access web-based
services/applications. For example, KSS allows students (who gained accesses to desktop
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systems in DIT) to remotely access Linux desktops in Trinity college and UCD without
requiring re-authentication. However, the same students need to be authenticated again
(by the web-based FSSO system) when accessing IEEE Xplore Digital Library.
SASL-SAML
SASL-SAML uses SASL to facilitate communications between non-web based services/app-
lications and SAML based FSSO system. This allows SAML based FSSO systems (i.e.
web-based FSSO systems) to manage single sign-on for both web-based and non-web
based services/applications, and end-users can access both web-based and non-web based
services after one authentication process.
SASL-SAML does not consider desktop authentication as part of its single sign-on
process (i.e. it does not incorporate the desktop authentication systems into its FSSO sys-
tem). This results in end-users needing to be authenticated multiple times to access desk-
top systems and (both web-based and non-web based) computer services/applications.
For example, the students need to be authenticated in order to access local desktop sys-
tems in DIT. The same students need to be authenticated again in order to access IEEE
Xplore Digital Library and remote Linux desktops in Trinity college.
SAML-AAI/Kerberos
SAML-AAI/Kerberos also uses SAML based FSSO system for managing single sign-on. It
requires web-based interfaces (accessible by web-browsers) to be implemented for non-web
based services/applications. It develops a web-based software that integrates web-based
FSSO sessions (in one domain) with non-web based single sign-on sessions (in the other
domains). The end-users (who obtained web-based FSSO sessions in one domain) can
access both web-based and non-web based computer services/applications (in the other
domains) without requiring re-authentication.
SAML-AAI/Kerberos also does not consider desktop authentication as part of its
single sign-on process. End-users need to be authenticated once by desktop authentica-
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tions systems to access desktop systems, then they need to be authenticated by web-based
authentication systems to access web-based services/applications. For example, the stu-
dents need to be authenticated in order to access local desktop systems in DIT. The same
students need to be authenticated again in order to access IEEE Xplore Digital Library
and the web-based interfaces of remote Linux desktops in Trinity college.
Research Gap
The reviews of Project Moonshot, Kerberos secure sharing, SASL-SAML and SAML-
AAI/Kerberos showed that each FSSO system partially incorporates the authentication
systems of desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based ser-
vices/applications (Figure 1.8). There is a need for a FSSO system that incorporates
the authentication systems of all three types of services.
Figure 1.8: Existing FSSO systems overview
1.2 Research Aim
This research aims to develop a new simplified FSSO system in order to address the
research gap (i.e. the lacking of a FSSO system that allows end-users to access desktop
systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based services/applications using
one authentication process). The new simplified FSSO system attempts to incorporate
the authentication systems of desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-
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web based services/applications, so that end-users can access the above services using one
authentication process.
Although trust is an important part of the federated single sign-on model, it is not
the focus of this research. The new simplified FSSO system assumes that trust has been
established between network domains. The management of trust (e.g. establishment,
measurement, maintenance and revocation) is out of the scope of this research.
This research draws extensively from the approaches of Kerberos Secure Sharing
(KSS) and SAML-AAI/Kerberos. KSS uses Kerberos to provide single sign-on for end-
users to access desktop systems and non-web based services/applications, and SAML-
AAI/Kerberos can acquire Kerberos tickets (from Kerberos single sign-on systems) on
behalf of the end-users. The simplified FSSO system incorporates these elements into its
design.
The new simplified FSSO system assumes that the network domains employ their
own Kerberos single sign-on systems (i.e. non-web based authentication infrastructures)
similar to KSS and SAML-AAI/Kerberos. It also assumes that a federation (i.e. a circle
of trust) has been established between the network domains, and the network domains
use SAML based FSSO system (i.e. web-based FSSO system).
The proof-of-concept system is evaluated using simulations of real world environ-
ments. The evaluation shows that the proof-of-concept system allows end-users to access
desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based services/applications
using one authentication process. In addition, the proof-of-concept system does not re-
quire modifications to the existing Kerberos single sign-on systems, and it doesn’t require
additional modifications to network domains’ firewall rules.
1.3 Research Methodology
This research found that currently the end-users need to be authentication multiple times
in order to access desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based
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services/applications. For example, an end-users need to be authenticated multiple times
in order to access a desktop systems in DIT, IEEE Xplore Digital Library and remote
Linux desktop system in Trinity college.
In order to address this challenge, this research reviews relevant literature on au-
thentication models (the silo model, centralised identity management and federated single
sign-on), and it found that federated single sign-on (FSSO) has the potential to deliver
single sign-on across multiple network domains.
The review of FSSO systems (e.g. Project Moonshot, Kerberos secure shar-
ing, SASL-SAML and SAML-AAI/Kerberos) shows that the existing FSSO systems do
not support desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based ser-
vices/applications. Although Kerberos secure sharing (KSS) is the only known FSSO sys-
tem that allows end-users to access desktop system and non-web based services/applications
using one authentication session, it does not support web-based services/applications. In
addition, it requires trust to be established between Kerboros single sign-on systems,
which means the Kerberos single sign-on systems (in different network domains) need to
be directly connected (i.e. exposed to the outside world). The review also shows that
although the SAML-AAI/Kerberos doesn’t provide single sign-on for end-users to access
desktop systems and both web-based and non-web based services, it has the components
to acquire Kerberos tickets on behalf of the end-users, and these components can be used
to improve KSS.
The results of the literature review are incorporated into the design of the new sim-
plified FSSO system. The new simplified FSSO system includes the designs of “Authenti-
cation Infrastructure Integration Program (AIIP)” and “Integration of Desktop Authen-
tication and Web-based Authentication (IDAWA).” The design of AIIP draws extensively
from KSS and SAML-AAI/Kerberos, and it acquires Kerberos tickets from Kerberos sin-
gle sign-on systems in different network domains without setting up trust between these
Kerberos single sign-on systems. The IDAWA is deigned to be an extension to web-based
authentication systems, and it uses Kerberos tickets as means for authentication. The
combination of AIIP and IDAWA allows end-users to access desktop systems, web-based
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services/applications and non-web based services/applications using one authentication
process.
This research uses Linux based Operating System (e.g. Ubuntu Server 10.04.4
LTS), Python programming language, eXtensible Markup Language (XML) and PHP
programming language to implement the evaluation environment and the proof-of-concept
system. It also uses virtual machine technology (e.g. Xen server) to divide hardware
machines (e.g. Sun Ultra 40M2 Workstation) into multiple virtual machines in order
to host the evaluation environment and the proof-of-concept system. All of the virtual
machines are on the same local network in order for them to communicate with each
other, and Bind9 is used to divide virtual machines into different domains.
1.4 Contributions
Contribution 1. The development of a new simplified FSSO system represents an im-
portant contribution to the research of federated single sign-on. This work is a novel
attempt to provide single sign-on for end-users to access desktop systems, web-based ser-
vices/applications and non-web based services/applications. The new simplified FSSO
system includes two major components: The Authentication Infrastructure Integration
Program (AIIP) and the Integration of Desktop Authentication and Web-based Authen-
tication (IDAWA).
• The Authentication Infrastructure Integration Program (AIIP) acquires Kerberos
tickets (for end-users who have been authenticated by a Kerberos single sign-on
system in one domain) from Kerberos single sign-on systems in different network
domains without establishing trust between these Kerberos single sign-on systems.
• The Integration of Desktop Authentication and Web-based Authentication (IDAWA)
is an extension to the web-based authentication systems (i.e. the web portal), and
it authenticates end-users by verifying end-users’ Kerberos tickets.
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Contribution 2. The development of three new criteria for evaluating FSSO systems.
They are used to evaluate the system that is presented in this research. The first cri-
terion determines which FSSO system can deliver true single sign-on (i.e. allowing end-
users to access desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based ser-
vices/applications using one authentication process). The second criterion determines
which FSSO system requires the least amount of modification to network domains’ non-
web based authentication infrastructure (i.e. requesting the least active support and
commitment from network domains). The third criterion determines which FSSO system
doesn’t exposes the network domains’ non-web based authentication infrastructures to
the outside world (i.e. lower risk to be compromised by attackers from the Internet).
1.5 Thesis Structure
The remaining sections of this document are organised as follows:
Chapter 2, Basic Concepts, focuses on the authentication functionality of iden-
tity management. The chapter starts from the introduction of identity management and
its core functionalities (e.g. authentication, authorisation and auditing), then it focuses
on reviewing the existing authentication models (e.g. silo, centralised identity manage-
ment and FSSO) and determines that FSSO has the potential to be the predominant
authentication models for cross domains single sign-on.
Chapter 3, Federated Single Sign-on (FSSO) Systems, focuses on reviewing FSSO
systems. This chapter reviews the existing approaches and presents the strengths and
weaknesses of these approaches. The limitations with existing approaches are identified
and the need for a new simplified FSSO system is discussed.
Chapter 4, The Design of a New Simplified FSSO System, describes the design of
the new simplified FSSO system. This chapter presents the technical specifications of the
simulations of Kerberos single sign-on, SAML based single sign-on, Secure shell protocol,
Unix/Linux desktop and a web-service. It then presents the design of a new simplified
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FSSO system (including AIIP and IDAWA).
Chapter 5, Proof of Concept Implementation, describes the implementation of the
new simplified FSSO system. This chapter presents the set-ups of hardware and software,
the flowchart of the systems, the lessons learned during the proof of concept development.
Chapter 6, Research Evaluation, presents the evaluation of the new simplified
FSSO system. This chapter presents five evaluation criteria (3 new criteria and 2 existing
criteria). These criteria are used to compare the new simplified FSSO system with Project
Moonshot, Kerberos Secure Sharing, SASL-SAML, SAML-AAI/Kerberos. This chapter
also discusses the results of the evaluations.
Chapter 7, Discussion and Conclusion, concludes the thesis. This chapter sum-
marises the main findings, presents the critical review and suggests further work.
Chapter 2
Authentication Systems
2.1 Introduction
Computer security maintains the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of com-
puter systems (Bishop, 2003). It prevents potential security violations such as unautho-
rised information access (i.e. an unauthorised end-user is able to read and take advantage
of information stored in the computer), unauthorised information modification (i.e. an
unauthorised end-user is able to make changes in stored information) and unauthorised
denial of use (i.e. an unauthorised end-user is able to prevent an authorised end-user from
referring to or modifying information even though the intruder may not be able to refer
to or modify the information) (Anderson, 1973; Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975).
Identity management has an important role in maintaining computer security. It
provides the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer systems via manag-
ing the end-users’ identity information (e.g. personally identifiable information and per-
mission). It has three core functionalities: Authentication, Authorisation and Auditing
(AAA). Authentication is the process of verifying claims about holding specific identi-
ties (Benantar, 2005; Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2006; Vacca et al., 2010). Authorisation is the
process of empowering someone to perform an operation or to have access to restricted
resources (Salomon, 2005). Auditing is the process of collecting and analysing information
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in order to ensure a proper level of security, as well as compliance with the policies of an
organisation (Salomon, 2005).
Figure 2.1: Authentication in Identity Management
This chapter focuses on the authentication aspect of identity management (Figure
2.1). Section 2.2 gives a brief overview of identity management and its core functionalities
(e.g. Authentication, Authorisation and Auditing). Section 2.3 presents the background
information on authentication systems (authentication mechanisms and authentication
models). Section 2.4 summaries this chapter.
2.2 Identity Management
Digital identity represents an entity in a specific context (Miyata et al., 2006; El Maliki
& Seigneur, 2007). It consists of traits, attributes, and preferences upon which one may
receive personalised services (Project, 2003). It does not have to represent an entity’s real
life identity (e.g. name, birthday) (Seigneur, 2005).
Identity management (in computing) can be defined as “the processes of creating,
managing and decommissioning of end-users’ digital identities (Halperin & Backhouse,
2008; Lee et al., 2009; Thomas & Meinel, 2009; Balasubramaniam et al., 2009).” It faces
challenges, for example, how to ensure the privacy of the digital identities (i.e. digital
identity available only to the right individuals or services at the right time and place),
how to avoid the abuse of digital identities, and how to make these provisions possible
in a scalable, usable, and cost effective manner (Glasser & Vajihollahi, 2008; Bertino &
Takahashi, 2010). It has an important role in maintaining computer security. It is a key
research theme for the coming decades (Dunleavy et al., 2006; Halperin & Backhouse,
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2008). It has three core functionalities: Authentication, Authorisation and Auditing
(AAA) (Mont et al., 2003).
Authentication
Benantar (2005); Pfleeger & Pfleeger (2006); Vacca et al. (2010) describe authentication
as the process of verifying claims about holding specific identities. The process consists
of obtaining the authentication information from an entity, analysing the data, and de-
termine if it is associated with that entity (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2006). Failure to identify
a legitimate end-user will deny the end-user’s access to the system. Failure to identify an
illegitimate end-user will threaten the security of the entire system.
Authorisation
Authorisation is the process of empowering someone to perform an operation or to have
access to restricted resources (Salomon, 2005). It manages the level of access of a digital
identity. It’s the next step after authentication in the identity management functionalities.
Authorisation identifies the level of access of an end-user’s digital identity after the end-
user was authenticated.
Auditing
Auditing is the process of collecting and analysing information in order to ensure a proper
level of security, as well as compliance with the policies of an organisation (Salomon,
2005). It manages (create, modify, and delete) the security policies that are followed by
authentication and authorisation. It also manages the provisioning and de-provisioning
of the end-users’ digital identities.
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2.3 Authentication Systems
An authentication system contains five elements: the end-user, the distinguishing charac-
teristic of the end-user, the proprietor who is responsible for the system, the authentication
mechanism and the access control mechanism (Smith, 2001). The distinguishing charac-
teristics were assigned to end-users by the proprietor. The authentication mechanism
authenticates the end-users. The access control mechanism ensures the level of access
that the end-users have.
There are four types of authentication mechanisms: Username and Password,
Challenge and Response, Digital Certificates and Biometrics (Smith, 2001; Bishop, 2005;
Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2006). Section 2.3.1 presents the strengths and weaknesses of these
authentication mechanisms. There are three authentication models: Silo Model, Cen-
tralised Identity Management Model and Federated Single Sign-on Model (Wason et al.,
2003; Jøsang & Pope, 2005; Jøsang et al., 2007; Mather et al., 2009; Vacca et al., 2010).
Section 2.3.2 reviews these authentication models.
2.3.1 Authentication Mechanisms
Authentication mechanisms (e.g. Username and Password, One-time Password, Digital
Certificates and Biometrics) use any of the following qualities to confirm an end-user’s
identity (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2006; Bishop, 2005):
• Something you know: password, PIN.
• Something you have: one-time-password.
• Something you are: voice, face, fingerprint.
• Where you are: “Location” as another important quality.
• Any combination of the four previous qualities.
The following section discusses the qualities that are used by each authentication mecha-
nisms. It also reviews the strengths and weaknesses of these authentication mechanisms.
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Username and Password
The Username and Password uses passwords as the sole authentication mechanism. Pass-
words are code words (Ahituv et al., 1987; Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2006). They are known
only to the end-user and the system. The passwords are either chosen by end-users or
assigned by the system. The length and format of the password vary from one system to
another.
The Username and Password mechanism is widely used; however, it suffers from
password guessing, lost or forgotten password, redundant password, theft of password and
revocation of password (Smith, 2001; Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2006).
Password Guessing. The strength of the password relies on its complexity. A
complex password is difficult to guess, but it’s hard to remember or create. If a password
is too simple, it’s vulnerable to guessing or brute force attack.
Lost or forgotten password. Operators or system administrators often cannot
determine the contents of the passwords. If end-users lose their passwords, new ones must
be assigned.
Redundant passwords. Supplying multiple passwords for different accesses can
be inconvenient and time consuming. It is also difficult for end-users to manage multiple
passwords. It usually results the loss of passwords.
Theft of password. A password is vulnerable to password file theft, keystroke
sniffing and network sniffing attacks.
Revocation of password. If a password was shared between multiple end-users
to access a common file, revocation of one end-user’s password needs notification.
Although Username and Password faces the above problems, it remains a widely
used authentication mechanism. This is due to Username and Password being easy to
manage. End-users or system administrators can easily change or reset the password
when facing the listed problems.
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Challenge and Response
Challenge and Response uses the one-time password scheme to address the password theft
problem. An one-time password is a type of password that changes every time it is used
(Haller & Metz, 1996). The system assigns a static mathematical function to an end-user
(instead of a static password). The system provides an argument to the function, and the
end-user computes and returns the function value. Such systems are also called challenge-
response systems because the system presents a challenge to the end-user and judges the
authenticity of the end-user by the end-user’s response (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2006).
This authentication mechanism requires end-users to carry a (physical or elec-
tronic) token to compute new passwords. This token-based authentication is more secure
than Username and Password. It relies on unique physical objects for authentication.
End-users can tell if their tokens have been stolen. It is also difficult for end-users to
share their tokens with the others and still be able to access the computer system.
Although Challenge and Response is more secure than Username and Password,
it remains less popular than Username and Password. This is because Challenge and
Response is hard to manage than Username and Password. Instead of remembering
passwords, end-users must keep the tokens with them at all time. If a token was lost, the
owner of that token will not be able to access the computer systems. If an unauthorised
end-user uses the token, he/she can attempt to impersonate the owner of that token. In
addition, all of the trouble shooting (e.g. reset password) must be manually done by
system administrators, which increases their work load.
Digital Certificates
A digital certificate (or public key certificate) uses public key infrastructure for authen-
tication. It is frequently quoted as the solution that is critical to authentication of the
network. It binds a public-key value to a set of information that identifies the entity
(such as a person, an organisation, an account, or a site) associated with use of the corre-
sponding private key (this entity is known as the “subject” of the certificate) (Chokhani
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& Ford, 1999). The advantage of a digital certificate is that only the public key is dis-
tributed through the network. We can take the security advantage of digital certificates
as long as the private key of a digital certificate is protected safely (Pfleeger & Pfleeger,
2006).
A digital certificate is harder to create and manage than passwords. They need to
be unique and contain the correct attributes of the end-users. End-users need to fill a list
of questions to generate a single certificate. Digital certificates are stored as a digital file.
End-users are in charge of maintaining them on their computers. End-users’ private keys
are at risk if their computers are not secure (Ellison & Schneier, 2000). End-users also are
too willing to accept invalid certificates, which makes them vulnerable to spoofing (i.e.
End-users assume they are accepting the correct certificates; however, they are accepting
certificates generated by unauthorised parties) (Schneier, 1998).
Biometrics
Biometrics deal with the identification of individuals based on their biological or be-
havioural characteristics (Jain et al., 1999). Biometric authentication devices can recog-
nise the following biometrics: fingerprints, hand geometry (shape and size of fingers),
retina and iris (i.e. parts of the eye), voice, handwriting, blood vessels in the finger, and
face (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2006). Biometrics are less likely to be forged, lost, borrowed or
stolen than passwords. It can not be forgotten and it is always available. It’s considered
as a more secure authentication solution than “Username and Password” authentication
mechanism.
Although biometrics has potential to replace passwords, it also presents new prob-
lems: inaccurate reading, single point of failure and forgeries. In addition, a compromised
biometric is a huge problem for end-users and system administrators since end-users can
not replace their biometric data (e.g. eye ball, fingers) (Jain et al., 1999; Smith, 2001;
Schuman, 2006; Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2006). Biometrics will not completely replace pass-
word unless these problems are addressed.
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2.3.2 Authentication Models
An authentication model consists of two parties, an identity provider (IdP) and a service
provider (SP). The identity provider manages end-users’ identities; it authenticates end-
users and provides identity assertions for authenticated end-users. The service provider
only provides computer services; it relies on the identity provider to provide authentica-
tion. There are three authentication models available: the silo model, centralised identity
management model (CIM) and federated single sign-on model (FSSO).
The Silo Model
The silo model (or Isolated User Identity Model) is the most common authentication
model currently deployed on the Internet (Jøsang & Pope, 2005; Jøsang et al., 2007;
Vacca et al., 2010). It combines the identity provider (IdP) and service provider (SP)
together in one network domain; however, it is not mandatory for them to reside in a
single computer system (Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2: The silo model
The silo model is the easiest authentication model to implement and manage. The
credentials of end-users are stored and managed in a single space. End-users can access
computer services in a network domain with one set of credentials. For example, Microsoft
Active Directory Domain Services (i.e. identity provider) manages end-users’ credentials
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for a network domain. It provides authentication for Microsoft services (e.g. Microsoft
Windows XP Desktop Operating System). End-users need to be authenticated by Active
Directory Domain Service before accessing Microsoft Windows XP Desktop Operating
Systems (Figure 2.3). The process includes: (1) An end-user requests access to a Window
desktop, (2) Windows desktop requests the end-user to be authenticated, (3) the end-user
sends its credential to the Windows desktop, (4) Windows desktop sends the credential
to the Active Directory for verification, (5) Active Directory verifies the credential and
replies the result back to the Windows desktop, and (6) Windows desktop accepts or
rejects end-user’s request based on the authentication result.
Figure 2.3: Silo Model Authentication Process
The silo model faces challenges when applying to a multi-domain environment (e.g.
Internet). End-users need to create and remember a set of credentials for each network
domain, which results in end-users are overloaded with identifiers and credentials (Figure
2.4). End-users are often required to memorise passwords, which unavoidably leads to
users forgetting passwords. End-users usually use the same password combinations for
every computer service, which means a compromised password effects every computer
service. For example, end-users of Zappos.com use the same password for Zappos.com
and other services (e.g. email service, computer desktop). The latest security breach of
Zappos.com resulted in 24 million customer accounts being compromised (Rashid, 2012).
Zappos.com reset these customers’ passwords; however, customers’ other services were still
at risk. Customers needed to reset their password for all computer services to prevent
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further security compromises.
Figure 2.4: An end-user must store credential in every domain
Centralised Identity Management (CIM)
Centralised Identity Management aims to address the problem of redundant credentials
(in the multi-domain environment). It separates the identity providers from the service
providers and merges them into a single central identity provider. The singular identity
provider provides identity and authentication for every end-user in the world (Figure 2.5).
The primary example of CIM is Microsoft’s Passport. It aims to provide a single
and convenient method for identifying end-users across different websites (Jøsang et al.,
2007). Microsoft will act as the central identity provider and hold end-users’ personal
information (e.g. credit card numbers) and make it available to all service providers (e.g.
Google email, Amazon web store, Apple web store) whenever needed. The processes
are: (1) an end-user requests email service from Google.com, (2) Google.com requests
the end-user to be authenticated, (3) the end-user sends its credential to Google.com, (4)
Google.com sends the end-user’s credential to the identity provider (i.e. Microsoft.com),
(5) Microsoft.com verifies the credential and replies the result back to Google.com, (6)
Google.com accepts or rejects the end-user’s request based on the authentication result.
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End-users can have access to all service providers using the same set of identifiers and
credentials (Bhargav-Spantzel et al., 2007).
Figure 2.5: Centralised Identity Management
The main weakness of centralised identity management is privacy. A singular
identity provider means all the credentials in the world are stored in a single space. It
is not ideal for enterprises to store all of their credentials in one place. For example,
Microsoft will be in charge of all the end-users’ personal information in the world. It
will have significant power to abuse these information, which is a violation of end-users’
privacy. In the end, Microsoft acknowledged that “... no single organisation, not even one
as big as Microsoft, could act as the sole identity provider for everything on the Internet
(Chappell, 2006).”
Another weakness of CIM is single point of failure. The centralised identity man-
agement system contains credentials of every end-user in the world. It is a huge target for
malicious attacks. Every service provider in the world will be affected when the identity
provider experienced technical failures or been compromised.
Centralised Single Sign-on
There may be many computer service providers in a single network domain; each service
provider supports a unique computing task. The identity provider must identify legitimate
end-users from all the service requests. End-users need to be authenticated for each
computer service, which increases the number of authentication processes for a single
end-user.
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Centralised Identity Management (CIM) also proposed a centralised single sign-
on model (i.e. one identity provider manages single sign-on sessions for multiple service
provider). It addresses the redundant authentication processes by building a mutual
trust between computer services providers and the central identity provider. It allows
computer service providers to trust the authentication processes of the other computer
service providers, and these computer service providers can grant accesses to the end-users
without re-promoting the authentication challenge. It allows an end-user to access com-
puter services using one authentication session. For example, an authentication session
was created when an end-user was authenticated and gained access to an electronic mail
service. The end-user can (continue to) access other computer services such as a printer
service without requiring re-authentication.
Centralised single sign-on (or single sign-on) model has the same privacy problem
in multi-domain environments as centralised identity management. For example, com-
puter services provider (e.g. Google.com, Amazon.com and Apple.com) can not trust a
single identity provider (e.g. Microsoft) to manage all of the authentication processes.
This model can only be used in a single domain environment. For example, Google.com
manages its end-users’ credentials. It allows its end-users to access Google email services
(i.e. mail.google.com), Google web calendar service (i.e. calendar.google.com) and Google
document services (i.e. docs.google.com) using one authentication session.
Federated Single Sign-on
Federated Single Sign-on model (FSSO) aims to deliver single sign-on across multiple
domains without compromising the privacy of the identities (Patterson et al., 2004). It
achieved it by de-centralising the identity providers to individual network domains (Table
2.1). It allows network domains to implement and manage their own identity providers
(and credentials) unlike centralised identity management model.
Federated single sign-on model (Figure 2.6) relies on the establishment of a feder-
ation (i.e. a circle of trust) between network domains (Wason et al., 2003; Sullivan, 2005;
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Management
Types
Silo Model/Isolated
User Identity Model
Centralised Identity
Management Model
Federated Single Sign-
on Model
Ownership
of identity
provider
Every domain manages its
own identity providers.
An single identity
provider is shared be-
tween domains.
Every domain manages its
own identity providers.
Ownership
and man-
agement of
identities
Identities are owned and
managed by their asso-
ciate domains’ identity
providers.
Identities are owned by
their associate domains
but managed by a single
identity provider.
Identities are owned and
managed by their asso-
ciate domains’ identity
providers.
Location of
identities
One domain’s identities
are isolated from the other
domains’ identities.
Identities reside in a single
space.
One domain’s identities
are isolated from the other
domains’ identities; how-
ever, identities’ attributes
can be shared between do-
mains.
Table 2.1: Differences Between Silo Model, Centralised Identity Management Model and
Federated Single Sign-on Model
Mather et al., 2009). These trust relationships are created using out-of-band business and
legal agreements between the federation participants (Buecker et al., 2008). The federa-
tion manages the trust relationships established beyond the internal network boundaries
or administrative domain boundaries among network domains (Mather et al., 2009; Ahn
& Ko, 2007). It is expressed in the form of security policies. The policies indicates the
level of access of end-users (from different domains) to the computer resources. Although
trust is an important part of federated single sign-on model, the management of trust is
out of the scope of this research.
Figure 2.6: Federated single sign-on overview
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The identity providers (in the FSSO) provide identity assertions for authenticated
end-users. The identity assertions claim that the end-user belongs to network domains
within the federation. The service providers allow end-users (who acquired identity as-
sertions in one domain) to access computer services in the other domains (within the fed-
eration) through trust (without requiring re-authentication) (Ying, 2010; Takaaki et al.,
2011; Sato & Nishimura, 2011; SWITCHaai, 2012; Google Inc., 2012). For example, a
federation has been established between Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT) and Asso-
ciation for Computing Machinery (acm.org). The federation policies allow students (and
staff) from DIT to access the online library of ACM.org (ACM Digital Library). End-
users who obtained identity assertion (provided by identity provider in DIT) will be able
to access the ACM Digital Library without requiring re-authentication (Figure 2.7). The
federated single sign-on process consists of the following:
1. An end-user requests access to the ACM Digital Library (i.e. service provider).
2. ACM Digital Library asks which domain does the end-user belong to.
3. The end-user selects the domain (i.e. DIT).
4. ACM Digital Library re-directs the end-user to DIT’s web portal (i.e. identity
provider).
5. The end-user authenticates using its credential.
6. DIT will create an identity assertion for the end-user if the authentication was
successful. The assertion is sent to the end-users, and it indicates that the end-user
is a student (or staff) in DIT.
7. The end-user presents the identity assertion to the ACM Digital Library.
8. ACM Digital Library accepts the end-user’s request and direct the end-user to its
online contents.
Federated single sign-on model has advantages over centralised identity manage-
ment (CIM) and the silo model: it does not present the privacy problems since each
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Figure 2.7: Federated Single Sign-on Process
network domain manages their own identity, and it can provide single sign-on across mul-
tiple domains using the federation established between the network domains. FSSO has
the potential to become the predominate authentication model that is used by network
domains to deliver cross domains single sign-on.
2.4 Summary
Authentication is a core functionality of identity management. It is the process of verify-
ing the claims about holding specific identities. This chapter listed authentication mecha-
nisms (e.g.“username and password”, “challenge and responses”, “digital certificates” and
“Biometrics”) that are used by end-users for authentication. Although each authentica-
tion process may involve one or more authentication mechanisms, this research focuses
on accessing computer services/applications using one authentication process. Therefore,
evaluating the authentication mechanisms is out of the scope of this research.
This chapter focuses on reviewing the authentication models: the silo model, cen-
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tralised identity management and federated single sign-on (FSSO). It found that FSSO
model has the potential to deliver single sign-on (in a multi-domain environment) with-
out causing privacy problem; therefore, FSSO has the potential to be the predominate
authentication model (that is used by network domains) to deliver cross domain single
sign-on. Chapter 3 reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the current federated single
sign-on systems.
Chapter 3
Federated Single Sign-on (FSSO)
Systems
3.1 Introduction
Federated single sign-on model (Figure 3.1) uses a claim based authentication model
to address the cross domain single sign-on problems. It allows end-users, who have
been successfully authenticated by domains within a federation, to access computer ser-
vices/applications in different network domains (within the federation) without requiring
re-authentication (Suriadi et al., 2009).
Federated single sign-on (FSSO) model de-centralised end-users’ identities to their
respective domains unlike centralised identity management model (CIM). End-users’ iden-
tities are not stored and managed by a single party in this model; therefore, FSSO are
not affected by single point of failure, and it does not present trust problems.
Figure 3.1: Federated Single Sign-on Model in Authentication Model
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FSSO model requires a federation (i.e. a circle of trust) to be established between
network domains (Wason et al., 2003; Sullivan, 2005; Mather et al., 2009). A federation
(i.e. a circle of trust) allows network domains to exchange information about their end-
users and computer resources, and it enables collaborations and transactions (Sullivan,
2005; Ahn & Ko, 2007). It manages the trust relationship established beyond the internal
network boundaries or administrative domain boundaries among distinct organisations
(Mather et al., 2009).
A federation is expressed in the form of security policies. These policies ensure the
end-users have the correct level of accesses to network domains’ computer resources. For
example, a corporation named Medi Corp (medico.com) has an access control policy that
states, in English: Any end-user with an e-mail name in the “medico.com” namespace is
allowed to perform any action on any resources (Godik & Moses, 2003). The policies may
be changed to machine readable language, so they can be managed by computer systems.
Beside the traditional “authority-centric” federated single sign-on system that was
described, there is a “user-centric” federated single sign-on system(UFed SSO). The UFed
SSO allows end-users to have an effective control over the use and management of their
private identification information (Table 3.1). It adopts the user-centric identity man-
agement (UCIM), and it designs from the end-user’s perspective (Jøsang & Pope, 2005;
Suriadi et al., 2009). End-users manage their own private identification information in
UFed SSO (Suriadi et al., 2009).
Management Type Authority-centric FSSO User-centric FSSO
Identity claim The end-user was verified as
who he/she claim to be (strong
claim).
The end-user has an identity
(weak claim).
Management of identity infor-
mation
Identity information is man-
aged by the identity providers.
Identity information is man-
aged by the end-users.
Ownership of identity informa-
tion
Identity information is owned
by identity providers.
Identity information is owned
by end-users.
Table 3.1: Authority-centric and User-centric Federated Single Sign-on
The UFed SSO does not provide strong identity assertions. Service providers are
not obliged to trust any claims of any end-users without corroboration by a trusted third
CHAPTER 3. FEDERATED SINGLE SIGN-ON (FSSO) SYSTEMS 35
party (Maler & Reed, 2008). The “Authority-centric” federated single sign-on is still
favoured by business enterprises, governments and education faculties such as JANET
(2012) and HEAnet (2012).
The focus of this research is “authority-centric” federated single sign-on. Section
3.2 gives a brief overview on federated single sign-on standards in web space. Section
3.3 identifies the strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches that aim to extend
federated single sign-on beyond web space. Section 3.4 summaries this chapter.
3.2 Federated Single Sign-on Solutions in Web Space
Federation technologies first appeared with the aim of offering web-based single sign-on
across network domains (Paul & Madsen, 2004; Don & Smith, 2008). Federated identity
and web services were both complement and dependent on each other (Paul & Mad-
sen, 2004). Federated identity standards such as Security Assertion Markup Language
(SAML), Liberty Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF) and WS-Federation took ad-
vantages of the web services standards stack. They were seen as built on top of web
services.
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is an XML-based framework for
exchanging security information (e.g. end-user’s authentication, entitlement and attribute
information) (Maler et al., 2003). It was developed by the Security Services Technical
Committee of the Organisation for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
(OASIS). It’s main objective is to deliver a single sign-on experience for end-users to
access web-based services/applications. It allows an end-user that was authenticated in
one domain to use web-based services/applications in the other domains without requiring
re-authenticating. SAML based solution such as Shibboleth R© system provides single sign-
on capabilities and allows sites to make informed authorisation decisions for individual
access of protected online resources in a privacy-preserving manner (Internet2, 2012).
The Liberty Alliance project aimed to develop open standards for federated net-
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work identity management and identity-based services (Sun Microsystems, 2004). It was
formed in September 2001. Its goals were to ensure interoperability, support privacy, and
promote adoption of its specications, guidelines, and best practices.
Liberty Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF) was developed by Liberty Alliance.
It was built on top of existing XML-based standards. ID-FF enables identity federation
and management through single sign-on, end-user account linking, and simple session
management (Shim et al., 2005).
SAML 1.0/1.1, Shibboleth Project and Liberty Alliance combined their work to
create SAML 2.0 (Figure 3.2) (Mather et al., 2009; Jason & Goode, 2012). SAML 2.0
emerged as the de-facto federated single sign-on standard for web-based applications. It
has been broadly implemented by all major web access management vendors (Ragouzis
et al., 2008). It is supported by major application server products (e.g. IEEE Xplore Dig-
ital Library and ACM Digital Library). It can be found among web services management
and security vendors (e.g. Ping Identity, Shibboleth and OpenAthens).
Figure 3.2: SAML 2.0 incorporates three existing federation technologies and standards:
SAML 1.1, ID-FF 1.2 and Shibboleth (Jason & Goode, 2012)
WS-Federation is another federated identity standard. It was developed by Mi-
crosoft, IBM, RSA Security, VeriSign, and BEA. It relies on a security token service
(STS) to broker trust of identities, attributes, and authentication between participating
CHAPTER 3. FEDERATED SINGLE SIGN-ON (FSSO) SYSTEMS 37
web services. WS-Federation v1.2 has been approved by OASIS to become a federated sin-
gle sign-on standard for web-based services/applications McRae (2009). WS-Federation
based products (e.g. WS Federation Authentication Module) have been integrated into
Microsoft’s software. WS Federation Authentication Module can be used by network
domains that use Microsoft products (Microsoft, 2012b).
Federated single sign-on standard such as SAML, ID-FF and WS-Federation par-
tially address the single sign-on problem. They allow end-users to access web-based
services in a single sign-on fashion. They do not allow end-users to access both web-based
and non-web based computer services/applications in a single sign-on fashion.
This research proposes to integrate web-based FSSO standards with FSSO solu-
tions that support non-web based services/applications. Although these standards can
not address the single sign-on problem on their own, they can be used in conjunction
with FSSO solutions that support non-web based services/applications. The integration
can provide an single sign-on session for end-users to access both web-based and non-web
based services.
3.3 Federated Single Sign-on Solutions Beyond Web
Space
The need of federated single sign-on beyond web-based services/applications has been
emphasised by Papez (2009); Wierenga & Lear (2012); Howlett (2011). This research
reviewed four projects that aim to extend federated single sign-on beyond web space:
Project Moonshot, Kerberos Secure Sharing (KSS), SASL-SAML (i.e. the combination
Simple Authentication and Security Layer with Security Assertion Markup Language)
and SAML-AAI/Kerberos (i.e. the combination of Security Assertion Markup Language’s
authentication authorisation infrastructure with Kerberos single sign-on infrastructure).
This section reviews the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches.
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3.3.1 Project Moonshot
Project Moonshot is a federated single sign-on project initiated by JANET(UK) (Howlett,
2011). It attempts to address a number of problems that were not addressed by SAML
based federated single sign-on systems. They include: SAML based federated single sign-
on do not support non-web based applications; it is difficult for end-users (who belong to
multiple domains) to be authenticated by the correct identity provider (and obtain the
correct identity assertion); it is difficult to select a identity provider from a large list (i.e.
a list that contains more than 100 identity providers).
Project moonshot proposes a new federated single sign-on system that supports
non-web based applications. It combines Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) and
Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface (GSS-API) to create a so-
lution for federated authentication (Howlett, 2010). EAP provide federation and authen-
tication mechanisms; it verifies the authentication, authorisation and auditing (AAA)
information. GSS-API integrates non-web based services/applications with the new fed-
erated single sign-on system, so that these services/applications can support EAP. The
authentication process (Figure 3.3) includes: (1) an end-user’s user agent sends the end-
user’s credentials to the service provider via GSS-API; (2) the service provider sends the
credentials to the identity provider via AAA transport protocol; (3) the identity provider
verifies the credentials using EAP, and replies the result via AAA transport protocol; (4)
the service provider accepts or rejects end-user’s requests based on the authentication
result.
Figure 3.3: Project Moonshot Model (Howlett, 2011)
Project Moonshot makes several important assumptions about the environment
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of the end-users (Painless Security, 2010). It assumes end-users have EAP supplicant
software installed and configured. It assumes end-users have configured their supplicant
with some information about the sets of identities they use. It also assumes end-users may
be required to take some steps to enable support for Project Moonshot in their applications
(e.g. replacing existing applications with ones that support project Moonshot).
It is clear that Project Moonshot is suitable for network domains that have the
ability to configure the machines of all their affiliates. It is also suitable for experienced
end-users who are able to follow directions and who see sufficient benefit in federated
single sign-on. It is not suitable for end-users who use machines that they do not control
or that have not been configured to meet the needs of their organisations.
Although Project Moonshot can deliver federated single sign-on for non-web based
services/applications, it does not interoperate with web-based federated single sign-on
technologies. This results in end-users need to be authenticated twice to access both
web-based and non-web based services. In addition, Project Moonshot does not inter-
operate with network domains’ existing non-web based authentication infrastructures,
which means federated authenticated (by Project Moonshot) and desktop authentication
are two separate authentication processes. End-users need to be authenticated at least
three times to access desktop system, web-based services/applications and non-web based
services/applications.
3.3.2 Kerberos Secure Sharing
Kerberos Secure Sharing (Gridwise Tech, 2010) allows end-users to access desktop sys-
tems and non-web based applications using one authentication process (Figure 3.4). It
proposes an architecture that implements federated single sign-on using LDAP, Kerberos
and GridwiseTech’s AdHoc. LDAP manages authorisation (i.e. end-users’ access rights).
Kerberos manages authentication and single sign-on. GridwiseTechs AdHoc is responsible
for managing access policies to resources.
Kerberos enables network applications to securely identify their peers (Miller et al.,
CHAPTER 3. FEDERATED SINGLE SIGN-ON (FSSO) SYSTEMS 40
Figure 3.4: Kerberos Secure Sharing (Gridwise Tech, 2010)
1988). Kerberos has the following major components: Key Distribution Centre (KDC)
and Ticket Granting Service (TGS). KDC is trusted to hold secret keys known by each
client and server on the network (their secret keys are established out-of-band or through
an encrypted channel). It also has access to the database that stores end-users’ credentials
(Needham & Schroeder, 1978). Ticket granting server (TGS) is logically distinct from
KDC which provides the initial ticket granting ticket service. TGS runs on the same host
and has access to the same database of clients and keys used by the KDC (Kohl et al.,
1991; El-Hadidi et al., 1997).
Kerberos Secure Sharing (KSS) established federation by directly connecting net-
work domains’ Kerberos single sign-on systems (e.g. KDCs and TGSs). It requires each
network domain’s KDC to have records of the other KDCs. It does not deploy new
federated single sign-on systems into network domains.
KSS has advantages over Project Moonshot: it allows end-users to log in their
desktop (using Kerberos authentication) and access non-web based services/applications
(which support Kerberos) without requiring re-authentication; it does not require new
federated single sign-on systems to be deployed into network domains. However, KSS
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is only suitable for network domains that trust each other and willing to expose their
Kerberos servers. For example, KSS is suitable for domains such as youtube.com and
google.com since they belong to the same owner (i.e. google.com). It is not suitable
for network domains that are unwilling to expose their Kerberos servers. For example,
google.com and apple.com are competing companies, they will not expose their internal
authentication infrastructures to each other.
KSS also partially addresses the single sign-on problem (similar to Project Moon-
shot). This approach only focus on supporting desktop systems and non-web based ap-
plications. It does not allow end-users to access both web-based and non-web based
services/applications without requiring re-authentication.
3.3.3 SASL-SAML
SASL-SAML attempts to provide federated single sign-on for both web-base and non-web
based services/applications. It uses SAML based federated single sign-on systems to man-
age federated single sign-on for both web-based and non-web based services/applications
(Wierenga & Lear, 2012). It does not use the existing authentication infrastructures (e.g.
Kerberos). It integrates the existing SAML based federated single sign-on system (e.g.
Shibboleth) with non-web based services/applications using Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL).
Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) is a generalised mechanism for
identifying and authenticating an end-user. It is also used for optionally negotiating a
security layer for subsequent protocol interactions (Melnikov & Zeilenga, 2006). The
effect is to make modular authentication, so that newer authentication mechanisms can
be added as needed.
SASL-SAML relies on the exchange of SAML based messages (e.g. identity as-
sertions and credentials) through SASL channels to achieve federated single sign on
for non-web based applications (Figure 3.5). Non-web based services/applications (and
their receptive user agents) are modified to support SASL. The modifications allow them
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to exchange SAML based messages with the SAML based federated single sign-on sys-
tems; therefore, they can use SAML based federated single sign-on systems for federated
single sign-on. This approach allows end-users who were authenticated (using SAML
based federated single sign-on system) to access both web-based and non-web based ser-
vices/applications without requiring re-authentication.
Figure 3.5: SASL-SAML Model (Wierenga & Lear, 2012)
Although SASL-SAML provides federated single sign-on sessions for end-users to
access both web-based and non-web based services, it does not integrate federated single
sign-on sessions with end-users’ desktop authentication sessions. Therefore, the end-users
need to be authenticated (by network domains’ non-web based authentication infrastruc-
tures) to access desktop systems, then they need to be authenticated again (by SASL-
SAML) to access both web-based and non-web based services/applications.
This approach requires active support and commitment from applications providers
and network domains. It requires existing non-web based service/applications to be mod-
ified to support SASL. If applications providers and network domains are unwilling to
modify their existing services/applications, this model will fail.
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3.3.4 SAML-AAI/Kerberos
SAML-AAI/Kerberos (Papez, 2009) allows end-users to access non-web based services as
web-based services, so that SAML based federated single sign-on systems can be used
to manage federated single sign-on for all services/applications. It contains two major
components: web-based software that integrates SAML based federated single sign-on
systems with network domains’ Kerberos single sign-on systems (Figure 3.6) and web-
based interfaces for non-web based services/applications. The combination of the web-
based software and web-based interfaces allow end-users to access both web-based and
non-web based services/applications without requiring re-authentication.
The web-based software integrates end-users’ web-based single sign-on sessions
(created by SAML based federated single sign-on systems) with non-web based single sign-
on sessions (created by Kerberos single sign-on systems). It requires end-users to be au-
thenticated by SAML based federated single sign-on systems. It uses Kerberos extensions
– “Services For User to Self (S4USelf)” and “Services for User to Proxy (S4U2Proxy)” –
to acquire Kerberos tickets (i.e. ticket granting ticket and service ticket) on behalf of the
authenticated end-users (Papez, 2009; Microsoft, 2012a). It seamlessly extends end-users’
federated single sign-on sessions (created by SAML based federated single sign-on) into
the other domains.
SAML-AAI/Kerberos requires application providers and network domains to de-
velop web-based interfaces for non-web based applications. End-users can access non-web
based services/applications via their web-based interfaces; therefore, end-users can access
both web-based and non-web based services/applications using web browsers.
Although SAML-AAI/Kerberos partially leveraged network domains’ authentica-
tion infrastructure, it also does not integrate federated single sign-on sessions with desktop
authentication sessions (similar to SASL-SAML). This approach requires at least two au-
thentication processes for an end-user to access a desktop system and (both web-based
and non-web based) computer services/applications. For example, end-users need to be
authenticated once to access their desktop, then they need to be authenticated again to
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Figure 3.6: Interoperating SAML-AAI and Kerberos (Papez, 2009)
access web-based services/applications.
This approach also requires active support and commitment from applications
providers and network domains similar to SASL-SAML. It requires them to create/deploy
new web-based interfaces for their non-web based applications, so that end-users can
access non-web based services/applications as they are web-based services/applications.
This approach will fail if applications providers and network domains are unwilling to
create new web-based interfaces for their non-web based services/applications.
3.4 Summary
The chapter found that there is a lack of federated single sign-on system that incor-
porates the authentication systems of desktop systems, web-based services/applications
and non-web based services/applications. Project Moonshot supports non-web based
services/applications, Kerberos secure sharing supports desktop systems and non-web
based services/applications, and SASL-SAML and SAML-AAI/Kerberos support both
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web-based and non-web based services/applications. These systems can not allow end-
users to access desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based ser-
vices/applications using one authentication process. Chapter 4 proposes a new simplified
federated single sign-on system that attempts to address this problem.
Chapter 4
The Design of a New Simplified
FSSO System
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the design of the new simplified federated single sign-on (FSSO) sys-
tem. The research found that both Kerberos secure sharing (KSS) and SAML-AAI/Kerberos
leverage network domains’ existing authentication infrastructures. KSS provides federated
single sign-on by directly connecting network domains’ Kerberos servers (i.e. non-web
based authentication infrastructures). SAML-AAI/Kerberos provides federated single
sign-on by connecting SAML-based federated single sign-on systems and service providers’
Kerberos servers.
The proposed system aims to allow end-users to access desktop systems (in the
same domain as the end-users), web-based services/applications and non-web based ser-
vices/applications (in multiple domains) using one authentication process. It’s designed
to incorporate network domains’ existing authentication infrastructures without exposing
them to the outside world.
The design of the new simplified federated single sign-on system includes two main
components: the design of a novel “Authentication Infrastructure Integration Program”
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(AIIP) and the design of the “Integration of Desktop Authentication and Web-based
Authentication” (IDAWA). AIIP is designed to facilitate federated single sign-on for end-
users who have gained access to desktop systems (i.e. who have been authenticated by
network domains’ Kerberos single sign-on systems). IDAWA is designed to integrate end-
users’ desktop authentication sessions with web-based federated single sign-on sessions.
AIIP draws from Kerberos secure sharing and SAML-AAI/Kerberos. It also uses
network domains’ Kerberos single sign-on systems for desktop authentications and local
network single sign-on; however, it does not directly connect Kerberos single sign-on
systems in different domains. AIIPs in different domains facilitate federated single sign-
on by seamlessly bridging connections between end-users’ desktop systems in one domain
and Kerberos single sign-on systems in the other network domains. AIIP in one domain
acquires Kerberos tickets from Kerberos single sign-on (in the same domain) and sends
the tickets to the end-users (in another domain). AIIPs allows end-users to use these
Kerberos tickets to access non-web based services/applications (in different domain) in a
single sign-on fashion.
IDAWA is an extension of SAML based federated single sign-on systems. It modi-
fies web-based authentication systems (i.e. identity provider end of SAML based federated
single sign-on systems) to support Kerberos tickets. It allows end-users who have acquired
Kerberos tickets (i.e. who have been authenticated by Kerberos single sign-on systems)
to access web-based services/applications without requiring re-authentication.
The new simplified federated single sign-on system assumes the following: a feder-
ation has been established between network domains; network domains employ their own
Kerberos single sign-on systems (i.e. authentication infrastructures); they support SAML
based federated single sign-on systems (i.e. web-based federated single sign-on systems);
network messages are encrypted during transfer.
The assumptions are realised in the design environment. The design environment
consists of simulations of the following: Kerberos single sign-on systems, SAML based
federated single sign-on systems, Linux desktop systems and Secure Shell protocol. The
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simulations were implemented with a goal to demonstrate the new simplified federated
single sign-on system. They are the striped down versions of the real world systems.
Section 4.2 presents the design environment. It discusses the use of simulations in
the design environment. Section 4.3 presents the technical details of the the simulations
(including Kerberos servers, SAML based federated single sign-on systems, Linux desktops
and Secure Shell protocol). Section 4.4 presents the design of the new simplified federated
single sign-on system. It includes the design of two major components: “Authentication
Infrastructure Integration Program” (AIIP) in section 4.4.1, and the “Integration of Desk-
top Authentication and Web-based Authentication” (IDAWA) in section 4.4.2. It then
presents the life-cycles of the proposed system in section 4.4.3. Section 4.5 summaries
this chapter.
4.2 Design Environment
4.2.1 Simulation of Real World Applications
Real world systems are production environments. They are managed by software pro-
grammers or system administrators. They can be modified by them. For example, ad-
ministrators can change the IP addresses of servers. If the research uses these servers,
it must change its design variables and re-implement its systems to support the new
changes. New evaluations need to be conducted as well, which results in lost time. It is
not advisable to conduct research in these environments.
This research uses simulations of real world systems: Kerberos single sign-on sys-
tems, SAML based federated single sign-on systems, Linux desktop systems and Secure
Shell protocol. The simulations provide the necessary functionalities for designing the
proposed system. They partially imitates the real world systems. Their goals are to
present the life-cycle of a real world authentication processes in a clean manner.
The benefits of using simulations are the simulations are small in size, they utilise
a small amount of computer resources, all processes (e.g. communication processes and
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authentication processes) can be monitored and all communication messages and stored
files (e.g. Kerberos tickets and databases) are created in human readable language. They
are more manageable than real world systems.
The Simulation of Kerberos Single Sign-on System
The simulation of Kerberos single sign-on system has the following core functionalities:
authenticating end-users, creating/verifying ticket granting ticket, creating service ticket.
These functionalities are implemented based on the real world systems. They are necessary
to provide desktop authentication and local network single sign-on, and they provide the
design environment for designing AIIP.
The simulation does not provide any encryption functionalities; it assumes the tick-
ets are encrypted during transfer and storage. It also does not provide any administration
functionalities. System configurations (e.g. create, modify or remove credentials in the
end-user database) need to be done by directly editing the source code or the text files.
Although these functionalities will be in the production system, they are not necessary
for demonstrating the proof of concept implementation. Therefore, they are not included
in the simulation (figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: High level comparison of Kerberos simulation and real world system
The real world Kerberos system’s communication protocol and Kerberos tickets
can only be used by Kerberos tools. To have better management over the design environ-
ment, the simulation of Kerberos single sign-on system uses its own set of communication
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protocols. In addition, the simulation’s Kerberos tickets can be created, modified and
removed by any text editors.
The Simulation of SAML based Federated Single Sign-on System
The simulation of SAML based federated single sign-on system focuses on providing func-
tionalities that are necessary for designing IDAWA (Figure 4.2). These functionalities
include verifying end-users’ credentials, creating identity assertions, storing identity as-
sertions in web-browsers’ cookies and verifying identity assertions. These functionalities
are implemented based on real world systems.
Figure 4.2: High level comparison of SAML based FSSO system simulation and real world
system
The simulation will present the result of authentication (e.g. successful or unsuc-
cessful). It does not provide any real world web-based services/applications. The identity
message (used by the simulation) is a strip down version of the real world SAML based
assertion message. It focuses on elements that are necessary for federated single sign-
on processes. These elements include username, role, domain name and authentication
result.
The Simulations of Linux Desktop System and Secure Shell Protocol
The simulation of Linux desktop system is based on Ubuntu desktop. Ubuntu desktop is
a free and open source Linux desktop system. It supports Kerberos single sign-on system,
and it can use Kerberos as primary desktop authentication system. The end-user can use
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it with or without a graphical user interface.
In order to demonstrate authentication and single sign-on, it is important to select
functionalities (from real world systems) that relate to authentication and single sign-
on. The simulation of Ubuntu desktop provides functionalities such as verifying end-
users’ credentials, storing the simulations of Kerberos tickets, sending the simulations of
Kerberos ticket, the simulation of secure shell client and the simulations of secure shell
server (Figure 4.3). The simulation of secure shell protocol provides functionalities such
as verifying the simulation of Kerberos tickets and creating a connection between a client
and server (Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.3: High level comparison of Ubuntu desktop simulation and real world system
These simulations uses the simulations of Kerberos single sign-on system for au-
thentication and single sign-on. They support the communication protocols of the sim-
ulation of Kerberos single sign-on systems, and they do not interoperate with the real
world system. The simulation of Ubuntu desktop does not provide any non-web based
services/applications. The simulation of secure shell protocol assumes network communi-
cations are encrypted.
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Figure 4.4: High level comparison of SSH protocol simulation and real world system
4.2.2 Environment Specification
Three Sample Network Domains
The design environment specifies three sample network domains. They are named do-
main Alpha, domain Beta and domain Gamma (Table 4.1). Domain Alpha is assigned
the domain name: “home.virtual.vm”, domain Beta is assigned the domain name: “for-
eign.virtual.vm” and domain Gamma is assigned the domain name: “third.virtual.vm”.
Domain Attributes Domain Alpha Domain Beta Domain Gamma
Domain Name home.virtual.vm foreign.virtual.vm third.virtual.vm
Provide computer Ser-
vices/Applications
Yes Yes Yes
Provide end-users’
identities
Yes Yes Yes
Table 4.1: Network Domain Names
The number of network domains will not effect the out come of the research. Each
federated single sign-on process requires two parties: an identity provider and a service
provider. A network domain can be an identity provider, a service provider or both at
the same time. There can be more than three domains; however, every federated single
sign-on process only involves an identity provider (in one domain) and a service provider
(in another domain).
Although a new federated single sign-on process is created for accessing a new
service/application, end-users only need to be authenticated for the first federated single
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sign-on process. The rest of the federated single sign-on processes are seamless to the
end-users; therefore, end-users view multiple federated single sign-on processes as one
federated single sign-on process.
Domain Setups
All three sample domains have the same setup. They have the simulations of the following
systems: Kerberos single sign-on systems, SAML based federated single sign-on systems,
Ubuntu desktop systems and secure shell protocol (SSH). The simulations of Kerberos
single sign-on systems manage single sign-on inside local network domains, and they
provide authentications for the simulations of both Ubuntu desktops and SSH protocol.
The simulations of SAML based federated single sign-on systems facilitate federated single
sign-on for web-based services/applications.
The goal of “Authentication Infrastructure Integration Program” (AIIP) is fa-
cilitating federated single sign-on by bridging communications between Kerberos single
sign-on systems in different domains. The simulations of Kerberos single sign-on sys-
tems are essential for designing the AIIP. The Kerberos system simulations (in different
domains) do not communicate or have any knowledge of each other.
The simulations of SAML based federated single sign-on system facilitate feder-
ated single sign-on between two ends: simulation of web-based authentication system
(i.e. identity provider) and simulations of web-based services/applications (i.e. service
provider). The simulation of web-based authentication system provides identity assertions
for authenticated end-users. The simulation of web-based service/application displays the
results of successful federated single sign-on.
The “Integration of Desktop Authentication and Web-based Authentication” (IDAWA)
is an extension to the SAML based federated single sign-on sysetm. It aims to allow the
web-based authentication systems to use Kerberos tickets as mean of authentication. The
simulation of SAML based federated single sign-on system is essential for designing the
IDAWA.
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Federated Single Sign-on Policy Specifications
Federated single sign-on requires the establishment of a federation (or a circle of trust)
between network domains. The federation is expressed in the form of security policies.
This design establishes the following sample policies:
1. End-users from any domain can access any services/applications in the other do-
mains.
2. The role “student” in domain Alpha has the role “guest” in domain Beta and domain
Gamma. The role “guest” can use services/applications and save end-user contents
on them. It does not have the permission to administrate the services/applications
(i.e. create, modify and delete services/applications).
3. The role “lecture” in domain Alpha has the role “power” in domain Beta and domain
Gamma. The role “power” can use, create, modify and delete services/applications.
4. The role “guest” in domain Beta and domain Gamma has the role “student” in
domain Alpha. The role “student” can use services/applications and save end-
user contents on them. It does not have the permission to administrate the ser-
vices/applications (i.e. create, modify and delete services/applications).
5. The role “power” in domain Beta and domain Gamma has the role “lecture” in do-
main Alpha. The role “lecture” can use, create, modify and delete services/applications.
The first policy is the basic policy for federated single sign-on. The identity
provider in one domain provides identity assertions for authenticated end-users. The
identity assertions indicate that the end-users have been authenticated by one domain
within the federation. The policy allows the service providers in the other domains to ac-
cept the end-users’ service requests. This policy is applicable to all three sample domains.
Although authorisation is not the focus of this research, the second and third
policies were required to support the authentication systems, and to demonstrate the
changes of identities in different domains. They define the changes of roles from domain
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Alpha to domain Beta/Gamma. They are applicable to domain Beta and domain Gamma.
They are expressed in the form of XML document (Figure 4.5).
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
<policy>
<student>
<role>guest</role>
</student>
<lecture>
<role>power</role>
</lecture>
</policy>
Figure 4.5: Second and Third Federation Policies Written in XML
The fourth and fifth policies define the changes of roles from domain Beta/Gamma
to domain Alpha. They are applicable to domain Alpha. They are expressed in figure
4.6.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
<policy>
<guest>
<role>student</role>
</guest>
<power>
<role>lecture</role>
</power>
</policy>
Figure 4.6: Fourth and Fifth Federation Policies Written in XML
The goals of these policies are to set up trust between network domains. The
first policy is the most important one because it defines the basic trust between network
domains, and it is used by the new simplified federated single sign-on system to facilitate
federated single sign-on. The next four policies are used to demonstrate the changes of
role when end-users access different services/applications in different domains, and they
will not effect the out come of this research.
Application Specification
Simulations of Kerberos single sign-on systems need to be executed on operating systems.
This research requires operating systems (e.g. GNU/Linux) to be installed on three
separate machines. Each machine represents a domain (Alpha, Beta or Gamma). Each
machine hosts a simulation of the Kerberos system.
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The simulation of SAML based federated single sign-on system operates on top of
web server software. It requires web server software (e.g. Apache HTTP server) to be
installed on the operating systems. Each domain (i.e. each machine) needs to install a
copy of the web server software.
4.3 Simulation Details
This section presents the technical specifications of end-user databases, Kerbero single
sign-on simulation, SAML based federated single sign-on simulation, Ubuntu desktop
simulation and secure shell protocol simulation. All three domains have the same setups;
therefore, the technical specifications will use domain Alpha as the sample domain.
4.3.1 End-user Database
The end-user database aims to store information that support the authentication systems.
It is used by the federated single sign-on systems and Kerberos single sign-on systems.
Federated single sign-on systems and Kerberos single sign-on systems require four basic
types of information: username, password, role and domain name.
• Username, it is the unique identifier of the end-user. It represents an individual
end-user. There should not be any repeating usernames in the database.
• Password, it is a combination of characters and numbers. It is the distinguish-
ing characteristic that differentiates that particular end-user or group from others
(Smith, 2001).
• Role, in this research, it represents an end-user’s character, place and status in the
network domain.
• Domain name, it is the name of the domain where the end-users reside in.
Each network domain will have an end-user database. These databases are inde-
pendent from each other. The credentials in a network domain’s end-user database are
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provisioned to the other domains when a federation was established between these do-
mains. For example, credentials in domain Alpha (Dα) are provisioned into domain Beta
(Dβ) and domain Gamma (Dγ). The same applies to domain Beta and domain Gamma.
Subsection 4.3.1 presents the variables in the database, provisioning of credentials, and
the technology used to construct the databases.
Credential Provisioning
SAML-AAI/Kerberos provisions separate end-user databases in different domains. It
proposed an identity mapping model that maps the identities in one domain into identities
in the other domains. End-users seamlessly use different credentials to access computer
services/applications in different domains.
This research manually provisions the credentials. It adopts the approach of
SAML-AAI/Kerberos; end-users have different credentials in domain Alpha, domain Beta
and domain Gamma. The credentials in these domains have the same username; however,
they have different passwords, roles and domain names. The identities were mapped the
identities from one domain into the other domains using SAML-AAI/Kerberos’ mapping
model. This research demonstrates federated single sign-on for three end-users. Their
usernames are “chen”, “fred”, and “paul” (Table 4.2). These three credentials were provi-
sioned from domain Alpha to domain Beta and domain Gamma. The end-users’ passwords
are different in different domains. For example, “chen” has the password “alpha123” in
domain Alpha. The provisioned credentials “chen” has the password “beta123” in domain
Beta .
Role represents an end-user’s character, place and status in the network domain.
For example, “chen” has the role of “student” in domain Alpha, and “chen” has the role
of “guest” in domain Beta and domain Gamma. “chen” can use service applications in
domain Beta/Gamma, but he can not create, modify or delete the service applications.
“fred” and “paul” have the role of “lecture” in domain Alpha; therefore, they have the
role “power” in domain Beta and domain Gamma. They can use, create, modify and
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delete the service applications in domain Beta/Gamma.
The Kerberos single sign-on servers only authenticate end-users in their respec-
tive domains. For example, the Kerberos single sign-on server in domain Beta only
authenticates end-users who belong to domain Beta (i.e. who have the domain name:
“foreign.virtual.vm”). End-users’ credentials in domain Alpha need to be changed from
“home.virtual.vm” to “foreign.virtual.vm” in domain Beta and to “third.virtual.vm” in
domain Gamma.
Attributes Domain Alpha Domain Beta Domain Gamma
Username chen chen chen
Password alpha123 beta123 gamma123
Role Student Guest Guest
Domain Name home.virtual.vm foreign.virtual.vm third.virtual.vm
Username fred fred fred
Password alpha123 beta123 gamma123
Role Lecture Power Power
Domain Name home.virtual.vm foreign.virtual.vm third.virtual.vm
Username paul paul paul
Password alpha123 beta123 gamma123
Role Lecture Power Power
Domain Name home.virtual.vm foreign.virtual.vm third.virtual.vm
Table 4.2: Domain Variables
Database Technology
The Extensible Markup Language (XML) has become the de facto standard for repre-
senting, storing, and exchanging electronic data (Bray et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2011).
It is used to construct the simulation of end-users’ databases.
The end-users’ credentials are stored in the database using XML. The end-user
databases are stored as text files. They can only be read and modified locally (as a
text file). They do not support network connection, and they do not provide database
administration functions.
A database has three entries (i.e. one for each end-user’s credentials). This research
creates a XML tag <user> to mark each credential (Figure 4.7). The credentials contain
four elements: username, password, role and domain name. Four XML tags were created
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<username>, <password>, <role> and <domain> to mark these four elements. The
XML tag <users> is used to mark the name of the database.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
<users>
<user>
<username>chen</username>
<password>alpha123</password>
<role>student</role>
<authenticated>true</authenticated>
<domain>home.virtual.vm</domain>
</user>
<user>
<username>fred</username>
<password>alpha123</password>
<role>lecture</role>
<authenticated>true</authenticated>
<domain>home.virtual.vm</domain>
</user>
<user>
<username>paul</username>
<password>alpha123</password>
<role>lecture</role>
<authenticated>true</authenticated>
<domain>home.virtual.vm</domain>
</user>
</users>
Figure 4.7: Sample End-user Database Written in XML
4.3.2 Kerberos Single Sign-on Simulation
This research assumes each network domain employs their own Kerberos single sign-on
system. The simulation of Kerberos single sign-on system is based on the designs that were
presented in Kohl et al. (1991); Neuman & Ts’o (1994); Walla (2000). They present the
detailed descriptions of Kerberos single sign-on system’s functions (e.g. creating/verifying
tickets) and life-cycles.
A Kerberos system contains a key distribution centre (KDC) and ticket granting
server (TGS). According to Kohl et al. (1991), KDC and TGS reside in the same physical
server. They have access to the same end-user database. The differences between KDC
and TGS are their functions. KDC authenticates the end-users’ credentials and issues
ticket granting tickets (TGT). KGS verifies the TGT and issues service tickets (ST).
The simulation includes the functions of KDC and TGS. Since the differences
between KDC and TGS are logical, they are merged into a single component (in the
simulation). The Kerberos system simulations are implemented based on the real world
CHAPTER 4. THE DESIGN OF A NEW SIMPLIFIED FSSO SYSTEM 60
system. They have the following core functionalities:
• Verifying end-user’s credentials.
• Creating ticket granting ticket.
• Creating shared key between service applications and Kerberos servers.
• Verifying ticket granting ticket.
• Creating service ticket.
• Creating and maintain single sign-on session.
Kerberos Simulation Daemon
Kerberos system simulation authenticates the end-users, and it issues ticket granting
tickets and service tickets. They also issue shared keys to services/applications. They
require static IP addresses and a specific network port for accepting incoming requests.
The real world Kerberos single sign-on systems use port 88 by default; the simulation
uses port 88 as well.
Kerberos system simulations use network sockets for network communication. Net-
work sockets allow applications to communicate using standard mechanisms built into
network hardware and operating systems. They were created using the identified IP ad-
dresses and network ports. This research uses Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) as
the socket protocol similar to real world systems. TCP employees error detection and
provides reliable network communications.
Database Functions
Extracting the credential data from the database is one of the tasks of the Kerberos
system simulations. It allows Kerberos system simulations to authenticate the end-users
by comparing the credential information in the database and the credential information
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of the end-users. The end-user database was constructed with XML language (Section
4.7); therefore, the database functions include the following:
• Reading the entire content of the XML file.
• Searching through the content to find the credential data.
The contents of a database are organised in a tree format (Figure 4.8). The
searching function starts from the root element of the tree (i.e. <users>) and travels
to child element (i.e. <user>) and sub child elements (i.e. <username>, <password>,
<role> and <domain name>).
Figure 4.8: Database Tree Relation in Colour
Authentication Function
Authentication is one of the core functionalities of Kerberos system simulation. It ensures
that the end-users are who they claim to be. The authentication function involves two
elements in the database: username and password.
The authentication function authenticates end-user by verifying two hash keys: one
hash key is sent by an end-user’s desktop system and created by putting the end-users’
usernames and passwords through a SHA-2 function, and the second hash key is created
from the usernames and password that are stored in the database. The authentication
function will return a success message to the end-user and the Kerberos server simulation
if the hash keys match.
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SHA-2 is a stronger hash function than SHA-1, and NIST had decided to phase
out SHA-1 in favourite of SHA-2 (NIST, 2004); therefore, hash keys are created using the
SHA-2 function in this research. A string that contains the username, role, authentication
result, domain name, issue date and expire date is used as input for the hash function.
The SHA-2 hash function generates a single fixed length string from the input string.
The generated hash is appended to the end of the input string to create a ticket granting
ticket.
Create and Verify Ticket Granting Ticket
Ticket granting ticket (TGT) is one of the core components of Kerberos system simulation.
It shows that the holder of the TGT has been successfully authenticated by the Kerberos
system. The simulation of the TGT is based on the design specifications that were
presented in Needham & Schroeder (1978); Kohl et al. (1991). A TGT contains the
shared key between the Kerberos server and the end-user, and it contains the expired
time of the tickets.
The simulation of TGT is a string that contains the username, role, authentication
result, domain name, issue date, expire date and hash key. These contents are separated
by semicolons (Figure 4.9). Kerberos single sign-on system performs a one-way hash
function on end-users’ credentials to create the hash key.
Figure 4.9: Simulate Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket
Kerberos system simulation saves a copy of the TGT on the system. The copy is
saved in the form of a text file. It’s named after the end-user’s username. The original
TGT is sent to the end-user. The end-user saves the TGT in a text file for later use (e.g.
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obtaining service ticket).
Create Shared Key between Services and Kerberos Server
Kerberos server simulations create shared keys for service/applications simulations. The
shared keys have two goals: They show that the services/applications have been registered
in the Kerberos server simulation; they are also used to verify the end-users’ service tickets.
A service/application simulation is manually registered in a service database. The
service database is constructed using XML language. The variables of a service include:
service name, domain name and IP address. For example, a sample service has the service
name “ssh” (Figure 4.10). It has the sample domain name “home.virtual.vm” and sample
IP address “127.0.0.1” (i.e. the local machine’s IP address).
These variables are stored in a tree format. The tag <services> is the top of the
hierarchy. Every service is under the section <service>. New service can be added into
the service database by adding new <service> sections.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
<services>
<service>
<serviceName>ssh</serviceName>
<domain>home.virtual.vm</domain>
<ipAddress>127.0.0.1</ipAddress>
</service>
</services>
Figure 4.10: Sample Service Database Written in XML
A Kerberos server simulation needs to verify the service simulation to create a
shared key. It receives the request for shared key, along with the service simulation’s
service name, domain name and IP address. Kerberos server simulation verifies the service
simulation by searching for a matching content in the service database. It compares the
content of <serviceName> and <domain> (under very service section) with the ones
provided by the service simulation. If the service simulation was found in the service
database, it will then create a shared key for the service simulation.
A shared ticket has three elements: service name, domain name and IP address.
They are presented as strings similar to TGT. The service name, domain name and IP
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address are merged into a single string (source string). They are separated by semicolons
(Figure 4.11). This source string is used to create a shared key.
Figure 4.11: Sample Source String
SHA-2 hash function is also used to create shared keys between Kerberos server
and the services. A hash key is created by putting the source string through SHA-2
hash function. The hash key is then appended to the end of the source string to create
the shared key (Figure 4.12). The shared key is then manually input into the service
simulation. The service simulation stores the shared key in the form of a text file.
Figure 4.12: Sample Shared Key
Create Service Ticket
End-users’ ticket granting tickets (TGT) need to be verified by the Kerberos system
simulations in order for them to obtain service ticket (ST). The end-users’ user agents
read the contents of ticket granting tickets (from the text files) and send them to the
Kerberos server simulations. They also send the names of the requested services to the
Kerberos server simulations.
Kerberos server simulations will search for the correspondent copies on the servers
upon receiving the ticket granting tickets. They will continue with the TGT verification
processes if matching copies were found on the system; otherwise, the end-users’ requests
will be rejected. The ticket granting ticket (TGT) verification processes include the
verifications of username, domain name and hash key. They also include ensuring the
issue date has expired.
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A Kerberos server simulation extracts the necessary variables (e.g. username,
domain name and hash key, issue date and expire date) from the TGT and from the
correspondent copy. It ensures the username, domain name and hash key in the TGT
match the corresponding variables in the copy. It also ensures the issue date on the TGT
does not exceed the expired date on the copy. The end-user’s request will be rejected if
any of these condition was not met.
The creation of service ticket is the same as creating the shared key between
a service/application simulation and Kerberos server simulation. The Kerberos server
simulations access the service database and uses the service name (that requested by the
end-user) to search for the service data (e.g. service name, domain name and IP address).
These service data are merged into a single string (source string). Semicolons are used to
separate the individual data. A SHA-2 hash key is created by putting the source string
through SHA-2 hash function (Figure 4.13). The hash key is the service ticket; it is then
sent to the end-user’s user agent.
Figure 4.13: Sample Service Ticket
4.3.3 Ubuntu Desktop and Secure Shell Simulation
The simulation of Kerberos single sign-on system uses its own set of communication
protocol, and it can not interoperate with real world Ubuntu desktop and SSH protocol.
The simulations of Ubuntu desktop and Secure Shell protocol (SSH) are developed with
the aim to support Kerberos single sign-on system simulation and to demonstrate non-web
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based single sign-on.
The simulation of Ubuntu desktop simulations provide basic functionalities (e.g.
Linux shell and web browser). It runs on top of real world operating system, and it can
access/edit/remove real world files. It can share files with real world applications (e.g.
web browsers) that are running on the same real world operating system.
Secure shell protocol simulations provide connection between two Ubuntu desktop
simulations. It runs on the simulation of Ubuntu desktop, and it allows end-users to
remotely access/use different Ubuntu desktop simulations (Figure 4.14). Relationship 1
represents the exchange of messages between an end-user and a Ubuntu desktop simu-
lation, and relationship 2 represents the exchange of information between a SSH client
simulation and a SSH server simulation.
Figure 4.14: Linux Shell and SSH simulation
Both Ubuntu desktop simulation and Secure Shell protocol simulation rely on
Kerberos system simulations to provide single sign-on. For example, end-users are au-
thenticated by Kerberos system simulation to use Ubuntu desktop simulations, then they
can proceed to access/use remote Ubuntu desktop simulations (via SSH simulations) using
the same Kerberos single sign-on sessions (i.e. without requiring re-authentication).
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Ubuntu Desktop Simulation
Ubuntu desktop simulation provides basic functionalities such as Linux shell. The “Shell”
is the Linux term for a user interface to the system. It lets end-users to communicate
with the computer via the keyboard and the display (Newham & Rosenblatt, 2005). It
allows end-users to interact with the Ubuntu desktop system (e.g. creating, modifying,
deleting or executing files).
A Ubuntu desktop requires the end-users to be authenticated before accessing the
Linux shell. It relies on Kerberos system simulation for authentication. It includes the
following functionalities:
• Connecting to Kerberos Server Simulation
The Ubuntu desktop simulation uses network socket to connect with the Kerberos
server simulation. The connection allows the Ubuntu desktop simulation to send
ticket granting ticket requests to the Kerberos server simulation.
• Present login prompt to the end-user
When end-users access the Ubuntu desktop simulation for the first time, it presents
a login prompt that asks for a username and a password. The login prompt asks
for the end-user’s username first, then it asks for the end-user’s password. It will
display the username as it been entered; it will not display the password.
• Requesting and Storing Ticket Granting Ticket
The simulation sends end-users’ requests for ticket granting tickets to the Kerberos
server simulation. Section 4.3.2 describes the verification process for the creden-
tials. It will receive ticket granting ticket from the Kerberos single sign-on system
simulations if the end-users’ credentials were successfully verified.
• Storing Ticket Granting Ticket
The Ubuntu desktop simulation accepts the end-user’s access and presents it with
a Linux shell simulation when it received the ticket granting ticket. The ticket
granting ticket (TGT) is stored on the desktop simulation in the form of a text file.
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The TGT can be accessed by SSH client simulation.
The Linux shell simulation only supports secure shell protocol. It provide the
secure shell command “ssh”, which triggers Secure Shell (SSH) client simulation. End-
users can access remote Ubuntu desktop simulations by executing the command “ssh”
followed by the domain name of the remote Ubuntu desktop. For example, a remote
Ubuntu desktop has the domain name “foreign.virtual.vm.” The SSH client simulation
(on the end-user’s desktop) will attempt to communicate with the SSH server simulation
on that Ubuntu desktop when the end-user executes “ssh foreign.virtual.vm”. The SSH
connections use pre-defined domain names (e.g. home.virtual.vm, foreign.virtual.vm and
third.virtual.vm). These are proof of concept systems, and new remote domains need to
be manually added into the source code of the SSH simulations.
Secure Shell Protocol Simulation
The research uses a Secure Shell Protocol simulation that allows end-users to access remote
Ubuntu desktop simulations from their local Ubuntu desktop simulations. Secure Shell
Protocol (SSH) is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network services
over an insecure network (Ylonen & Lonvick, 2006). SSH allows end-users to authenticate
with Kerberos authentication system (MIT, 2008; Migeon, 2008).
The goal of a SSH simulation is to support Kerberos server simulation, Ubuntu
desktop simulation and AIIP. The SSH simulation needs to support the communication
protocol and Kerberos ticket that are used by Kerberos server simulation. It also needs to
have two ends, a client and server. The SSH client and server can both run on the same
Ubuntu desktop simulation; however, they usually run on different Ubuntu desktops. The
SSH clients initiate connections by sending connection requests to the SSH servers. The
SSH servers listen and accept connection requests from SSH clients. The SSH sessions
are maintained by SSH clients and servers.
Secure Shell Client Simulation
The SSH client simulation supports Kerberos server simulation and SSH server simulation.
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It also uses network sockets for connecting to Kerberos single sign-on system simulations
and SSH server simulations. It has the following functions:
1. Extracting ticket granting ticket information (TGT) from the TGT text file.
The ticket granting tickets that were created by the Kerberos server simulation are
stored on the Ubuntu desktop simulation. The SSH client simulation reads the
ticket files and extracts the content into a string. The string is stored in the SSH
client simulation’s memory.
2. Sending the ticket granting ticket information (with the request for service tickets)
to the Kerberos server simulations.
The SSH client simulation connects and sends the ticket granting ticket strings to
the Kerberos server simulations.
3. Receiving the service tickets from the Kerberos server simulations.
The SSH client accepts the service tickets that were sent from Kerberos server
simulations. The service ticket creation process is described in section 4.3.2.
4. Sending the service ticket to the SSH server simulation.
The SSH client establish connection with SSH server simulation using network sock-
ets. It then sends the service ticket to the SSH server simulation.
5. Receiving the result of service ticket verification.
The SSH client simulation receives the result of service ticket verification. It will
Maintain the SSH session if the verification was successful. It will terminate the
SSH session if the verification was unsuccessful.
6. Send the end-user’s command requests to the SSH server simulation.
The SSH session allows the end-user to execute commands on the remote Ubuntu
desktop simulation. The Linux shell simulation receives the commands from the
end-user, then the SSH client simulation sends these commands to the SSH server
simulation.
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7. Receiving the result from the SSH server simulation.
The SSH client receives the result of executing the commands, and the Linux shell
simulations displays them to the end-user.
Secure Shell Server Simulation
The SSH server simulations run on Ubuntu desktop simulations. They listen to connection
requests, and they can handle multiple connections at the same time. The SSH server
simulations have the following functions:
• Requesting shared key from the Kerberos server simulation.
The SSH server simulation needs to be registered in Kerberos single sign-on system’s
service database in order to obtain the shared key. For example, a SSH server has
been manually registered in the service database under the name “ssh” (Figure
4.15). It has the domain name “home.virtual.vm”. It has the sample IP address
127.0.0.1.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
<services>
<service>
<serviceName>ssh</serviceName>
<domain>home.virtual.vm</domain>
<ipAddress>127.0.0.1</ipAddress>
</service>
</services>
Figure 4.15: Sample SSH server simulation Entry in the Service Database
The SSH server simulation connects to the Kerberos server simulation, then it sends
its service name, domain name and IP address to the Kerberos server simulation.
It will acquire a shared key from the Kerberos server simulation if it was registered
in the service database. The shared key consists of a service name, a domain name,
an IP address (i.e. sample IP address) and a hash key (Figure 4.16).
Figure 4.16: Sample Shared Key between SSH Server and Kerberos Server Simulation
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• Verifying the end-user’s service ticket.
The SSH client simulation sends the service ticket and the end-user’s username to
the SSH server simulation. The service ticket is appended to the username, and the
two strings are separated by a semicolon (Figure 4.17). The SSH server simulation
compares the hash key in the shared key with the hash key in the service ticket.
Figure 4.17: Sample Message that includes a Username and Service Ticket
• Maintaining the network socket to maintain the SSH session.
The end-user’s service ticket is successfully verified if both hash keys match. The
SSH server maintains the network socket that is connecting to the SSH client sim-
ulation. It receives the command requests from the SSH client simulation. The
remote Ubuntu desktop simulation, which runs the SSH serve simulation, executes
these commands. The SSH server simulations returns the results (of the executions)
to the SSH client simulation.
• Closing the connection.
The SSH server simulation returns the result and closes the network socket if the
service ticket was not verified. Closing the network socket results in the termination
of SSH session.
Exiting the SSH session
SSH allows end-users to access remote Ubuntu desktop simulations. SSH simulation
runs on top of the Ubuntu desktop simulation, however, they are isolated sessions. The
termination of SSH session will not terminate the (local or remote) Ubuntu desktop
session.
Termination of SSH session will not remove the end-user’s saved files on the remote
Linux desktop simulation. Files and directories that were created in the SSH session are
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saved on the remote Ubuntu desktop simulation. End-users can access the same files and
directories in the next session.
The SSH client simulation will send a termination message to the remote SSH
server simulation. The SSH server confirms the termination, and both sides will terminate
the connection by closing their network sockets. The termination of SSH session ends the
end-user’s access to remote Ubuntu desktop and returns the end-user to its local Ubuntu
desktop simulation.
4.3.4 SAML based FSSO System Simulation (Identity Provider)
SAML based federated single sign-on system simulation contains two components: web-
based authentication system simulation (i.e. identity provider end) and web-based ser-
vice/application simulation(i.e. service provider end). A network domain can have the
web-based authentication system simulation, the web-based services/applications or both
at the same time. This section presents the simulation of the web-based authentication
system. Section 4.3.5 presents the simulation of the web-based services/applications.
The web-based authentication system simulation presents the end-users with a
web-based authentication portal. The web portal currently requires end-users to enter
their username and password (i.e. authentication). This research will address this problem
using IDAWA in section 4.4.2. End-users won’t need to enter their username and password
for authentication in the new simplified federated single sign-on system.
Create Identity Assertion
The web-based authentication system simulation provides identity assertions if the end-
users have been successfully authenticated. The identity assertions allow end-users to ac-
cess web-based services/applications in the other domains without requiring re-authentication.
The identity assertion message includes the following variables: username, role, domain
name and authentication result.
Web cookies are used by real world SAML based federated single sign-on system
CHAPTER 4. THE DESIGN OF A NEW SIMPLIFIED FSSO SYSTEM 73
to transfer identity assertion message; therefore the simulations also use web cookies.
The four variable, username, role, domain name and authentication result, are stored as
web cookies. The web cookies are stored on the end-user’s web browser. The web-based
service/application simulations (i.e. service provider) in different domains can access the
end-user’s identity assertion variables via the web cookies.
4.3.5 SAML based FSSO Simulation (Service Provider)
The simulation of a web-based service/application (i.e. service provider) only presents
successful/unsuccessfully federated single sign-on in this research. It verifies end-users’
identity assertion messages and grants the access to the end-users if their identity assertion
messages indicate that they are from domains within the federation. It then displays the
end-users’ authentication data (e.g. username, domain name, role).
Accessing Identity Assertion
The end-users’ identity assertions contain four variables, “username”, “domain name”,
“role” and “authentication result” (presented in section 4.3.4). They are stored as web
cookies in the web browsers. They can be accessed by the web-based service/application
simulation.
Web-based service/application simulation looks for the variable “authentication
result”. The “authentication result” is a boolean variable (i.e has the value “true” or
“false”). A successfully authenticated end-user will have the “true” value under “authen-
tication result”.
4.4 New Simplified FSSO System Design
This section presents the design of the new simplified federated single sign-on system. It
contains the designs of two major components: the “Authentication Infrastructure Inte-
gration Program” (AIIP) and the “Integration of Desktop Authentication and Web-based
CHAPTER 4. THE DESIGN OF A NEW SIMPLIFIED FSSO SYSTEM 74
Authentication” (IDAWA). The designs of these two components follow the specifications
that were presented in the design environment (section 4.2).
AIIP facilitates federated single sign-on by bridging connections between end-users’
desktop systems (in one domain) and Kerberos single sign-on systems (in different network
domains). It seamlessly acquires Kerberos tickets from Kerberos single sign-on systems in
different network domains and sends these tickets to the end-users’ desktop systems, and
end-users can access non-web based services in the different domains using the acquired
Kerberos tickets.
IDAWA is an extension to the SAML based federated single sign-on system. It
allows the web-based authentication systems (i.e. the identity provider end) to use Ker-
beros single sign-on tickets as means of authentication (subsection 4.4.2). It allows end-
users who obtained Kerberos tickets to access web-based services without requiring re-
authentication.
4.4.1 Authentication Infrastructure Integration Program (AIIP)
AIIP contains two ends: the identity provider end (AIIPi) and the service provider end
(AIIPs). A network domain can have a AIIPi, a AIIPs or both at the same time.
The AIIPi and the AIIPs work together to bridge the communications between end-
users’ desktop system (in one domain) and Kerberos single sign-on systems (in the other
domains). They use the trust that were established between network domains within the
federation.
The goal of the AIIPi is to verify that end-users have obtained desktop authen-
tication sessions (i.e. the end-users have been authenticated by Kerberos single sign-on
systems). It presents itself as a service that supports Kerberos single sign-on, and it
requests for end-users’ service tickets. It will create and send identity assertions to the
AIIPs after it successfully verified end-users’ service tickets.
The goal of the AIIPs is to acquire Kerberos service ticket on behalf of the end-
users in different domains. It will present itself as an end-user to the Kerberos single
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sign-on systems. After it received identity assertions from the AIIPi, it will request ticket
granting ticket and service ticket using end-users’ provisioned credentials. It then sends
the service tickets to the AIIPi, which will pass these service tickets to the end-users.
Identity Provider End of AIIP
This section describes the functions of the identity provider end of “Authentication Infras-
tructure Integration Program” (AIIPi). The AIIPi relies on Kerberos server simulations
for authentication. It verifies end-users’ service tickets (that were created by Kerberos
server simulation), and it provides identity assertions for end-users who have valid Ker-
beros service tickets. It has the following functions:
1. Requesting shared key from Kerberos server simulation.
2. Verifying the end-users’ service tickets.
3. Creating and sending the identity assertion messages.
4. Receiving the Kerberos service tickets from domain Beta and passing them to the
end-users.
Requesting Shared Key
The AIIPi presents itself as a service to the Kerberos single sign-on systems in a network
domain. Like any services, the AIIPi needs to be registered in Kerberos server simu-
lation’s service database. The AIIPi is stored under “saml-aai-kerberos” in the service
database (Figure 4.18). It has the sample domain name of “home.virtual.vm” and the
sample IP address of “127.0.0.1”. It has different domain names in different domains. For
example, the AIIPi in domain Beta has the domain name of “foreign.virtual.vm”.
The AIIPi requests a shared key from the Kerberos server simulation. It will
receive a shared key when Kerberos single sign-on system simulation found its entry in
the service database. The shared key consists of the AIIPi’s service name, domain name
and IP address and a hash key (Figure 4.19). The service name, domain name, IP address
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
<services>
<service>
<serviceName>saml-aai-kerberos</serviceName>
<domain>home.virtual.vm</domain>
<ipAddress>127.0.0.1</ipAddress>
</service>
</services>
Figure 4.18: Sample AIIPi Entry in the Service Database
are merged into a single string (i.e. source string). The hash key is created by putting
the source string through SHA-2 hash function.
Figure 4.19: Sample Shared Key of AIIPi
Verifying Service Ticket
The AIIPi needs to verify the end-users’ service tickets before creating identity assertions
for them. The verification process is the same as SSH server simulation (described in
section 4.3.3): an end-user sends its username and service ticket to AIIPi, and AIIPi
compares the hash key in the share key with the hash key in the service ticket.
By supporting the Kerberos single sign-on, AIIPi can authenticate end-users using
their Kerberos service ticket instead of their credentials. This is the first step of integrating
end-users’ desktop authentication session with non-web based federated single sign-on
sessions. The next stage is creating and send identity assertion to AIIPs.
Creating and Sending Identity Assertion
The AIIPi will send a response to the end-user if the service ticket was successfully
verified. The response indicates that the end-user’s service ticket has been successfully
verified. The end-user then sends its username, role and domain name to AIIPi upon
receiving the response. These data are merged into a single string, and they are separated
by semicolons (Figure 4.20). The string is used as the identity assertion message. AIIPi
then sends the identity assertion message to the AIIPs in another domain.
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Figure 4.20: Sample Identity Assertion
This step connects the AIIPi in one domain and the AIIPs in another domain. By
sending the identity assertion message, the bridge between two domains is established.
The next step involves AIIPs acquiring Kerberos service ticket from one domain and
sending it to AIIPi in another domain.
Receiving and Passing the service tickets
AIIPs (in another domain) will reply with a service ticket after it receives the identity
assertion message. This service ticket was created by the Kerberos server simulation in
another domain. It allows end-users to access non-web based services that are in the same
domain as AIIPs. AIIPi receives the service ticket and sends it to the end-user. The
detail processes of acquiring service tickets are described in section 4.4.1.
This step comes after the AIIPs acquiring a service ticket on behalf of the end-
users. It completes the non-web based federated single sign-on process. AIIPi passes
the service ticket that was created in another domain to the end-user. The end-user can
use the service ticket to access non-web based services in the domain that created the
service ticket. The entire federated single sign-on process did not request the end-user to
be authenticated.
Service Provider end of AIIP
This section describes the design of AIIPs. The main goals of AIIPs are acquiring ticket
granting ticket and service ticket on behalf of the end-users (in the other domains).
Acquiring Ticket Granting Tickets
AIIPs uses network sockets for network connection. It listens on a specific network
port (port 80). The network port can be changed to suite the firewall configuration. It
will attempt to acquire ticket granting tickets for the end-users if the identity assertions
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indicated that the correspondent end-users have been authenticated by AIIPi.
AIIPs acquires ticket granting tickets on behalf of the end-users. It extracts the
username and domain name from the identity assertion messages. It then searches for
the correspondent identities in the end-user database. Once it finds the credentials of the
end-users in the database, it will request of ticket granting tickets (from the Kerberos
single sign-on system simulation in the same domain) using the end-users’ credentials. It
then proceed to request service tickets after it receives the ticket granting tickets from the
Kerberos single sign-on system.
Acquiring Service Ticket
The other function of AIIPs is acquiring service tickets on behalf of the end-users. The
AIIPs sends the ticket granting tickets and requests for service tickets to Kerberos single
sign-on system in the same domain. Once it receives the service ticket, it will pass it back
to AIIPi.
These two functionalities complete the connections between the Kerberos single
sign-on sessions in separate domains. The acquired service tickets will be sent back to the
AIIPi and then passed to the end-users. The acquired service tickets allow the end-users
from other domains to access non-web based services/applications (in the same domain
that created the service tickets).
Modifying SSH clients
The SSH client selects Kerberos single sign-on systems based on the domain name that
were entered in the SSH command. For example, the SSH command “ssh home.virtual.vm”
will trigger the SSH client to request service ticket from Kerberos single sign-on system
in domain “home.virtual.vm”. This is suitable for Kerberos secure sharing (KSS) since
KSS allows SSH clients to connect to Kerberos servers in different domains; however, this
is not suitable for the AIIP.
The AIIP bridges the communications between end-users’ desktop systems and
Kerberos single sign-on systems. Kerberos single sign-on systems are not accessible from
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outside their network domains; therefore, the SSH clients can not communicate with
Kerberos single sign-on systems in the other domains, and it will not be able to request
Kerberos service tickets.
An extension has been added to the SSH client to address this problem. The
extension reads the domain names in the SSH command and decides whether they point
to local domain or foreign domains. It will allow the SSH client to continue on its request
(for service tickets) if the domain names point to local domain. It will direct the request
for service tickets to AIIPi in the local domain if the domain names point to foreign
domains.
The extension currently needs to be added to the source code of SSH clients, and
the SSH client needs to be recompiled and redeployed into the network domains. This
process requires support from network domains and application creators. This problem
can be addressed in the future by separating the extension from the SSH client and into
a stand alone program, so that it will not require SSH client to be re-compiled and re-
deployed. In addition, the stand along extension can provide the same functionalities for
the other clients of non-web based services (e.g. NFS).
Another solution is AIIPi can pretend to be Kerberos single sign-on systems from
foreign domains. It seamlessly intercepts the ticket requests from SSH clients when end-
users attempted to access SSH servers in foreign domains. It can then proceed to acquire
Kerberos tickets from the actual Kerberos single sign-on systems in foreign domains and
send the tickets back to the SSH clients. This approach does not require SSH clients (or
any non-web based services/applications clients) to be modified; therefore, it will further
simplify the deployment of the AIIP.
AIIP Design Analysis
The benefits of AIIP (over Kerberos Secure Sharing) is that it does not expose Kerberos
single sign-on systems to the outside world, and it does not require any changes to the
Kerberos single sign-on systems (Figure 4.21). The AIIPi presents itself as a service to
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the Kerberos single sign-on systems in one domain, while the AIIPs presents itself as
an end-user to the Kerberos single sign-on systems in another domain. The Kerberos
single sign-on systems will treat them as normal services and normal end-users, and
the AIIP seamlessly connects the Kerberos single sign-on sessions in these domains by
acquiring/transferring Kerberos service tickets from one domain to another domain. They
allow end-users to use Kerberos service tickets (acquired from different domains) to access
non-web based services in different domains.
Figure 4.21: Side by side comparison of AIIP and KSS
Although the AIIP does not expose Kerberos single sign-on systems to the outside
world, it needs to communicate with the AIIPs in other domains; therefore, AIIPs are
exposed to the outside world. They can’t be protected by security firewall; therefore,
they are open to security problems such as man-in-the-middle attack and single point of
failure.
The AIIPs only manage the federated single sign-on processes; therefore, they will
not effect the local network authentications. In case of security compromise, network
domains can shut down its AIIP to protect the local network. Shutting down the AIIP
will stop end-users from accessing non-web based services in the other domains in a single
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sign-on fashion; however, end-users can still access/use non-web based services in local
network domain in a single sign-on fashion.
The AIIPs can use Transport Layer Security (TLS) (Dierks & Rescorla, 2008)
to defend against a man-in-the-middle attack. It uses asymmetric cryptography for key
exchange and symmetric encryption for confidentiality, and message authentication codes
for message integrity. It can secure the communication between the two end points of
AIIP (i.e. AIIPi and AIIPs) during communication.
The AIIP handles all of the non-web based federated single sign-on processes.
This may cause a single point of failure. Although AIIP does not affect the single sign-on
processes in the local domains, end-users will not able to access non-web based services in
the foreign domains in a single sign-on fashion. Each domain should have a primary AIIP
system and multiple secondary AIIPs in order to defend against single point of failure.
If the primary AIIP has failed, the secondary AIIPs can take over the non-web based
federated single sign-on processes.
4.4.2 Integration of Desktop Authentication and Web-based Au-
thentication (IDAWA)
The Integration of Desktop Authentication and Web-based Authentication (IDAWA) is
an extension to the web-based authentication system (i.e. identity provider end of SAML
based federated single sign-on system). It aims to allow web-based authentication sys-
tems to use end-users’ Kerberos tickets as means of authentication instead of end-users’
credentials (i.e. username and password). It allows end-users (who have gained access to
desktop systems) to access web-based services without requiring re-authentication.
End-users who have been authenticated by Kerberos single sign-on system will
acquire Kerberos tickets. Since end-users need to gain access to desktops before accessing
a web-browser, it’s safe to assume that end-users were already authenticated by Kerberos
server (and acquired ticket granting tickets) when they are accessing a web-browser.
Requesting Shared Key
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The IDAWA are added into the source code of web-based authentication system, and
it executes as part of the web-based authentication system. It uses shared keys (cre-
ated by Kerberos single sign-on systems) to verify end-user’s service tickets; therefore,
it needs to be registered in the Kerberos service database (Figure 4.22). The web-based
authentication systems in different domains will have different data. For example, it
has domain name “home.virtual.vm” in domain Alpha, and it will have domain name
“foreign.virtual.vm” in domain Beta.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
<services>
<service>
<serviceName>idp</serviceName>
<domain>home.virtual.vm</domain>
<ipAddress>127.0.0.1</ipAddress>
</service>
</services>
Figure 4.22: Sample Web-based Authentication System Simulation Entry
The IDAWA connects to the Kerberos server simulation and sends its service name,
domain name and IP address to the Kerberos server simulation. It should obtain a shared
key from the Kerberos server simulation if it has been registered in the service database.
The shared key consists of the service name, domain name, IP address (i.e. sample IP
address) and SHA-2 hash key (Figure 4.23).
Figure 4.23: Sample Shared Key between Web-based Authentication System Simulation
and Kerberos Server Simulation
The IDAWA acquires shared keys from Kerberos single sign-on systems. The
shared keys allows the web-based authentication systems to verify end-users’ service tick-
ets. This is the first step for web-based authentication systems to support Kerberos
tickets. The next step is acquire end-users’ service tickets.
Requesting Service Ticket
The IDAWA creates a file uploading system to accept end-users’ TGTs (Figure 4.24). It
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passes the contents of TGTs to the Kerberos single sign-on systems once they have been
uploaded by the end-users. It will receive the service ticket from the Kerberos server
simulation after it verifies TGTs.
The IDAWA verifies the service ticket by comparing the SHA-2 hash key in the
service ticket with the SHA-2 hash key in the shared key. It will create identity assertions
for the end-users if both keys match.
Figure 4.24: Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket Portal
4.4.3 Simplified Federated Single Sign-on System Life-cycles
This section covers four scenarios that may occur to an end-user. Life-cycle 1 shows an
end-user (in domain Alpha) attempts to access/use a non-web based service/application
in domain Beta. Life-cycle 2 is a continuation of life-cycle 1; it shows the same end-user in
domain Alpha attempts to access/use a web-based service/application in domain Gamma
after life-cycle 1. Life-cycle 3 shows an end-users in domain Beta attempts to access/use
both web-based and non-web based services/applications in domain Alpha.
A federation (i.e. a circle of trust) has been established between there three do-
mains (Alpha, Beta and Gamma). The federation is expressed in the form of security
policies (described in section 4.2.2). The policies indicate that end-users in each do-
main can access both web-based and non-web based services/applications in each other’s
domains.
The life-cycles assume that encryption methods have been applied during network
communications and file storage. For example, the communications between the two
ends of AIIP are encrypted using TLS. Communications between Kerberos single sign-on
(KSSO) systems and AIIP are encrypted using AES (which is supported by Kerberos).
Kerberos tickets (ticket granting tickets and services tickets) are encrypted during transfer
and storage (also using AES).
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Life-cycle 1: end-user accesses non-web base application
Authentication Infrastructure Integration Program (AIIP) includes two ends: AIIPi and
AIIPs. The AIIPi resides in domain Alpha, and AIIPs resides in domain Beta in life-
cycle 1. Both AIIPi and AIIPs rely on the federation that was established between
domain Alpha and Beta.
The AIIPi and the AIIPs handle the communications between an end-user’s desk-
top system in domain Alpha and the Kerberos single sign-on (KSSO) system in domain
Beta. They facilitate federated single sign-on by acquiring Kerberos ticket for end-users
(from domain Alpha) in domain Beta (Figure 4.25). The end-user has an input and out-
put relationship with the desktop system. They exchange information such as credentials,
authentication results, application requests and applications request results. The full life-
cycle can be viewed in appendix C.1; this section only shows the steps that involve the
new simplified federated single sign-on system.
9 SSHc extracts STα from the desktop system and sends it to AIIPi.
10 AIIPi will create an identity assertion message for the end-user and send it to AIIPs
if STα was successfully verified.
Step 9 and step 10 show the AIIP (in domain alpha) initialises the FSSO processes
in the new simplified FSSO system. These steps are the primary difference between
Kerberos secure sharing (KSS) and the new simplified FSSO system. The Kerberos single
sign-on system (in domain Alpha) only manages local single sign-on and is not aware
of the FSSO transactions; therefore, it is not exposed to the outside work in the new
simplified FSSO system.
11 AIIPs accepts the end-user’s identity assertion based on the federation’s policies.
It creates a database query that searches for end-user’s provisioned identity (Iβ) in
domain Beta. It sends the query to Dβ.
12 Dβ executes the query and returns Iβ to AIIPs.
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Figure 4.25: A New Simplified Federated Single Sign-on Life-cycle 1
13 AIIPs uses the Iβ to authenticate to the KSSO system in domain Beta (Kβ) on
behalf of the end-user.
14 Kβ sends a search query to Dβ.
15 Dβ finds the credentials and return the result to Kβ since Iβ exists in Dβ.
16 Kβ creates and sends a ticket granting ticket (TGTβ) to AIIPs. TGTβ will be stored
in AIIPs.
17 AIIPs sends TGTβ to Kβ and requests service ticket (STβ) for SSHs on behalf of
the end-user.
18 Kβ verifies TGTβ and sends STβ to AIIPs.
Step 11 to step 18 shows that the AIIP (in domain Beta) accepts the FSSO request
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from domain Alpha, and it acquires a Kerberos single sign-on ticket (in domain Beta) for
the end-user (in domain Alpha). The ticket is sent from domain Beta to domain Alpha
by the AIIP in domain Beta. The Kerberos single sign-on system in domain Beta is also
not aware of the FSSO transactions; therefore, it isn’t exposed to the outside world as
well.
19 AIIPs sends STβ to AIIPi.
20 AIIPi sends STβ to SSHc.
Step 19 and step 20 show that the Kerberos ticket (created in domains Beta) is
sent to domain Alpha, and it is then passed to the end-user. This is the last stage of
the federated single sign-on. The end-user (in domain Alpha) can then use the Kerberos
ticket to access the SSH server in domain Beta. The entire FSSO process did not require
authentication of the end-user, and they are seamless to the end-user.
The entire non-web based FSSO process didn’t expose KSSO systems (in both
domains Alpha and Beta) to the outside world. The AIIPi presents itself as a service
to the KSSO system domain Alpha, while the AIIPs presents itself as an end-user to
the KSSO system in domain Beta. Neither KSSO system was modified, and neither one
aware that they were part of federated single sign-on process.
Life-cycle 2: end-user accesses web-based application
Integration of Desktop Authentication and Web-based Authentication (IDAWA) is an-
other component of the new simplified federated single sign-on system. IDAWA is an
extension to web-based authentication system (WBASα). It allows WBASα to accept
and verify Kerberos tickets (Figure 4.26).
Life-cycle 2 is a continuation of life-cycle 1. The end-user already gained access to
a desktop system in domain Alpha and a non-web based services in domain Beta. He/she
will attempt to access a web-based service/application in domain Gamma (WSAγ). The
user agent is a web browser (WBα) that runs on the desktop.
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The relationship between the end-user and desktop is the same as figure 4.25. They
exchange information such as credentials, authentication results, application requests and
applications request results. The entire life-cycle can be viewed in appendix C.2. This
section only presents the steps that are relate to IDAWA.
Figure 4.26: A New Simplified Federated Single Sign-on Life-cycle 2
5 WBα sends the ST to WBASα. IDAWA (in the WBASα) accepts the ST.
6 After IDAWA successfully verifies the ST, WBASα, it then creates an identity
assertion message and passes it back to WBα.
Step 5 and step 6 are the most important steps in this life-cycle. They show that
the IDAWA uses the Kerberos ticket (from the end-users) as a means for authentication,
and the end-user doesn’t need to re-enter its credential (e.g. username and password).
This enables the web-based authentication system to create identity assertion message
without re-authenticating the end-user.
Life-cycle 2 shows that the IDAWA can be used in conjunction with the AIIP.
The end-user, who has already gained access to a non-web based service/application
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in domain Beta, can gain access to a web-based service/application in domain Gamma
without requiring re-authentication. The same Kerberos ticket granting ticket (gained by
desktop authentication) was used for both web-based and non-web based FSSO.
Although life-cycle 1 and life-cycle 2 only show three domains (Alpha, Beta and
Gamma), each FSSO process only involved two domains (the FSSO process in life-cycle
1 involves domain Alpha and domain Beta, and the FSSO process in life-cycle 2 involves
domain Alpha and domain Gamma). The numbers of domains will not affect each FSSO
process; therefore, the new simplified FSSO system is not restricted in three domains.
Life-cycle 3: an end-user in domain Beta access domain Alpha
This life-cycle shows a reverse of domains. An end-user in domain Beta attempts to
access any computer services/application in domain Alpha in this life-cycle. He/she then
attempts to access a web-based service/application (WSAα) using a web browser (WBβ)
on the desktop (Figure 4.27). The same end-user then attempts to access a remote SSH
server (SSHs) in domain Alpha using SSH client (SSHc) on the same desktop system.
The entire life-cycle can be viewed in appendix C.3.
Steps 1 to 4 show an end-user enter its credentials into the desktop login prompt
and gain access to the desktop system in domain Beta. This is the first (and only)
authentication process that the end-user has to go through. A Kerberos ticket is created
for the end-user and stored on the desktop system.
Steps 5 to 14 show the same end-user attempts to access a web-based service/application
in domain Alpha. The end-user uses its Kerberos ticket (that was created during desktop
authentication) as mean for web-based authentication. The steps are the same as life-
cycle 2: the IDAWA accepts and verifies the end-user’s Kerberos ticket in domain Beta, it
creates identity assertion message to the web-based service/application in domain Alpha,
and the web-based service/application grants access to the end-user.
Step 14 to 32 show the same end-user attempts to access a non-web based ser-
vice/application (i.e. SSH server) in domain Alpha. This steps are the same as life-cycle
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Figure 4.27: Life-cycle 3: an end-user in domain Beta access diverse service/applications
domain Alpha
1: the end-user uses the Kerberos ticket (i.e. the same that was created during desktop
authentication) as a means for authentication to AIIP in domain Beta. The AIIP (in
domain Beta) accepts and verifies the end-user’s Kerberos ticket and creates/sends an
identity assertion to the AIIP in domain Alpha. The AIIP in domain Alpha replies with
a Kerberos ticket (that was created in domain Alpha), and the new Kerberos ticket allows
the end-user (in domain Beta) to access the non-web based service/application (in domain
Alpha) without requiring re-authentication.
This life-cycle shows an end-user (from domain Beta) accessing both web-based
and non-web based services/applications in domain Alpha. Both AIIP and IDAWA share
the same desktop session, and they used the same Kerberos ticket for authenticating end-
users. The new simplified FSSO system (i.e. the combination of AIIP and IDAWA) allows
end-users (from any domain) to access desktop systems, web-based services/applications
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and non-web based services/applications (in different domains within the federation) using
one authentication process.
4.5 Summary
The design of the new simplified federated single sign-on system attempts to address
the limitations of existing federated single sign-on systems. By incorporating the au-
thentication systems of desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web
based services/applications, this new system allows end-users to access desktop systems,
web-based services/applications and non-web based services/applications using one au-
thentication process. It achieves it with two major components: the “Authentication
Infrastructure Integration Program” (AIIP) and the “Integration of Desktop Authentica-
tion and Web-based Authentication” (IDAWA). The AIIP supports desktop systems and
non-web based services/applications. Although AIIP provides the same single sign-on as
Kerbero secure sharing (KSS), it improves upon KSS by acquiring Kerbeors tickets from
Kerberos single sign-on systems (in different network domains) without establishing trust
between these Kerberos single sign-on systems. This allows AIIPs to be deployed into
network domains without modifying their existing Kerberos single sign-on systems. The
IDAWA supports desktop systems and web-based services/applications; it is an extension
to the web-based authentication systems. It uses Kerberos tickets as means of web-based
authentication instead of end-users’ credentials (e.g. username and password). The new
simplified federated single sign-on system uses a combination of AIIP and IDAWA to
provide single sign-on.
Chapter 5
Proof of Concept Implementation
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the proof of concept implementation of the new simplified federated
single sign-on (FSSO) system. The implementation is divided into two stages. The
first stage is the implementation of the design environment. The seconds stage is the
implementation of the new simplified FSSO system.
The design environment includes the implementation of the simulations of Ker-
beros single sign-on system, SAML based federated single sign-on system, web-based
services/applications, Ubuntu desktop and Secure Shell protocol (SSH). The simulations
are strip down version of the real world systems. They serves as foundations for im-
plementing the new simplified federated single sign-on system. They provide necessary
functionalities such as desktop authentication, web-based authentication, local network
single sign-on, web-based federated single sign-on. They assume that encryption methods
have been applied during network communication and ticket storage (described in section
4.2).
The new simplified FSSO system includes the implementations of the “Authentica-
tion Infrastructure Integration Program” (AIIP) and the “Integration of Desktop Authen-
tication and Web-based Authentication” (IDAWA). AIIP bridges the connections between
91
CHAPTER 5. PROOF OF CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION 92
end-users’ desktop system in one domain and Kerberos single sign-on systems in the other
domains; it achieves it by acquiring Kerberos tickets in different domains for end-users.
IDAWA is an extension to web-based authentication system, and it uses Kerberos tickets
as means of authentication.
A federation (i.e. a circle of trust) has been established between network domains
(e.g. domain Alpha, domain Beta and domain Gamma). The federation is expressed
in the form of federation policies. The main policy that was introduced in the design
environment was: “End-users from any domain can access any services/applications in
the other domains.” This policy is followed by the SAML based federated single sign-on
system, and “Authentication Infrastructure Integration Program” (AIIP).
Section 5.2 presents the technical overview. It includes the development environ-
ment (e.g. computer software and programming language) and system configuration (e.g.
hardware and software configuration). Section 5.3 presents the implementations of the
design environment. Section 5.4 presents the implementations and testing of the new
simplified federated single sign-on system. Section 5.6 summaries the chapter.
5.2 Technical Overview
5.2.1 Development Environment and Programming Languages
The new simplified federated single sign-on system and it’s design environment were
developed on the Ubuntu 10.04.4 LTS Server and Xubuntu 12.04 LTS platform. The
programming languages (that are used in the implementations) are Python, PHP and
AJAX. Python 2.6 was used to develop AIIP, the simulation of Kerberos single sign-on,
the simulation of Ubuntu desktop and the simulation of SSH. PHP 5.3.10 and AJAX
were used to develop IDAWA and the simulation of SAML based federated single sign-on
system.
AIIP and the simulations of Kerberos single sign-on system, Ubuntu desktop and
SSH involve communications between multiple applications. They require the source code
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to be clean and easy to debug. Python uses a clean and easy to read code style; therefore,
it’s suitable for programming and debugging complex applications.
IDAWA and the simulation of SAML based federated single sign-on system are
small but dynamic web applications. These reasons promoted the use of PHP and AJAX.
PHP is a server-side HTML embedded scripting language. It is suitable to create small
scale web applications. AJAX creates asynchronous web applications. It can change
contents on a web page without refreshing the web browser.
5.3 Implementation of Design Environment
This section presents the implementations of Kerberos single sign-on system simulation,
Ubuntu desktop system simulation, SSH simulation and SAML based federated single
sign-on system simulation. The implementations follow the design environment described
in chapter 4. Kerberos single sign-on system simulations provides authentication for
Ubuntu desktop system simulations and SSH simulations. Web-based authentication
system (i.e. identity provider end of the SAML based federated single sign-on system)
authenticates end-users and provides identity assertions. Web-based services/application
(i.e. service provider end of the SAML based federated single sign-on system) only displays
successfully federated single sign-on; it does not have any other functions.
The communication protocol that is used by the simulation is implemented using
Python sockets. It’s a independent communication protocol that ensures the different
simulations (e.g. Kerberos single sign-on, Ubuntu desktop, SSH protocol and AIIP) can
communicate with each other. It does not interoperate with real world Kerberos single
sign-on systems.
5.3.1 Kerberos Single Sign-on System
The goal of the Kerberos single sign-on system simulations is to support single sign-on in
a single domain. Each system is isolated from the outside world, and it has the following
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functionalities that are the same as the real world system: creating system daemon that
listing on a specific network port (i.e. port 88) for external connections, receiving requests
(e.g. ticket granting ticket requests, service ticket requests and share key requests) and
replying to these requests.
The simulation of Kerberos single sign-on system creates human readable Kerberos
tickets and shared keys (e.g. ticket granting ticket, service ticket and shared keys). They
are stored as text files. They are easier to manage than real world Kerberos tickets since
they can be read and edited by text editors instead of real world Kerberos tools.
Create System Daemon
The socket type of Kerberos single sign-on system simulation is defined using AF INET
and SOCK STREAM, and the socket is bind to the machine’s IP address (i.e. LOCAL IP)
and network port (i.e. LOCAL PORT) (Figure 5.1) . The AF INET defines the socket
as an Internet socket, the SOCK STREAM defines the connection as TCP connection,
the LOCAL IP is set by the DHCPD server: 169.168.1.59, and the LOCAL PORT is set
to 88. Port 88 is also used by the real world Kerberos single sign-on system.
s = socket.socket (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.bind((LOCAL_IP, LOCAL_PORT))
s.listen(5)
Figure 5.1: Start Kerberos Server Simulation
This Kerberos system daemon requires class ClientThread to manage multi-
ple clients. Each connection (from an end-user) will be managed by a thread and each
thread provides Kerberos functions such as creating ticket granting tickets, verifying ticket
granting tickets and creating service tickets (Figure 5.2).
The thread determines a client’s requests by examine the messages that were sent
by the client (using message = self.conn.recv(1024). The messages are long strings
that contain multiple short strings. Short strings are separated by semicolons (in the
long string). The first short string (in a long string) contains the type of request. The
thread determines a client’s request by comparing the first short string with three values:
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Figure 5.2: Kerberos single sign-on system thread flowchart
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req_tgt, req_sk and req_st.
• req_tgt: The client is requesting a ticket granting ticket. The message also contains
a set of credentials (including username and password).
• req_sk: The client obtains a shared key. The message also contains service infor-
mation (including service name and domain name).
• req_st: The client is requesting a service ticket. The message also contains ticket
granting ticket (including username, password, role, authentication result, domain
name, ticket creation date, expire date and SHA-512 hash key).
Creating Ticket Granting Ticket
The simulation of Kerberos single sign-on system will execute two functions once it de-
termined a client is requesting a ticket granting ticket:
• auth_user(self,username, password). It authenticates the end-users’ identities.
• create_tgt(self). It creates ticket granting tickets for authenticated end-users.
It extracts the username and password and passes them into function
auth_user(self,username, password). The function travels from the root of the end-
user database (i.e. userdatabase.xml) to the child nodes and searches for matching cre-
dentials (Figure 5.3). It uses if statements to search for values that match end-user’s
credentials (e.g. username and password).
DOM was originally used as interface to XML files (e.g. userdatabase.xml). It
was later changed to ElementTree since ElementTree was designed to support Python’s
coding style. The implementation was changed to use ElementTree to provide a easy to
read source code.
The Kerberos system simulation uses function, create_tgt(self), to create ticket
granting tickets. It uses the end-user’s username, password, role, authenticate result,
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def auth_user(self, username, password):
tree = xml.parse("userdatabase.xml") # Parse the user database
doc = tree.getroot() # Get the root node
# Check the username and password
for user in doc:
if user[0].text == username and user[1].text == password:
self.user = user
return True
return False
Figure 5.3: Searching for a Matching Credentials
# Create Ticket Granting Ticket
def create_tgt(self):
ticket_info = ‘’
issue_time = datetime.datetime.now()
expire_time = datetime.datetime.now() + datetime.timedelta(days=1)
for elements in self.user:
ticket_info += elements.text
ticket_info += ‘;’
ticket_info += issue_time.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M")
ticket_info += ‘;’
ticket_info += expire_time.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M")
ticket_info += ‘;’
hash = hashlib.sha512(ticket_info) # Hash the shared key informations
hash_hex = hash.hexdigest()
ticket_info += str(hash_hex)
f = open(self.user[0].text, ‘w’) # Keep recodes of authenticated users
f.write(ticket_info)
f.close
return ticket_info
Figure 5.4: Creating Ticket Granting Tickets
domain name, ticket creation date and ticket expire date to create a SHA-512 hash string
(Figure 5.4).
The hash function is part of the Python’s hashlib library. The hash string is
appended to the end of the presented data. The result is the ticket granting ticket (i.e.
tgt_message); it’s then sent to the client (using self.conn.send (tgt_message)). A
copy of the ticket granting ticket is also saved on the Kerberos system simulation.
Creating Shared Key
Kerberos system simulation extracts the two variables (service name and domain name)
from the request message. It then passes these two variables into function
auth_service(self, service_name, service_domain_name) to determine whether or
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# Authenticate the service
def auth_service(self, service_name, service_domain_name):
tree = xml.parse("servicedatabase.xml") # Parse the service database
doc = tree.getroot() # Get the root node
# Compare the service name and domain name against the database
for service in doc:
if service[0].text == service_name and \
service[1].text == service_domain_name:
self.service = service
return True
return False
Figure 5.5: Verifying Services Data
# Create Share Key
def create_share_key(self):
share_key = ‘’
for elements in self.service:
share_key += elements.text
share_key += ‘;’
# Hash the shared key informations
hash = hashlib.sha512(share_key)
hash_hex = hash.hexdigest()
share_key += str(hash_hex)
return share_key
Figure 5.6: Creating Shared Key
not the service has been registered in the service database. It will create a shared key for
the service if a matching pair was found in the service database. The function searches
through the service database to find a matching pair of service name and domain name
(Figure 5.5).
The function create_share_key(self) uses a similar method to that used to
create ticket granting ticket in creating the shared key (Figure 5.6). The shared key
includes the service name, domain name, IP address and hash key. The hash key is a
SHA-512 hash key that was created from the service’s service name, domain name and IP
address. The shared key (i.e. sk_message) is then manually input into the service (using
self.conn.send (sk_message)).
Creating Service Ticket
The Kerberos system simulation verifies a client’s (i.e. end-user’s) ticket granting ticket
and creates a service ticket for the end-user. It uses function auth_tgt(tgt_info) to
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# Verify Ticket Granting Ticket
def auth_tgt(self, tgt_info):
f = open(str(tgt_info[0]), ‘r’)
if f == None:
print ‘User not found’
return False
else:
key_info = f.readline()
f.close()
key_info_list = key_info.split(‘;’, 7)
if tgt_info[0] == key_info_list[0] and \
tgt_info[4] == key_info_list[4] and \
tgt_info[5] < key_info_list[6] and \
tgt_info[7] == key_info_list[7]:
return True
else:
return False
Figure 5.7: Verifying Ticket Granting Ticket
# Create Service Ticket
def create_st(self, service_name):
tree = xml.parse("servicedatabase.xml") # Parse the service database
doc = tree.getroot() # Get the root node
st_info = ‘’
# Compare the service name and domain name against the database
for service in doc:
if service[0].text == service_name:
self.service = service
break
for elements in self.service:
st_info += elements.text
st_info += ‘;’
hash = hashlib.sha512(st_info) # Hash the shared key informations
hash_hex = hash.hexdigest()
return str(hash_hex)
Figure 5.8: Creating Service Ticket
verify the end-user’s ticket granting ticket (i.e. tgt_info).
The function uses a build-in function (i.e. open("filename", permission)) of
Python to open the saved ticket granting ticket (i.e. f = open(str(tgt_info[0]), ‘r’)).
It then compares the username and hash key of the end-user’s ticket granting ticket with
the saved copy. It also ensures the ticket has not expired (Figure 5.7).
The Kerberos system simulation creates service tickets using the services’ service
name (e.g. “ssh”), domain name, IP address and a SHA-512 hash key based on these
variables (Figure 5.8). It then sends the service tickets to the end-users.
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Kerberos Single Sign-on System Summary
The simulation of Kerberos single sign-on system contains functionalities that can create
ticket granting ticket, services tickets and shared keys. It only supports single sign-on
in a single domain, and it does not have functionalities to communication with other
Kerberos single sign-on systems in different domains. Its communication protocol can be
supported by any program that supports a network socket, and it creates human readable
ticket/keys. It provides the foundation for implementing the AIIP.
5.3.2 Ubuntu Desktop and Secure Shell Protocol
Ubuntu Desktop Simulation
The Ubuntu desktop system simulation provides end-users with Linux shell and Secure
Shell (SSH) protocol (Figure 5.9). It does not provide any other functionalities.
The Ubuntu desktop simulation relies on Kerberos single sign-on system simulation
for authenticating end-users (Figure 5.10). It requests end-users to input their usernames
(name = raw_input(‘Username: ’)) and passwords
(password = getpass.getpass(‘Password: ’) ). The entered credentials are appended
to the end of the request strings. For example, req_tgt;chen;alpha123 is a string that
requests ticket granting ticket; it contains the username chen and password alpha123. It
then sends the credentials to the Kerberos single sign-on system simulation.
The Ubuntu desktop simulation will receive the ticket granting ticket if the end-
user’s credentials were successfully authenticated by Kerberos system simulation. It then
grants access to the end-user by presenting them with Ubuntu shell simulations (i.e.
local shell~>). It also saves the ticket granting ticket (i.e. ticket) on the system
using function save_tgt(ticket). It saves the ticket granting ticket into a text file
(Figure 5.11).
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Figure 5.9: Flowchart of Ubuntu desktop simulation
# End-user Authentication
def authentication():
try:
# Socket for connecting to Kerberos server simulation
krb_sok = socket.socket (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
krb_sok.connect((KRB_HOST, KRB_PORT))
print ‘Connecting to’, KRB_HOST, ‘...’
name = raw_input(‘Username: ’)
password = getpass.getpass(‘Password: ’)
krb_sok.send(‘req_tgt;’ + name +‘;’ + password)
Figure 5.10: Desktop Authentication and Requesting Ticket Granting Ticket
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# Save ticket granting ticket from KDC
def save_tgt(tgt_info):
# Set ticket granting ticket content in memory
tgt.set_ticket_info(tgt_info)
print ‘Recieved and saved Ticket Granting Ticket.’
# Save ticket granting ticket content in file
f = open(‘tgt.key’, ‘w’)
f.write(tgt_info)
f.close()
Figure 5.11: Saving Ticket Granting Ticket
SSH Client Simulation
The SSH client simulation aims to establish connections to SSH servers (Figure 5.12). It
first acquires the service ticket from Kerberos single sign-on system in the same domain
using function (request_service_ticket()). The process includes sending the end-
user’s ticket granting tickets to the Kerberos system simulation along with a request for
the service ticket (Figure 5.13). It will receives a copy of the service ticket if the Kerberos
single sign-on system simulation successfully verified the ticket granting ticket.
Once the SSH client received the service ticket, it will send it to the SSH server
simulation as a means for authentication (Figure 5.14). A connection will be established
between the SSH client simulation and SSH server simulation (Figure 5.15) if the service
ticket was successfully verified (i.e. if shell_name != ‘fail’). The connection will not
terminate until both sides have confirmed the end request
(while results != ‘exit_confirm’).
Secure Shell Server
The SSH server simulation is used to test single sign-on (and federated single sign-on
at later stage). It does not provide any functionalities other than requesting shared key,
verifying end-users’ service ticket and accepting/establishing remote connection from SSH
clients (Figure 5.16). It uses one socket to listen for requests from SSH client simulations,
and it uses another socket to connect to Kerberos servers simulation.
The SSH server simulation connects to Kerberos single sign-on system simulation
and requests the shared key (Figure 5.17). The SSH servers simulation will receive a copy
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Figure 5.12: Flowchart of SSH client simulation
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# Get service ticket from KDC to access services
def request_service_ticket():
krb_sok = socket.socket (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) # KRB socket
f = open(‘tgt.key’, ‘r’)
tgt_info = f.readline()
f.close()
tgt_info_list = tgt_info.split(‘;’, 7)
krb_sok.connect((KRB_HOST, KRB_PORT))
print ‘Connecting to’, KRB_HOST, ‘...’
krb_sok.send(‘req_st;’ + tgt_info)
answer = krb_sok.recv(1024)
if answer == ‘fail’:
return ‘fail’
else:
krb_sok.send(‘ssh’)
st_info = krb_sok.recv(1024)
return tgt_info_list[0] + ‘;’ + st_info
Figure 5.13: Requesting Service Ticket
# SSH client simulation
def ssh_local(st_info):
ssh = socket.socket (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) # SSH socket
ssh.connect((SSHD_HOST, SSHD_PORT))
# Send service ticket to ssh server
ssh.send(st_info)
Figure 5.14: Sending Service Ticket
# Recieve single sign-on reply
shell_name = ssh.recv(1024)
if shell_name != ‘fail’:
results = ‘’
while results != ‘exit_confirm’:
command = raw_input(shell_name)
ssh.send(command)
results = ssh.recv(1024)
if results != ‘exit_confirm’:
print results
Figure 5.15: Secure Shell Client Simulation
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Figure 5.16: Flowchart of a SSH server thread simulation
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def request_shared_key():
# Get shared secure ticket from KDC (kdc_sim.py)
krb_socket = socket.socket (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
krb_socket.connect((KRB_HOST, KRB_PORT))
message = ‘’
message += ‘req_sk;’
message += (SERVICE_NAME + ‘;’)
message += (DOMAIN + ‘;’)
message += (IP)
krb_socket.send(message) # Send service information to KDC
share_key = krb_socket.recv(1024) # Recieve reply from KDC
# Check the replied message
if share_key != ‘fail’:
f = open(SERVICE_NAME + ‘.key’, ’w’) # Save the shared key
f.write(share_key)
f.close
krb_socket.close
return True
else:
krb_socket.close
return False
Figure 5.17: SSH Server Simulation Requesting Shared Key
f = open(‘ssh.key’, ‘r’) # open ssh.key to read the key
key_info = f.readline()
key_info_list = key_info.split(‘;’, 3)
Figure 5.18: SSH Server Simulation Opens the Shared Key
of the shared key if its service name (e.g. ssh), domain name (e.g. home.virtual.vm)
and IP address (e.g. 192.168.1.59) were found in Kerberos’s service database.
The SSH server simulation will not listen for connection requests until it obtained
a shared key from the Kerberos system simulation. This helps to debug the system during
implementation. If the service was not registered in the Kerberos service database, the
simulation will not start.
Secure shell (SSH) server simulation uses thread (ClientThread) to manage con-
nections from multiple clients. It receives the end-user’s service ticket
(st_info = self.conn.recv(1024)). It extracts the username and SHA-512 hash key
from the service ticket (username, st = st_info.split(‘;’, 1)). It then extracts the
SHA-512 hash key from the shared key that was issued by the Kerberos server simulation
(Figure 5.18).
The SSH server simulation will accept the SSH connection if the two SHA-512 hash
keys match. It then directs the end-users to their dedicated directories and will create
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if key_info_list[3] == st:
# Create home directory for the user if the directory doesn’t exist
if os.path.exists(username):
os.chdir(username)
else:
os.makedirs(username)
os.chdir(username)
print "Authenticated the service ticket"
self.conn.send(‘home remote shell~>’) # Send the SSH server’s shell name to the SSH client.
Figure 5.19: Create Dedicated Directories
dedicated directories for first time to the end-users (Figure 5.19).
Ubuntu Desktop and SSH Protocol Summary
The goals of the simulations using the Ubuntu desktop and SSH protocol are to demon-
strate local network single sign-on and federated single sign-on. The Ubuntu desktop
relies on Kerberos single sign-on for providing authentication and ticket granting ticket.
The SSH client and server runs on top of Ubuntu desktop simulation. They communicate
with each other using network sockets. The SSH server can authenticate the end-user
by verifying their service tickets instead of verifying their credentials (i.e. usernames
and passwords). Currently the end-user can access remote Ubuntu desktops (in the local
domain) via SSH protocol in a single sign-on fashion.
5.3.3 SAML based Federated Single Sign-on System Simulation
Web-based Authentication System
The simulation of web-based authentication system provides the foundation for imple-
menting IDAWA. It’s the identity provider end of the SAML based federated single sign-on
system. The other end is the simulation of the web-based service/application.
The authentication system currently authenticates end-users by verifying their
usernames and passwords, and it creates identity assertion for end-users that have been
successfully authenticated. It provides the foundation for implementing IDAWA, which
will accept Kerberos service tickets as means of authentication.
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The identity assertion message is a strip down version of the real world assertion
message. It includes the end-users’ username, password, domain name, role and the result
of authentication (e.g. true or false). The value “true” means the end-user has been suc-
cessfully authenticated; the value “false” means the end-user hasn’t been authenticated.
It does not include any SAML tags (e.g. <SAML>) or SAML attributes.
The web-based authentication system uses session variables to transfer variables
between web pages. Session variables are named as following: $_SESSION["username"],
$_SESSION["idp_domain"], $_SESSION["role"] and $_SESSION["authenticated"]. They
are created and maintained by placing session_start(); at the start of the PHP script.
Session variables can not be accessed by web pages in different domains. For
example, the session variables in home.virtual.vm can not be accessed by web pages in
foreign.virtual.vm. My implementation addresses this problem using web browser cookies.
Web cookies are stored on end-users’ web browsers. They are accessible by web
pages. An end-user’s identity assertion message can be stored as cookies on the web
browsers. These cookies can be accessed by web-based service/application simulation
when the end-users are accessing the web-based service/applications (using web browsers).
The use of web cookie is based on the assumption that the web-browsers support
the use of web cookies. The web-browsers can save and read the web cookies. If they do
not support web cookies, then the implementation will not work.
PHP script, setcookie("user", $value, time()+3600, "/", "virtual.vm"),
is used to create cookies. Variable “user” is the name of the cookie. \$value contains
the value of the cookie; it contains the session variables such as username, role, domain
name and authentication result (Figure 5.20). time()+3600 is the life time of the cookie.
“/” indicates the cookie is place at the root of the domain and accessible by sub domains.
virtual.vm is the root of the domain. This allows domain “foreign.virtual.vm” to access
the identity assertion messages.
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$value = $_SESSION["username"].‘;’.$_SESSION["role"]. \
‘;’.$_SESSION["idp_domain"].‘;’.$_SESSION["authenticated"];
Figure 5.20: Creating Cookie Value
$user = $_COOKIE["user"];
$user_list = explode(";", $user);
$username = $user_list[0]; //$_SESSION["username"];
$role = $user_list[1]; //$_SESSION["role"];
$domain = $user_list[2]; //$_SESSION["idp_domain"];
Figure 5.21: Extracting Cookie Value
Web-based Service/Application
The goal of the simulation of web-based service/application is to display successfully
federated single sign-on. It displays that end-users have been successfully authenticated
by the simulation of web-based authentication systems, and it displays the roles of the
end-users. It does not provide any real world functionalities (e.g. web-based document
editor).
The simulation of web-based service/application extracts the variables (e.g. user-
name, role, domain) from the cookies. These variables compose an end-user’s identity
assertion message (Figure 5.21).
The simulation of web-based service/application reads an end-user’s identity as-
sertion message (i.e. user “chen”). It determines the permission of the end-user according
to the federation’s policy (described in section 4.2.2). It then displays the end-user’s data
(Figure 5.22).
SAML based FSSO Simulation Summary
The SAML based federated single sign-on system provides the foundation for implement-
ing the IDAWA. The identity provider side (i.e. web-based authentication system) does
not support Kerberos single sign-on system, and it authenticates end-users by verifying
their usernames and passwords. It provides identity assertions, which are strip down ver-
sion of real world assertions for end-users that have been successfully authenticated. The
service provider side (i.e. web-based services/applications) displays the end-users’ data
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Figure 5.22: Web-based Service/Application Simulation in Domain foreign.virtual.vm
(e.g. username, domain name, role); it does not provide any real world functionaries.
5.4 Implementation of the New Simplified FSSO Sys-
tem
This section presents the implementation of the new simplified federated single sign-on
(FSSO) system. The implementation incorporates the simulations of Kerberos single sign-
on system and SAML based federated single sign-on system, and it includes two major
components: Authentication Infrastructure Integration Program (AIIP) and Integration
of Desktop Authentication and Web-based Authentication (IDAWA).
This section also presents the modifications to the SSH client simulations. These
modifications allow the SSH clients to request Kerberos tickets (from foreign domains)
through AIIP instead of requesting ticket from foreign domains’ Kerberos single sign-on
systems.
5.4.1 Implementation of AIIP
The “Authentication Infrastructure Integration Program” (AIIP) follows the federation’s
policies, which state, “End-users from any domain can access any services/applications
in the other domains.” It includes the implementation of two ends: the identity provider
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end (AIIPi) and service provider end (AIIPs). A network domain may have both ends;
however, a single federated single sign-on process involves two ends that are in separate
domains.
Both ends work together to extend end-users’ desktop authentication sessions (i.e.
Kerberos authentication sessions) from one domain to other domains. The AIIPi uses
Kerberos system simulation for authentication, and it creates/sends identity assertions to
the service provider. The AIIPs receives and verifies the identity assertions; it acquires
Kerberos tickets in the same domains and sends them to the AIIPi.
The AIIPi chooses AIIPs based on end-users’ requests. For example, an end-user
entered the command “ssh foreign.virtual.vm”, then the AIIPi will communicate with
the AIIPs in the domain that has the domain name “foreign.virtual.vm”.
AIIP (Identity Provider End)
The identity provider end (AIIPi) of the AIIP has two main functions: authenticating
end-users using Kerberos server simulation and creating/sending identity assertions for
the authenticated end-users. It authenticates end-users by verifying their Kerberos service
tickets, and it creates identity assertions and sends them to the service provider end of
the AIIP (Figure 5.23).
The AIIPi uses a network socket to listen for federated single sign-on requests
from the end-users’ non-web based user agents (e.g. SSH client). It requires two more
sockets for connecting to Kerberos server simulation and the service provider end of AIIP
(AIIPs).
In order to support Kerberos single sign-on, the AIIPi requests a shared key from
the Kerberos server simulation (Figure 5.24). It receives and stores the shared key. The
shared key is later used to verify end-users’ service tickets.
The AIIPi listens for requests from end-users. It accepts connections from end-
users’ SSH clients and accepts their service tickets (Figure 5.25). It also reads the contents
in the shared key (saml-aai-kerberos.key). It compares the SHA-512 hash key (i.e.
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Figure 5.23: Flowchart of identity provider end of AIIP
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def request_shared_key():
# Get shared secure ticket from Kerberos system simulation
krb_socket = socket.socket (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
krb_socket.connect((KRB_HOST, KRB_PORT))
message = ’’
message += ’req_sk;’
message += (SERVICE_NAME +’;’)
message += (DOMAIN + ’;’)
message += (IP)
krb_socket.send(message) # Send service information to Kerberos system
share_key = krb_socket.recv(1024) # Recieve reply from Kerberos system
# Check the replied message
if share_key != ’fail’:
f = open(SERVICE_NAME + ’.key’, ’w’) # Save the shared key
f.write(share_key)
f.close
krb_socket.close
return True
else:
krb_socket.close
return False
Figure 5.24: Requesting Shared Key
f = open(‘saml-aai-kerberos.key’, ‘r’) # open ssh.key to read the key
key_info = f.readline()
key_info_list = key_info.split(‘;’, 3)
st_info = self.conn.recv(1024)
username, st = st_info.split(‘;’, 1)
Figure 5.25: Accepting Service Tickets
key_info_list[3]) in the shared key with the hash key (st) in the service ticket. The
end-users are authenticated if the two SHA-512 hash keys match.
The AIIPi requests authenticated end-users’ data (e.g. username, role and domain
name). It receives the data and appends them to the end of FSSO request message
(‘req_st_foreign;’) to create identity assertion messages. It then sends the identity
assertion messages to the service provider end of AIIP (Figure 5.26). The data (in the
identity assertion messages) are necessary for the other domains to determine the level of
access of the end-users to their services/applications.
The firewalls between the two domains have been set to support the web-based
services; therefore, port 80 was opened. The AIIPs can use any network port for commu-
nication. They can be reconfigured to suit the network domains’ firewall rules. In this
case, the AIIPs chose port 80 as the communication port so that network domains (that
already opened port 80) don’t need to re-configure their firewall rules. In addition, AIIP’s
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def send_assertion(self, assertion):
foreign_sak_socket = socket.socket (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
foreign_sak_socket.connect((self.FOREIGN_MIDDLE_HOST, self.FOREIGN_MIDDLE_PORT))
message = ‘req_st_foreign;’
message += assertion # Create identity assertion message
print message
foreign_sak_socket.send(message) # Send identity assertion message
# Wait for the reply from the service provider end of AIIP
foreign_st_info = foreign_sak_socket.recv(1024)
foreign_sak_socket.close()
return foreign_st_info
Figure 5.26: Creating/Sending Identity Assertion to the Service Provider End of AIIP
sockets are in the Transport Layer of the OSI stack. It will not interfere with HTTP since
HTTP is in Application Layer of the Internet model.
The AIIPi will receive the Kerberos service tickets (created in the other domains)
from the AIIPs if the identity assertion messages were accepted. It then passes these
service tickets to the end-users’ user agents (e.g. SSH clients). The end-users can then
use the service tickets to access non-web based services in the other domains without
requiring re-authentication.
AIIP (Service Provider)
The service provider end of AIIP (AIIPs) listens for new connections from the AIIPis,
and it manages clients using thread (ClientThread). Each thread manages each request
from the identity provider end of AIIP (Figure 5.27). It verifies the identity assertions
(req_st_foreign) and extracts the end-users’ data (e.g. username, role/permission and
domain name) from the identity assertion messages (Figure 5.28).
The AIIPs maps an end-user’s identity to an identity in the AIIPs’s domain
(Figure 5.29). It reads the end-users database (in the same domain) and looks for a
matching username (if user[0].text == username). It reads the rest of the credentials
(username, password, domain name, permission) if it found a matching username. The
provisioned credentials will be used for acquiring Kerberos tickets.
The AIIPs requests the Kerberos ticket granting ticket on behalf of the end-
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Figure 5.27: Flowchart of a thread of service provider end of AIIP
foreign_user_info = self.conn.recv(1024) # Receive identity assertion message
foreign_user_info_list = foreign_user_info.split(‘;’, 1) # Extract request message
if foreign_user_info_list[0] == ‘req_st_foreign’:
detailed_info = foreign_user_info_list[1].split(‘;’, 2) # Extract end-user data
username = detailed_info[0]
domain = detailed_info[1]
permission = detailed_info[2]
Figure 5.28: Extracting End-user’s Identity Information from Identity Assertion Message
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def exist_user(self, username, domain, permission):
try:
tree = xml.parse("foreignuserdatabase.xml") # Parse the user database
doc = tree.getroot() # Get the root node
# Check the username and password
for user in doc:
if user[0].text == username:
self.user = user
provisioned_user_info = ‘’
provisioned_user_info += user[0].text
provisioned_user_info += ‘;’
provisioned_user_info += user[1].text
provisioned_user_info += ‘;’
provisioned_user_info += user[2].text
provisioned_user_info += ‘;’
provisioned_user_info += user[3].text
return provisioned_user_info
Figure 5.29: Mapping End-user’s Credentials
# Requesting TGT on behalf of the end-user
def s4u2selfuser(self, provisioned_user_info):
detailed_info = provisioned_user_info.split(‘;’, 3)
username = detailed_info[0]
password = detailed_info[1]
krb_socket = socket.socket (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) # Kerberos socket
krb_socket.connect((KRB_HOST, KRB_PORT))
message = ‘req_tgt;’
message += username
message += ‘;’
message += password
# Request TGT
krb_socket.send(message)
tgt_info = krb_socket.recv(1024)
krb_socket.close()
return tgt_info
Figure 5.30: Requesting Ticket Granting Ticket on behalf of End-user
user similar to SAML-AAI/Kerberos (Figure 5.30). It acquires ticket granting ticket
(req_tgt’) by sending the provisioned credential (i.e. username and password) to the
Kerberos server (in the same domain as the AIIPs). It then stores the ticket granting
ticket in the programme’s memory.
The AIIPs will request the Kerberos service ticket on behalf of the end-user after
acquiring the ticket granting ticket (Figure 5.31). It sends the request for service ticket
(req_st) and the ticket granting ticket (tgt_info) to the Kerberos server simulation. It
then sends the name of the service (e.g. ‘‘ssh’’) to the Kerberos server simulation if
the ticket granting ticket was successfully verified. It will send the acquired service ticket
to the AIIPi in the other domains.
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def s4u2selfproxy(self, tgt_info):
krb_socket = socket.socket (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) # Kerberos socket
krb_socket.connect((KRB_HOST, KRB_PORT)) # Create connection
message = ’req_st;’
message += tgt_info
krb_socket.send(message)
answer = krb_socket.recv(1024)
if answer == ’fail’:
krb_socket.close()
return ’fail’
else:
krb_socket.send(’ssh’)
st_info = krb_socket.recv(1024)
krb_socket.close()
return st_info
Figure 5.31: Requesting Service Ticket Ticket on behalf of End-user
Modifying SSH Client
The SSH client simulation requires extra functions to use the AIIP for federated single
sign-on. Instead of accessing Kerberos single sign-on systems in the foreign domains, the
SSH client requests a service ticket from the AIIPi when an end-user issued a command to
access a SSH server in a separate domain. This is achieved using the following functions:
requesting service tickets to access the identity provider end of AIIP (AIIPi), authenticat-
ing (to the AIIPi) using the service ticket, accepting Kerberos tickets that were created
in the other domains, and using the service ticket (created in the other domains) to access
SSH servers in the other domains.
The SSH client will receive a service ticket for accessing a SSH server in a separate
domain. It then can use the service ticket to access the SSH server in the separate
domains (Figure 5.32). It sends the service ticket (st_info) to the SSH server (in the
other domain). The SSH server should successfully verify the service ticket since it was
created by the Kerberos server in the same domain (as the SSH server). A connection
will be established between the client and server.
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def ssh_foreign(st_info):
ssh_foreign_socket = socket.socket (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) # SSH socket
ssh_foreign_socket.connect((FOREIGN_SSHD_HOST, FOREIGN_SSHD_PORT))
# Send service ticket to ssh server
ssh_foreign_socket.send(st_info)
# Recieve single sign-on reply
shell_name = ssh_foreign_socket.recv(1024)
if shell_name != ‘fail’:
results = ‘’
while results != ‘exit_confirm’:
command = raw_input(shell_name)
ssh_foreign_socket.send(command)
results = ssh_foreign_socket.recv(1024)
if results != ‘exit_confirm’:
print results
else:
pass
else:
print ‘Service ticket failed to authenticate’
ssh_foreign_socket.close()
print ‘exiting...’
Figure 5.32: Accessing SSH Servers in Separate Domains
Implementation of AIIP Summary
The AIIP has two ends, identity provider end and service provider end. Both end follows
the federated single sign-on policies that were established between network domains. A
non-web based federated single sign-on involves an identity provider end in one domain
and a service provider end in another domain. The identity provider end authenticates
end-users using their service tickets, and it creates/sends identity assertions to the service
provider end. The service provider (in another domain) acquires Kerberos tickets in the
same domain and passes them back to the identity provider end, which will proceed to
pass them to the end-users. End-users can use these service tickets to access non-web
based services in the foreign domains. The two end of AIIP work together to bridge the
Kerberos single sign-on sessions in different domains. The SSH clients were added new
functions in order to request a service ticket from AIIP when end-users attempted to
access SSH server in foreign domains.
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5.4.2 Implementation of IDAWA
IDAWA is an extension to the web-based authentication system simulation. It allows
end-users to use their Kerberos ticket for authentication (Figure 5.33). It integrates the
desktop authentication session with web-based authentication session; therefore, end-users
do not need to be authenticated again to access web-based services/applications.
IDAWA uses sockets to connect to Kerberos server simulation. It manually obtain
the shared key from the Kerberos server simulation, and it saves the shared key into
session variable $_SESSION["idp_shared_key"] (Figure 5.34).
IDAWA adds the support of Kerberos tickets onto the web-based authentication
system. It allows end-users to upload their Kerberos ticket granting tickets (Figure 5.35).
The ticket granting ticket is named tgt and saved as a file variable ($_FILE["tgt"]).
The IDAWA gets the content of the Kerberos ticket granting ticket using
($tgt = file_get_contents($_FILES["tgt"]["tmp_name"]);). It assigns the value of
the ticket granting ticket to variable $tgt. It then sends the request of service ticket to
the Kerberos server simulation on behalf of the end-user (Figure 5.36).
The IDAWA will continue send the name of the service (e.g. ‘‘idp’’) to the
Kerberos server simulation if $answer showed the authentication was successful. It then
compares the hash key in the service ticket ($service_ticket) with the hash in the shared
key ($idp_shared_key). It will create identity assertion for the end-user if the two hash
keys are a match (Figure 5.37). It allows end-users to continue to access web-based ser-
vices/applications using the identity assertion (i.e. without requiring re-authentication).
5.5 Demonstration of the New Simplified FSSO Sys-
tem
An end-user (in domain Alpha) attempts to access a remote SSH server and the web-
based service/application in domain Beta. The demonstration attempts to show that
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Figure 5.33: Flowchart of IDAWA
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$kerberos_port = 88; // Get the port for the Kerbero service.
$kerberos_ip = "192.168.1.59"; // Get the IP address for the target host.
/* Create a TCP/IP socket. */
$socket = socket_create(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, SOL_TCP);
$connect = socket_connect($socket, $kerberos_ip, $kerberos_port);
$request = "req_sk;";
$request .= "idp".‘;’;
$request .= "home.virtual.vm".‘;’;
$request .= "192.168.1.59".‘;’;
socket_write($socket, $request, strlen($request));
$shared_key = socket_read($socket, 1024);
$_SESSION["idp_shared_key"] = $shared_key;
Figure 5.34: IDAWA Requesting Shared Key
<form action="auth_key.php" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data">
<label for="key">Kerberos TGT:</label>
<input type="file" name="tgt" id="tgt" />
<input type="submit" name="submit" value="Submit" />
</form>
(a) Source Code
(b) Web page
Figure 5.35: Uploading Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket onto IDAWA
$request = "req_st;";
$request .= $tgt;
$reply = ’’;
// Sending service ticket request.
socket_write($socket, $request, strlen($request));
// Recieving response.
$answer = socket_read($socket, 1024);
Figure 5.36: Web-based Authentication System Requests Service Ticket
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// request service ticket
socket_write($socket, "idp", strlen("idp")); //reqest service ticket for idp
$service_ticket = socket_read($socket, 1024);
socket_close($socket);
$idp_shared_key = $_SESSION["idp_shared_key"];
$idp_shared_key_info = explode(";", $idp_shared_key);
if ($idp_shared_key_info[3] == $service_ticket) //compare service ticket and shared key
{
$user_info = explode(";", $tgt);
$_SESSION["username"] = $user_info[0];
$_SESSION["role"] = $user_info[2];
$_SESSION["idp_domain"] = $user_info[4];
// $_SESSION["authenticated"] asserts that the end-user is authenticated
$_SESSION["authenticated"] = true;
}
Figure 5.37: Web-based Authentication System Verifies the Service Ticket
AIIP integrates the Kerberos single sign-on sessions in domain Alpha to domain Beta
and that IDAWA allows the end-user to use the Kerberos ticket (created during desktop
authentication) for web-based authentication.
5.5.1 Demonstration of AIIP
Access the Local Ubuntu Desktop Simulation in Domain Alpha
The end-user attempts to access a desktop system in domain Alpha by entering its user-
name and password at the login prompt (Figure 5.38). Upon successfully verification of
the credentials, the desktop simulation accepts the end-user and present a Linux shell
(i.e. local shell~>). It will also receive a copy of the ticket granting ticket from the
Kerberos single sign-on system in domain Alpha.
Figure 5.38: End-user login the Local Ubuntu desktop simulation in home.virtual.vm (i.e.
domain Alpha)
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Initiate the Remote SSH Server Simulation in Domain Beta
The remote SSH server simulation manually obtains a shared key from the Kerberos single
sign-on system when it’s started (Figure 5.39). It then waits for a connection request (from
SSH clients), and it will remain in this state until receiving a connection request.
Figure 5.39: Start the remote SSH server simulation in domain foreign.virtual.vm (i.e.
domain Beta)
Non-web based Federated Single Sign-on using AIIP
The end-user executes the command “ssh foreign.virtual.vm” in the local Ubuntu desktop
simulation (Figure 5.40). The remote SSH server simulation requests authentication. This
triggers the local Ubuntu desktop simulation to request a service ticket from the identity
provider end of AIIP in domain Alpha.
Figure 5.40: End-user attempts to access the remote SSH server in foreign.virtual.vm (i.e.
domain Beta)
AIIPi first authenticates the end-user by verifying its service ticket. It then cre-
ates/sends an identity assertion to the service provider end of AIIP (AIIPs) in domain
Beta (Figure 5.41). If AIIPs replies with a service ticket (that was created in domain
Beta), AIIPi will pass the acquired Kerberos ticket to the end-user’s SSH client simulation
in domain Alpha.
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Figure 5.41: AIIPi verifies the end-user’s identity and sends an identity assertion to
AIIPs
AIIPs verifies the identity assertion message and acquires a ticket granting ticket
and service ticket on behalf of the end-user (Figure 5.42). It then passes the service ticket
to AIIPi.
Figure 5.42: AIIPs accepts the end-user’s identity assertion and requests ticket granting
ticket and service ticket on behalf of the end-user in domain foreign.virtual.vm
Figure 5.43: The remote Ubuntu desktop simulation accepts the request from the end-user
The end-user uses the service ticket (created in domain Beta) to access the remote
SSH server simulation in domain Beta. The remote SSH server simulation verifies the
end-user’s service ticket, and it accepts the service request (Figure 5.43). The end-user
(in domain Alpha) is granted access to the remote SSH server simulation in domain Beta
CHAPTER 5. PROOF OF CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION 125
Figure 5.44: The end-user is granted access the to remote SSH server in domain for-
eign.virtual.vm
(Figure 5.44).
Demonstration of IDAWA
IDAWA is an extension to web-based authentication systems, and it allows the end-users
to use their Kerberos ticket for as means for authentication. The end-users need to upload
their ticket granting ticket onto the IDAWA during the first web-based federated single
sign-on process (Figure 5.45).
Figure 5.45: Use Kerberos Authentication Method in domain home.virtual.vm (i.e. do-
main Alpha)
The web-based authentication system creates an identity assertion message for the
end-user after IDAWA verified the end-user’s identity (using Kerberos single sign-on).
The identity assertion message includes the end-user’s username, the issue date of the
message, the end-user’s domain and the end-user’s role.
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The end-user accesses the web-based service/application (in domain Beta) with
the identity assertion message. The web-based service/application verifies the identity
assertion and displays the result. The result shows the end-user has been granted access
to the web-based service/application (Figure 5.46).
Figure 5.46: Successful access to web-based service/application in domain for-
eign.virtual.vm
5.6 Summary
This chapter presented the proof of concept implementation of the new simplified fed-
erated single sign-on system. It includes the proof of concept implementations of these
two major components: Authentication Infrastructure Integration Program (AIIP) and
the Integration of Desktop Authentication and Web-based Authentication (IDAWA). The
AIIPs do not require any modifications to network domains’ Kerberos single sign-on sys-
tems and their firewall rules during deployment, and they don’t expose Kerberos single
sign-on systems to the outside world. They facilitate federated single sign-on by acquir-
ing Kerberos service tickets in different network domains and send them to the end-users;
end-users can authenticate using these Kerberos service tickets in different domains. The
IDAWA, which is added to the web-based authentication systems, allows end-users to up-
load their Kerberos ticket. End-users are authenticated using their Kerberos ticket instead
of their credentials. The demonstrations showed that the end-users can acquire Kerberos
tickets after desktop authentication, and the combination of AIIP and IDAWA allows the
end-users to use these Kerberos tickets to access both web-based and non-web based ser-
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vices/applications instead of using their credentials. Therefore, the end-users access desk-
top systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based services/applications
using one authentication process.
A good implementation change is changing from using DOM as the interface
to XML files to using an ElementTree instead. ElementTree was designed to support
Python’s coding style; therefore, the source code is easier to read and debug than using
DOM. Another good practice during the implementation stage is inserting debug mes-
sages into source code in order to track any coding problems (e.g. tracking positions in
loops). s into source code in order to track any coding problems (e.g. tracking positions
in loops).
Chapter 6
Research Evaluation
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the evaluation of the research, in which we use five criteria for
evaluating the new simplified federated single sign-on systems. The first, second and
third criteria were developed as part of this research. The fourth and fifth criteria were
adopted from Painless Security (2010).
The evaluation assumes that a federation has been established between network
domains. It also assumes that network domains employ their own Kerberos single sign-
on systems (i.e. non-web based authentication infrastructures) for managing desktop
authentications, and network domains use SAML based federated single sign-on systems
for web-based federated single sign-on.
The new simplified federated single sign-on (FSSO) includes two major compo-
nents: “Authentication Infrastructure Integration Program” (AIIP) and the “Integration
of Desktop Authentication and Web-based Authentication” (IDAWA). The AIIP bridges
the communications between end-users’ desktop systems (in one domain) and Kerberos
single sign-on systems (in the other domains), and it acquires Kerberos service tickets in
different domains without setting up trust between these Kerberos single sign-on systems.
IDAWA is an extension to web-based authentication systems (i.e. identity provider end of
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SAML based federated single sign-on system), and it supports the use of Kerberos tickets
as means for authentication. The evaluation compares the new simplified federated sin-
gle sign-on system (i.e. the combination of AIIP and IDAWA) with Project Moonshot,
Kerberos Secure Sharing, SASL-SAML and SAML-AAI/Kerberos.
Section 6.2 presents the development of criteria. Section 6.3 evaluates Project
Moonshot, SASL-SAML, Kerberos Secure Sharing, SAML-AAI/Kerberos and the new
simplified federated single sign-on system using the developed criteria. Section 6.5 sum-
maries this chapter.
6.2 Criteria Development
Although this research specified security measures such as TLS and master/slave setup
to address security risks (e.g. man-in-the-middle attack and single point of failure) in
section 4.4.1, the security methods are not the focus of the evaluation. The goals of the
new simplified federated single sign-on system is to provide single sign-on; therefore, the
new criteria focuses on evaluating the usability of the systems. The five criteria are:
1. How many authentication processes are required for an end-user to access a desktop
system (in the same domain as the end-user), a web-based service/application (in a
separate domain) and a non-web based service/application (in a separate domain)?
2. Does the federated single sign-on system modify network domains’ existing non-
web based authentication infrastructures (i.e. Kerberos), or does it deploy a new
authentication infrastructure?
3. Does the system expose network domains’ existing authentication infrastructures to
the outside world?
4. Whether the client needs to talk directly to the authentication infrastructure or
whether the conversation with the authentication infrastructure is tunnelled?
5. How much new development is required?
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6.3 Evaluation using the Developed Criteria
6.3.1 First Criterion
The first criterion examines the number of authentication processes that are required
for an end-user to access a desktop system, web-based service/application and a non-
web based services/application (Table 6.1). This criterion considers the authentication
processes start at desktop authentication (i.e. an end-user walks up to a desktop system
and enters his/her username and password into the login prompt). The end-user and
the desktop system reside in one domain, and the web-based service/application and the
non-web based service/application reside in a separate domain.
This criterion is the key to identify whether a federated single sign-on system can
deliver single sign-on. This is a new criterion that considers desktop authentication as
part of the federated single sign-on process, and it starts from desktop authentication
and counts the number of times that an end-user needs to enter his/her username and
password at a login prompt. An end-user attempts to access both web-based and non-web
based services/application in both local and foreign domains.
The evaluation (using the new criterion) showed that Kerberos Secure Sharing,
Project Moonshot, SASL-SAML and SAML-AAI/Kerberos require more than one authen-
tication process for end-users to access desktop systems, web-based services/applications
and non-web based services/applications. The new simplified FSSO system addresses the
limitation of the existing system by providing true single sign-on for end-users. It allows
end-users to access desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based
services/applications using one authentication process.
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6.3.2 Second Criterion
The second criterion examines whether the federated single sign-on system modifies net-
work domains’ existing non-web based authentication infrastructures (i.e. Kerberos single
sign-on systems) or deploy a new authentication infrastructure (Table 6.2).
This criterion determines the cost of deploying the federated single sign-on system.
The most ideal scenario is the federated single sign-on system can use the existing non-web
based authentication infrastructures without modifying them. In this way, network do-
mains do not need to spend resources on modifying existing authentication infrastructures
or deploying new authentication infrastructures.
A federated single sign-on process involves two ends: an identity provider and
a service provider. The identity provider manages identities and authentications. The
service provider provides computer services/applications. A network domain can be an
identity provider or a service provider in a single federated single sign-on process.
The comparison showed that the simplified federated single sign-on system has
advantages over the existing approach (e.g. KSS, Project Moonshot, SASL-SAML and
SAML-AAI/Kerberos): it uses network domains’ existing authentication infrastructures
(i.e. Kerberos single sign-on systems) for authentication, and it does not modify these
existing authentication infrastructures (i.e. minimum cost of modification). In addition,
it only facilitates federated single sign-on and does not affect the other authentication
processes (e.g. local domain single sign-on).
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Project name Comparison using the first criterion
Kerberos Secure Sharing Kerberos Secure Sharing allows an end-user to access a desktop
system and non-web based services/applications using one au-
thentication process. It does not support web-based federated
single sign-on; therefore, the same end-user needs to be au-
thenticated again (i.e. second authenticate process) to access
web-based services/applications.
Project Moonshot Project Moonshot does not include the desktop authentica-
tion as part of federated single sign-on process, and it does
not support web-based federated single sign-on. An end-user
needs to be authenticated three times to access a desktop sys-
tem, non-web based services/applications, and web-based ser-
vices/applications.
SASL-SAML SASL-SAML does not include the desktop authentication as
part of federated single sign-on process. It supports both web-
based and non-web based federated single sign-on. An end-user
requires two authentication processes: once for desktop au-
thentication, then once for both web-based and non-web based
services/applications.
SAML-AAI/Kerberos SAML-AAI/Kerberos also does not include desktop authenti-
cation as part of the federated single sign-on process. It sup-
ports both web-based and non-web based federated single sign-
on. An end-user also requires two authentication processes:
once for desktop authentication, then once for both web-based
and non-web based services/applications.
The New Simplified
FSSO System
The new simplified FSSO system includes desktop authenti-
cation as part of federated single sign-on process. It supports
both web-based and non-web based federated single sign-on.
An end-user requires one authentication process to access the
desktop system, the web-based service/application and the
non-web based service/application.
Table 6.1: Comparing approaches using the first criterion
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6.3.3 Third Criterion
The third criterion examines whether the system exposes the network domains’ existing
authentication infrastructures (i.e. Kerberos single sign-on systems) to the outside world
(i.e. Internet) (Table 6.3). Authentication infrastructures manage all of the authentication
processes in network domains; therefore, network domains are reluctant to use any system
that will expose their authentication infrastructures to the outside world. The most ideal
scenario is the federated single sign-on system doesn’t expose network domains to the
outside world.
Although the new simplified federated single sign-on system relies on network
domains’ Kerberos single sign-on systems (similar to KSS), it does not expose them to the
outside world (similar to Project Moonshot, SASL-SAML and SAML-AAI/Kerberos). It
is more ideal than KSS since it only exposes AIIPs to the outside world instead of Kerberos
single sign-on systems; therefore, it protects the Kerberos single sign-on systems from been
accessed from the outside world.
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Project name Comparison using the second criterion
Kerberos Secure Sharing Kerberos secure sharing (KSS) requires details (e.g. name, do-
main and network location) of Kerberos single sign-on systems
to be registered in each other’s Kerberos single sign-on sys-
tem records, so that they can directly communicate with each
other.
Project Moonshot Project Moonshot does not modify network domains’ existing
authentication infrastructures. It deploys a separate authenti-
cation infrastructure (at both identity provider end and service
provider end) for non-web based federated single sign-on.
SASL-SAML SASL-SAML does not modify network domains’ existing non-
web based authentication infrastructures. It deploys a separate
authentication infrastructure (at the identity provider end and
the service provider end) for non-web based federated single
sign-on.
SAML-AAI/Kerberos SAML-AAI/Kerberos does not modify network domains’ au-
thentication infrastructures. It incorporates the network do-
mains’ Kerberos single sign-on system at the service provider
end. It deploys a separate authentication infrastructure at the
identity provider end.
A new Simplified FSSO
System
The new simplified FSSO system doesn’t request trust to be
established between the Kerberos single sign-on systems; there-
fore, it does not require any modification to network domains’
existing Kerberos single sign-on systems. It also does not de-
ploy new authentication infrastructure.
Table 6.2: Comparing approaches using the second criterion
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Project name Comparison using the third criterion
Kerberos Secure Sharing Kerberos secure sharing requires network domains to share in-
formation about their Kerberos key distribution centres. It
exposes Kerberos single sign-on systems to the outside world,
so that Kerberos single sign-on systems (in different domains)
can directly communicate with each other.
Project Moonshot Project Moonshot is separate from the existing authentication
infrastructures. It does not expose the existing authentication
infrastructure to the outside world.
SASL-SAML SASL-SAML is separate from the existing authentication in-
frastructures similar to Project Moonshot. It does not expose
the existing authentication infrastructure to the outside world.
SAML-AAI/Kerberos SAML-AAI/Kerberos uses web-based software to communi-
cate with Kerberos single sign-on systems, and the processes
do not go beyond network domains’ boundaries. It does not
exposes network domains’ authentication infrastructures to the
outside world.
A new Simplified FSSO
System
The new simplified FSSO system uses methods that are sim-
ilar to SAML-AAI/Kerberos. It doesn’t require the Kerberos
single sign-on systems (in different domains) to communicate
with each other. It does not expose Kerboers single sign-on
systems to the outside world.
Table 6.3: Comparing approaches using the third criterion
6.3.4 Fourth Criterion
The fourth criterion is whether the client needs to talk directly to the authentication
infrastructure or the conversation with the authentication infrastructure is tunnelled (Ta-
ble 6.4). Network domains usually configure their firewall (i.e. open network port 80) to
support web services. They need to add new firewall rules to support new direct commu-
nications (between different domains). Tunnelling communication can change the ports
CHAPTER 6. RESEARCH EVALUATION 136
that are used by the communications. For example, tunnelling communication can change
different communication protocols to use port 80 for communication. Communications
through opened firewall ports are more desirable to network domains since it does not
require additional firewall configurations.
Although AIIPs directly communicate with each others, they can be configured
to use any network port (e.g. port 80). If firewalls open port 80 to support web-based
services/applications, the new federated single sign-on system can communicate without
adding new rules to the firewalls (similar to Project Moonshot, SASL-SAML and SAML-
AAI/Kerberos). KSS requires network domains to open port 88 on the firewalls in order
for Kerberos single sign-on systems (in different domains) to communicate with the others.
The new simplified FSSO system uses network sockets, which are in the Transport
Layer of the OSI stack. A web-based service uses HTTP, which is in the Application
Layer of the OSI stack. The communication of the new simplified FSSO system will not
interfere with the communication of web-based services/applications.
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6.3.5 Fifth Criterion
The fifth criterion for comparison examines the level of new developments that are re-
quired and how well the mechanism will fit into existing applications (Table 6.5). Less
modification to existing applications means easier to deploy to network domains.
Although the new simplified federated single sign-on system improves upon KSS
(i.e. it facilitates FSSO without modifying and exposing Kerberos single sign-on systems),
the improvements require modifications to clients of non-web based services/applications.
Similar to Project Moonshot and SASL-SAML, the new simplified federated single sign-
on system added extra source code into the clients, so the clients will request Kerberos
ticket from AIIP instead of Kerberos single sign-on systems when end-users attempt to
access non-web based services/applications in other domains. The adoption of the new
simplified federated single sign-on systems requires application providers to re-compile
their software, and it requires network domains to re-deploy these clients.
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Project name Comparison using the fourth criterion
Kerberos Secure Sharing Kerberos secure sharing requires all the Kerberos single sign-on
systems to directly communicate with each other. It requires
the additional port (e.g. port 88) to be opened on network
domains’ firewalls.
Project Moonshot Project Moonshot uses EAP for federated single sign-on. EAP
uses tunnel communication between clients and authentication
infrastructures. It does not require additional configurations
to network domains’ firewalls.
SASL-SAML SASL-SAML uses SAML based federated single sign-on sys-
tem. SAML based federated single sign-on systems use web
communication protocols and ports (e.g. port 80). It does not
require any additional configurations to the firewalls since the
firewalls already support web-based services/applications.
SAML-AAI/Kerberos SAML-AAI/Kerberos uses web-based communication protocol
for communication. It uses SAML based federated single sign-
on system (i.e. web communication protocol) for federated
single sign-on. It does not require any additional configurations
to the firewalls similar to SASL-SAML.
A new Simplified FSSO
System
The new simplified federated single sign-on system uses Au-
thentication Infrastructure Integration Program (AIIP) to
manage non-web based federated single sign-on. AIIP use di-
rect communication, and it can be configured to use any net-
work port (e.g. port 80). It does not require any additional
configurations to firewalls.
Table 6.4: Comparing approaches with the fourth criterion
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Project name Comparison using the fifth criterion
Kerberos Secure Sharing Kerberos secure sharing uses Kerberos as it’s primary authen-
tication system. Kerberos has been established as the predom-
inant single sign-on system (Kerberos support has been built
into Microsoft Windows systems, GNU/Linux and Mac OS X).
Existing applications don’t need to be modified to use KSS.
Project Moonshot Project Moonshot proposes to modify the existing user agents
to use EAP for federated single sign-on. This means all non-
web based applications creators needs to modify their existing
user agents.
SASL-SAML SASL-SAML is similar to Project Moonshot. It modifies the
existing user agents to communicate with a web-based identity
provider through SASL.
SAML-AAI/Kerberos SAML-AAI/Kerberos requires the creation of new web-based
applications to access non-web based service applications.
A new Simplified FSSO
System
The new simplified federated single sign-on system added
extra functionalities to existing clients of non-web based
services/applications, so the clients can request Kerberos
tickets from AIIP (instead of Kerberos single sign-on sys-
tems) when end-users attempt to access non-web based ser-
vices/applications in other domains.
Table 6.5: Comparing approaches with the fifth criterion
6.4 Comparison Overview
This section presents the comparison overview using the same five evaluation criteria
(Table 6.6). It compares new simplified federated single sign-on system with Kerberos
secure sharing (KSS), Project Moonshot, SASL-SAML and SAML-AAI/Kerberos.
The new simplified federated single sign-on (FSSO) system is the only system
that supports desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based ser-
vices/applications (according to the evaluation). This system can deliver single sign-on
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for end-users to access desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web
based services/applications according to the evaluation. The other approaches (e.g. KSS,
Project Moonshot, SASL-SAML and SAML-AAI/Kerbers) require more than one authen-
tication processes for an end-users to access diverse computer services/applications.
Although the new simplified single sign-on system uses network domains’ existing
Kerberos single sign-on systems similar to KSS, it improves upon KSS by requesting
Kerberos tickets from Kerberos single sign-on systems (in different network domains)
without setting up trust between these Kerberos single sign-on systems. The trust is
established between the AIIPs; therefore, the existing Kerberos single sign-on systems are
not modified and not exposed to the outside world. The system also does not require new
modifications to network domains’ firewall rules.
The new simplified single sign-on system, however, requires new modifications to
user agents (i.e. clients) of non-web based services/applications. An extra model was
added to the user agents, and it allows the user agents to acquire Kerberos tickets (that
were created in foreign network domains) via the new simplified federated single sign-on
system when end-users requested non-web based services/applications in foreign network
domains. This system requires active support from application creators and network
domains (similar to Project Moonshot, SASL-SAML and SAML-AAI/Kerberos). This is
discussed in section 7.4.
Security attacks such as replaying attack, eaves dropping and man in the middle
attacks can be used to compromise the communications between AIIPs and federations.
These security attacks can also compromises the the digital signatures (i.e. hash strings)
that were used for authenticating end-users in the single sign-on processes. Replay attack
allows the attackers to use the authentication information that were previously used for
authenticating end-users, eaves dropping can steal the end-users’ identity assertion in-
formation when they are transferred between federations, and man-in-the-middle attack
allows the attackers to inject arbitrary messages between two end points (e.g. two AIIPs)
or steal authentication messages.
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The new simplified FSSO system requires additional security protocols (e.g. times-
tamping, TLS protocol and digital certificate) before the new simplified FSSO system
can be deployed into universities/institutions (e.g. DIT, UCD and Trinity college). Tim-
stamping limits the life span of Kerberos tickets and identity assertion messages; therefore,
it limits the risk of replay attacks. TLS protocol use asymmetric encryption and sym-
metric encyrption to encrypt the transferred messages. The attackers can not read the
encrypted messages (e.g. authentication messages and identity assertions); therefore, TLS
reduces the risks of eaves dropping. Digital certificates (e.g. X.509) can be used to pre-
vent spoofing attacks (e.g man-in-the-middle) between the AIIPs (AIIP-AIIP and AIIP
to end-users) and communication between federations.
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Evaluation Criteria Keberos Se-
cure Sharing
(KSS)
Project
Moonshot
SASL-SAML SAML-
AAI/Kerberos
New Simpli-
fied FSSO
System
Support of desktop
system, web-based
services/applications
and non-web based
services/applications
Numbers of authentica-
tion processes (includ-
ing desktop authentica-
tion) for accessing two
(web-based and non-web
based) applications
Two Three Two Two One
Modifications to existing
non-web based authenti-
cation infrastructure or
deploying new authenti-
cation infrastructure
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Exposing existing au-
thentication infrastruc-
ture to the outside
world
Yes No No No No
Modifications to firewall
rules
Yes No No No No
Modifications to ex-
isting computer ser-
vices/applications
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 6.6: Comparison of the New Simplified FSSO System with Existing Approaches
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6.5 Summary
This chapter used five criteria to evaluate the new simplified federated single sign-on
(FSSO) system (i.e. the combination of AIIP and IDAWA). The evaluation shows that the
new simplified FSSO system addresses the limitation of existing FSSO systems. The end-
users, who use the new simplified FSSO system, can access desktop systems, web-based
services/applications and non-web based services/applications using one authentication
process. In addition, the new system is simpler to deploy than other existing approaches:
it can incorporate network domains’ existing non-web based authentication infrastructures
(i.e. Kerberos single sign-on systems) without requiring additional modifications to them,
and it does not require modifications to network domains’ firewall rules.
Chapter 7
Discussion and Conclusion
7.1 Introduction
This research found that current federated single sign-on (FSSO) systems (e.g. Project
Moonshot, SASL-SAML, Kerberos Secure Sharing and SAML-AAI/Kerberos) do not al-
low end-users to access desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web
based services/applications (in multiple domains) using one authentication process.
The current FSSO systems partially incorporates the authentication systems of
desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based services/applications
(Figure 7.1): Project Moonshot supports non-web based services/applications. Keberos
secure sharing (KSS) supports desktop systems and non-web based services/applications.
SASL-SAML and SAML-AAI/Kerberos support both web-based and non-web based ser-
vices/applications. The limitations of existing FSSO systems mean end-users need to go
through multiple authentication systems in order to access these services.
This research developed a new simplified FSSO system that incorporates the au-
thentication systems of desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web
based services/applications. The system includes the developments of two major compo-
nents: an “Authentication Infrastructure Integration Program” (AIIP) and an “Integra-
tion of Desktop Authentication and Web-based Authentication” (IDAWA).
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Figure 7.1: Existing FSSO systems overview
The Authentication Infrastructure Integration Program (AIIP) incorporates the
authentication systems of desktop systems and non-web based services/applications. The
AIIPs (in different network domains) bridge communications between end-users’ desktop
systems in one domain and Kerberos single sign-on systems in the other domains. They fa-
cilitate non-web based FSSO by seamlessly acquiring Kerberos tickets in different domains
for the end-users (that have been authenticated by Kerberos single sign-on systems) in one
domain, so that the end-users can proceed to access non-web based services/applications
in different domains using these tickets (instead of requiring re-authentication).
The Integration of Desktop Authentication and Web-based Authentication (IDAWA)
incorporates the authentication systems of desktop systems and web-based services/applic-
ations. The IDAWA is an extension to the web-based authentication system (of SAML
based federated single sign-on system). It allows end-users to use their Kerberos ticket as
means of authentication (instead of their credentials); therefore, the end-users (who had
gained access to desktop systems) can access web-based services/applications (in multiple
domains) without requiring re-authentication.
The new simplified federated single sign-on system (i.e. the combination of AIIP
and IDAWA) allows end-users to access desktop systems, web-based services/applications
and non-web based services/applications using one authentication process; however, it’s
open for security attacks such as man-in-the-middle attack and single point of failure. To
address the security risks, this research has specified the following security measures:
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• The AIIPs use Transport Layer Security (TLS) (Dierks & Rescorla, 2008) to de-
fend against man-in-the-middle attack. TLS uses asymmetric cryptography for key
exchange and symmetric encryption for confidentiality, and message authentication
codes for message integrity. It can secure the communication between the AIIPs in
different domains.
• Each domain should have a primary AIIP system and multiple secondary AIIPs in
order to defend against a single point of failure. If the primary AIIP has failed, the
secondary AIIPs can take over the non-web based federated single sign-on processes.
7.2 Contributions
Contribution 1
The major contribution of this research is the development of the new simplified FSSO
system. The new system addresses the limitation of exiting FSSO systems – they do not in-
corporate the authentication systems of desktop systems, web-based services/applications
and non-web based services/applications. The two major components (of the new sim-
plified FSSO system) are the “Authentication Infrastructure Integration Program” (AIIP)
and the “Integration of Desktop Authentication and Web-based Authentication” (IDAWA).
By combining AIIP and IDAWA, the new simplified FSSO system allows the end-users to
access desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based services/appli-
cations using one authentication process.
• The AIIP acquires Kerberos tickets (for end-users who have been authenticated
by a Kerberos single sign-on system in one domain) from Kerberos single sign-
on systems in different network domains without establishing trust between these
Kerberos single sign-on systems.
• The IDAWA is an extension to the web-based authentication system (i.e. web
portal), and it authenticates end-users by verifying their Kerberos tickets.
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Contribution 2
The research has developed three new evaluation criteria (in addition to the two existing
criteria) to compare the new simplified FSSO system with known FSSO systems (e.g.
Project Moonshot, Kerberos secure sharing, SASL-SAML and SAML-AAI/Kerberos).
These criteria determine which FSSO system can deliver true single sign-on (i.e. allowing
end-users to access desktop systems, web-based services/applications and non-web based
services/applications using one authentication process). They also determine which FSSO
system requires the least active support and commitment from network domains and has
lower risk to be compromised by attackers from the outside world (i.e. the Internet).
7.3 Critical Review
The work (i.e. the new simplified FSSO system) presented in this thesis is a step towards
achieving true single sign-on. The primary advantage of the new simplified FSSO system
is that it allows end-users to access a desktop system, web-based services/applications
and non-web based services/applications using one authentication process. For example,
the end-users (who have gained accesses to desktop systems in DIT) can proceed to
access IEEE Xplore Digital Library and remote Linux systems in Trinity college without
requiring re-authentication. Any universities and institutions can use the new simplified
FSSO system to provide true single sign-on for their students and staffs.
Although the design of AIIP (i.e. a component of the new simplified FSSO system)
draws extensively from Kerberos secure sharing (KSS) and SAML-AAI/Kerberos, the
AIIP has the following advantages over KSS and SAML-AAI/Kerberos. The AIIP can
be deployed into universities/institutions (e.g. DIT, UCD and Trinity college) without
requiring modifications to their existing Kerberos single sign-on systems and firewall rules.
Therefore, the universities/institutions can provide single sign-on without exposing their
Kerberos single sign-on systems to each other, without setting up trust between their
Kerberos single sign-on systems, and without modifying their firewall rules.
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The new simplified FSSO system currently requires modifications to the user agents
of non-web based services/applications unlike KSS. This is because the user agents request
Kerberos tickets from Kerberos single sign-on systems in the foreign domains (instead of
the AIIPs); therefore, an extra model was added to the user agents. The extra model
allows the user agents to request Kerberos tickets from the AIIPs when end-users are
requesting non-web based services/applications in foreign network domains. Additional
functionalities that allow the AIIPs to masquerade as Kerberos single sign-on systems (in
the foreign network domains) are required to address this limitation. By masquerading as
Kerberos single sign-on systems (in foreign network domains), the user agents will assume
that they are requesting Kerberos tickets from Kerberos single sign-on systems, but they
are in fact requesting them from the AIIPs.
As described in the research evaluation (section 6.4), the new simplified FSSO sys-
tem requires additional security protocols (e.g. timestamping, TLS protocol and digital
certificate) before it can be deployed into universities/institutions (e.g. DIT, UCD and
Trinity college). Timstamping limits the life span of Kerberos tickets and identity asser-
tion messages; therefore, it limits the risk of replay attacks. TLS protocol use asymmetric
encryption and symmetric encyrption to reduces man-in-the-middle attacks, while digi-
tal certificates (e.g. X.509) can be used to prevent spoofing attacks between the AIIPs
(AIIP-AIIP and AIIP to end-users) and communication between federations.
7.4 Future Work
Future work includes adding security protocols (e.g. timestamping, TLS protocol) to the
new simplified FSSO system in order to deploy it into the real world (e.g. DIT, UCD).
Time-stamping can limit the valid period of the FSSO requests (e.g. identity assertion
messages) and replies (e.g. Kerberos tickets); therefore, it can reduce the threat of replay
attacks on the AIIPs. The TLS protocol provides symmetric encryption, asymmetric en-
cryption and message authentication code (Freier et al., 2011). The symmetric encryption
technology ensures the privacy of the communications between the AIIPs by encryption
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the messages with a shared key. The asymmetric encryption technology ensures the
security of the symmetric encryption technology’s key exchange process. The message
authentication code ensures the integrity and authenticity of the messages (Krawczyk
et al., 1997). The use of time-stamping and TLS protocol can increase the security of the
message exchanges between the AIIPs.
Additional functionalities that allow the AIIPs (in the home network domain) to
masquerade as Kerberos single sign-on systems (in the foreign network domains) may be
included in the future work. These functionalities can reduce the modifications to the
user agents by allowing the AIIP (in the same domain as the user agents) to pretend to
be Kerberos single sign-on systems in the foreign network domains, so that user agents
will send requests (e.g. requesting ticket granting tickets and service tickets) to the AIIP
instead of the Kerberos single sign-on systems.
Microsoft Windows operating systems use authentication systems (i.e. Active Di-
rectory) that were developed based on the Kerberos single sign-on systems; therefore,
Windows supports Kerberos single sign-on. Although the proof of concept implementa-
tion of the new simplified federated single sign-on system was developed using the Linux
based environment, the concept should be able to support Window-based operating sys-
tems. One of the future work topics in this area will involve experiments of the concept
of the new simplified federated single sign-on system in a Windows environment, and
determine the requirements for allowing the AIIP to support the single sign-on protocols
of Active Directory.
User-centric federated single sign-on (UFed SSO) was proposed by Suriadi et al.
(2009), and it allows end-users to manage their own identity information instead of net-
work domains’ identity providers. This approach allows end-users to have an effective
control over the use and management of their private identification information. One of
the future work topics in this area will involve incorporating the concept of UFed SSO into
the new simplified FSSO system. By allowing the end-users to provide identity assertions
for themselves, the new simplified FSSO system can be used by end-users that do not
belong to specified network domains.
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Appendix A
System Specifications
A.1 Hardware Specifications
The new simplified federated single sign-on system was developed on a Sun Ultra 40M2
Workstation and HP-ProBook 6550b (Table A.1). The hardware specifications are as
following:
In addition to the hardware that were used for developing the system, the vir-
tual machines’ control centre and the XenCenter 6.0, was installed on a Dell Optiplex
GX260. Hardware includes 2.40 GHz Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU, 512 MB RAM, In-
tel(R) PRO/1000MT Network Connection and Intel(R) 82845G Graphic Controller. A
Linksys Wireless-N Gigabit Router (WRT350N) is used to create network connections
between applications and machines. The router issues IP addresses to all of the machines
(physical and virtual). The router has the IP address 192.168.1.1. The IP address range
for all the machines is from 192.168.1.10 to 192.168.1.254.
A.2 Software Specifications
.
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Sun Ultra 40M2 Work-
station
HP-ProBook 6550b
Processor 2 x Dual-Core AMD
Opteron (tm) Processor
2222
4 x Intel(R) Core(TM) i3
CPU M 370
Memory 4096MB 2048MB
Hard disk drive
(HDD)
128GB 300GB
Networking 2 x Bridge: nVidia Corpo-
ration MCP55 Ethernet • Intel Corporation
82577LC Gigabit
Network Connection
• Broadcom Corpo-
ration BCM4313
802.11b/g/n Wireless
LAN Controller
Video nVidia Corporation G92
[Quadro FX 3700]
Intel Corporation Core Pro-
cessor Integrated Graphics
Controller
Table A.1: IBM eServer Hardware Overview.
DNS server Beta Virtual Server
Processor Single CPU Single CPU
Memory 512MB 1024MB
Hard disk drive
(HDD)
8GB 8GB
Networking Bridge Connection Bridge Connection
Operating Sys-
tem
Ubuntu Server 10.04.4 LTS
32bit
Ubuntu Server 10.04.4 LTS
32bit
Key Software
• bind9
• openssh-server
• apache2
• php5
• openssh-server
• python2.6
IP Address 192.168.1.24 192.168.1.17
Domain Name hostmaster.virtual.vm foreign.virtual.vm
MAC CA:78:6B:9B:9B:5D B2:CD:11:E2:F5:87
Table A.2: Sun Ultra 40M2 Workstation Configuration.
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DNS server
Operating Sys-
tem
Xubuntu Desktop 12.04
LTS 64bit
Key Software
• apache2
• php5
• python2.7
IP Address 192.168.1.59
Domain Name home.virtual.vm
MAC AC:81:12:43:58:7C
Table A.3: HP Probook 6550b Software Configuration.
Figure A.1: Dell Optiplex GX260 configuration.
Appendix B
List of Security Technologies
B.1 The Simple Authentication and Security Layer
(SASL)
The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)(Melnikov & Zeilenga, 2006) is a
framework for providing authentication and data security services in connection-oriented
protocols via replaceable mechanisms. SASL provides a structured interface between
protocols and mechanisms. SASL also provides a protocol for securing subsequent protocol
exchanges within a data security layer. The data security layer can provide data integrity,
data confidentiality, and other services.
SASL’s design is intended to allow new protocols to reuse existing mechanisms
without requiring redesign of the mechanisms and allows existing protocols to make use
of new mechanisms without redesign of protocols.
SASL is conceptually a framework that provides an abstraction layer between
protocols and mechanisms as illustrated in figure B.1.
It is through the interfaces of this abstraction layer that the framework allows any
protocol to utilize any mechanism. While this layer does generally hide the particulars of
protocols from mechanisms and the particulars of mechanisms from protocols, this layer
does not generally hide the particulars of mechanisms from protocol implementations.
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Figure B.1: SASL is conceptually a framework that provides an abstraction layer between
protocols and mechanisms(Melnikov & Zeilenga, 2006)
For example, different mechanisms require different information to operate, some of them
use password-based authentication, some of then require realm information, others make
use of Kerberos tickets, certificates, etc. Also, in order to perform authorization, server
implementations generally have to implement identity mapping between authentication
identities, whose form is mechanism specific, and authorization identities, whose form is
application protocol specific.
B.2 Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface (GSS-API)
Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API)(Linn, 2000) Version
2 provides security services to callers in a generic fashion, supportable with a range of
underlying mechanisms and technologies and hence allowing source-level portability of
applications to different environments. This specification defines GSS-API services and
primitives at a level independent of underlying mechanism and programming language
environment, and is to be complemented by other, related specifications:
• documents defining specific parameter bindings for particular language environ-
ments.
• documents defining token formats, protocols, and procedures to be implemented in
order to realize GSS-API services atop particular security mechanisms.
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B.3 Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)(Aboba et al., 2004) is an authentication frame-
work which supports multiple authentication methods. EAP typically runs directly over
data link layers such as Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) or IEEE 802, without requiring
IP. EAP provides its own support for duplicate elimination and retransmission, but is
reliant on lower layer ordering guarantees. Fragmentation is not supported within EAP
itself; however, individual EAP methods may support this.
EAP may be used on dedicated links, as well as switched circuits, and wired as
well as wireless links. To date, EAP has been implemented with hosts and routers that
connect via switched circuits or dial-up lines using PPP(Simpson, 1994). It has also been
implemented with switches and access points using IEEE 802(IEE, b). EAP encapsulation
on IEEE 802 wired media is described in IEE (a), and encapsulation on IEEE wireless
LANs in IEE (c).
One of the advantages of the EAP architecture is its flexibility. EAP is used
to select a specific authentication mechanism, typically after the authenticator requests
more information in order to determine the specific authentication method to be used.
Rather than requiring the authenticator to be updated to support each new authentication
method, EAP permits the use of a backend authentication server, which may implement
some or all authentication methods, with the authenticator acting as a pass-through for
some or all methods and peers(Aboba et al., 2004).
B.4 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP for short) is a directory service for man-
aging the user accounts. It’s an open Internet standard, produced by the Internet Engi-
neering Task Force (IETF), the same body that gave the world TCP/IP as an alternative
to the heavy weight DAP.(Howes & Smith, 1997) LDAP is a directory service, it is a
simplified database, and should not be confused with traditional database. Typically,
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it does not have the database mechanisms to support transactions (Wang et al., 2008).
Directories are flexible, secure, and can be personalized. Another defining characteristic
of a directory is that it supports Information Extensibility and Data Distribution(Howes
et al., 2003).
A computer system requires the compatibility to locate certain types of information
easily, efficiently, and quickly. As a directory service, LDAP is reasonably simple, but
provides a wealth of features. It consolidate existing services into a single directory that
can be accessed by it’s clients from various vendors, such as browsers, email clients, and
authentication protocols(Carter, 2003; Howes & Smith, 1997).
In the 1980s, two separate standard bodies, International Telegraph and Telephone
Consultative Committee, now know as International Telecommunication Union and In-
ternational Organization for Standardization (ISO) started work on directory services for
their own purpose. Eventually, the two independent directory specification efforts merged
into one effort, and X.500 standard was approved in late 1988 then published in 1990.
Like other open standards, LDAP have many implementations, from property software,
to open source software such as openLDAPHowes & Smith (1997); Voglmaier (2003).
B.5 ActiveDirectory
“Active Directory (AD) is a Microsoft network operating system (NOS) directory, built
on top of Windows 2000 and Windows Server 2003”(Richards et al., 2006; Hunter, 2006).
In 1997 Microsoft release Active Directory beta as the basis of their domain management
function(Richards et al., 2006). The initial version was released with Windows 2000 and
Windows Server 2003(Hunter, 2006). Active Directory proved to be one of the most
important new features in Windows NT 5.0. It greatly simplify the tasks involved in
administering and managing large Windows NT networks, and it improves the user’s
interaction with networked resources.
The Active Directory is also the underpinning key that enables the improvements
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in distributed system security. All resources are stored and managed on the network,
it’s easy for developers, administrators, and users to find and use. It provides a single,
consistent, open set of interfaces for performing common administrative tasks, such as
adding new users, managing printers, and locating resources throughout the distributed
computing environment(Solomon, 1998).
The Active Directory data model has many concepts similar to X.500. It includes
many other useful features such as group policies and delegation of authority that are
useful in a diverse and distributed environment such as the university (Blezard & Marceau,
2002). The directory holds objects that represent various resources, which are described
by attributes. The universe of objects that can be stored in the directory is defined in
the schema. For each object class, the schema defines what attributes an instance of the
class must have, what additional attributes it can have, and what object class can be a
parent of the current object class. This directory structure has the following key features:
• Flexible hierarchical structure.
• Efficient multimaster replication.
• Granular security delegation.
• Extensible storage of new classes of objects and properties.
• Interoperability through Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) version 3
support.
• Scalability to millions of objects per store.
• Integrated dynamic Domain Name System (DNS) server.
• A programmable class store.
Programmability and extensibility are significant capabilities of the Active Direc-
tory. Developers and administrators deal with a single set of directory service interfaces,
regardless of the installed directory service(s). The programming interface, called the
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Active Directory Service Interfaces (ADSI), is accessible by any language. You can also
access the directory using the LDAP API. The LDAP C API, defined in RFC 1823, is a
lower-level interface available to C programmers.
To establish if the functionality offered by Active Directory above NT domains is
actually required we need to examine the functionality required in our environment for
the support of Windows clients. Some simple questions need to be asked. These questions
include the following:
• Is there anything that Microsoft Active Directory domain offers that is not read-
ily available from Samba based Windows NT or (if supported in Samba) Active
Directory domains?
• Is there anything that we need that Samba cannot provide to Windows clients?
One requirement that is clear is the availability of simple tools for use by systems
administrators for the management of existing user accounts and resources. From experi-
ence, it is the opinion of the author that the majority of regular sysadmin tasks should be
performed by scripting rather than by hand. This is the best way to ensure the consistent
application of settings, options and parameters to user and resource accounts. It is true
that in certain cases, individual settings may need to be verified and for this reason a
graphical tool is desirable. However, in many cases, the assertion or re-assertion of such
settings using a pre-defined script tool is an equally sure guarantee that the required set-
tings have been applied. The different opinions on this matter are somewhat analogous to
the difference between a stateful and a stateless approach to system management. While
one system administrator might prefer to check the settings applied to a user or resource
and to do this with a graphical tool, another might ignore the current state and simply
apply a pre-defined state using a configuration script.
Appendix C
Life-cycles of the New Simplified
FSSO System
C.1 Life-cycle 1: end-user accesses non-web base ap-
plication
1. An end-user in domain Alpha logs onto a desktop system by entering his/her cre-
dentials. The credentials are then sent to the KSSO system (Kα).
2. Kα sends a search query to the end-user database (Dα) in domain Alpha.
3. Dα returns the results to Kα.
4. Kα creates and sends a ticket granting ticket (TGTα) to the desktop system if the
credentials were found in Dα. The TGTα will be stored on the end-user’s desktop
system.
5. The end-user requests access to SSH server (SSHs) in domain Beta. The end-user
accesses SSHs using SSH client (SSHc).
6. SSHs requests the end-user to be authenticated.
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7. SSHc extracts TGTα from the desktop system and presents it to Kα. It then
requests a service ticket (STα) from Kα to access AIIPi.
8. Kα will create and send STα to SSHc if TGTα was successfully verified. STα will
be stored on end-user’s desktop system as well.
9. SSHc extracts STα from the desktop system and sends it to AIIPi.
10. AIIPi will create an identity assertion message for the end-user and and send it to
AIIPs if STα was successfully verified.
11. AIIPs accepts the end-user’s identity assertion based on the federation’s policies.
It creates a database query that searches for end-user’s provisioned identity (Iβ) in
domain Beta. It sends the query to Dβ.
12. Dβ executes the query and returns Iβ to AIIPs.
13. AIIPs uses the Iβ to authenticate to the KSSO system in domain Beta (Kβ) on
behalf of the end-user.
14. Kβ sends a search query to Dβ.
15. Dβ finds the credentials and return the result to Kβ since Iβ exists in Dβ.
16. Kβ creates and sends a ticket granting ticket (TGTβ) to AIIPs. TGTβ will be stored
in AIIPs.
17. AIIPs sends TGTβ to Kβ and requests service ticket (STβ) for SSHs on behalf of
the end-user.
18. Kβ verifies TGTβ and sends STβ to AIIPs.
19. AIIPs sends STβ to AIIPi.
20. AIIPi sends STβ to SSHc.
21. SSHc presents STβ to SSHs.
22. SSHs verifies STβ and accepts the request from SSHc.
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C.2 Life-cycle 2: end-user accesses web-based appli-
cation
1. The end-user uses a web browser (WBα) to request a web-based service (WSAγ) in
domain Beta.
2. WSAγ requests WBα to identify the domain that the end-user belongs to. WSAγ
then re-directs WBα back the web-based authentication system (WBASα) in do-
main Alpha.
3. WBα will retrieve the TGT from the desktop and send it to Kα.
4. Kα verifies the TGT and sends the service ticket ST to WBα.
5. WBα sends the ST to WBASα. IDAWA (in the WBASα) accepts the ST.
6. After IDAWA successfully verified the ST,WBASα then creates an identity assertion
message and passes it back to WBα.
7. WBα sends the identity assertion message to WSAγ.
8. WSAγ sends a search query to the end-user database in domain Beta (Dγ).
9. Dγ returns the result to WSAγ.
10. WSAγ grants the request from WBα.
C.3 Life-cycles 3: an end-user in domain Beta access
domain Alpha
1. An end-user in domain Beta logs onto a desktop system by entering his/her creden-
tials. The credentials will be sent to the Kerberos server (Kβ) in domain Beta.
2. Kβ sends a search query to the end-user database (Dβ) in domain Alpha.
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3. Dβ returns the results to Kβ.
4. Kβ will create and send a ticket granting ticket (TGTβ) to the desktop system if the
credentials were found in Dβ. The TGTβ will be stored on the end-user’s desktop
system, and it’s accessible by WBβ and SSHc.
5. The end-user uses WBβ to request WSAα in domain Alpha.
6. WSAα requests WBβ to identify the domain that the end-user belongs to. WSAα
then re-directs WBβ back the web-based authentication system (WBASβ) in do-
main Beta.
7. WBβ will retrieve the TGT from the desktop and send it to Kβ.
8. Kβ verifies the TGT and sends the service ticket ST to WBβ.
9. WBβ sends the ST to WBASβ. IDAWA (in the WBASβ) accepts the ST.
10. After IDAWA successfully verified the ST,WBASβ then creates an identity assertion
message and passes it back to WBβ.
11. WBβ sends the identity assertion message to WSAα.
12. WSAα sends a search query to the end-user database in domain Beta (Dα).
13. Dα returns the result to WBASβ.
14. WSAα grants the request from WBβ.
15. The end-user proceeds to request access to SSH server (SSHs) in domain Alpha.
The end-user accesses SSHs with SSH client (SSHc).
16. SSHs sends a authentication request to SSHc.
17. SSHc extras TGTβ from the desktop system and presents it to Kβ. It then requests
another service ticket (STβ) from Kβ to access AIIPi.
18. Kβ will create and send STβ to SSHc if TGTβ was successfully verified. STβ will
be stored on end-user’s desktop system as well.
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19. SSHc extracts STβ from the desktop system and sends it to AIIPi.
20. AIIPi will create an identity assertion message for the end-user and and send it to
AIIPs if STβ was successfully verified.
21. AIIPs accepts the end-user’s identity assertion based on the federation’s policies.
It creates a database query that searches for end-user’s provisioned identity (Iα) in
domain Alpha. It sends the query to Dα.
22. Dα executes the query and returns Iα to AIIPs.
23. AIIPs uses the Iα to authenticate to the KDC in domain Beta (Kα) on behalf of
the end-user.
24. Kα sends a search query to Dα.
25. Dα finds the credentials and return the result to Kα since Iα exists in Dα.
26. Kα creates and sends a ticket granting ticket (TGTα) to AIIPs. TGTα will be stored
in AIIPs.
27. AIIPs sends TGTα to Kα and requests service ticket (STα) for SSHs on behalf of
the end-user.
28. Kα verifies TGTα and sends STα to AIIPs.
29. AIIPs sends STα to AIIPi.
30. AIIPi sends STα to SSHc.
31. SSHc presents STα to SSHs.
32. SSHs supports Kα. It verifies STα and accepts the request from SSHc.
